*
JUSTICE McDADE delivered the opinion of the court:
In June 2007 the circuit court of Peoria County granted defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims to recover damages for sexual abuse on the grounds plaintiffs’ claims were timebarred. The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motions to reconsider in October 2007.
For the reasons that follow, we reverse:
BACKGROUND
In this consolidated appeal, plaintiffs all allege to have been the victims of separate and numerous acts of sexual abuse while in their minority by the individual defendants, all Catholic priests.
Plaintiffs allege that at the times the abuse occurred, defendants, the Catholic Diocese of Peoria, and Bishop Daniel Jenky, individually, and the defendants’ respective churches, employed or controlled the individual defendants as parish priests.
Plaintiffs all filed their complaints after reaching majority and after reaching age 30. Defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds the statute of repose applicable to plaintiffs’ causes of action expired prior to plaintiffs’ filing of their complaints.
Defendants premised their motions to dismiss on the statute of repose contained in the 1991 Childhood Sexual Abuse Act (Act) (735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (West 1992)).
Plaintiffs responded subsequent amendments to the Act removed the statute of repose and should apply retroactively to their claims. Plaintiffs argued that the 1991 Act did not create a vested right in defendants to the expiration of the statute of repose, and, therefore, plaintiffs’ causes of action are not barred. Plaintiffs also responded that if the statute of repose did apply, their complaints are not barred under the doctrine of equitable tolling. In June 2007 the circuit court of Peoria County granted defendants’ motions to dismiss.
The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motions to reconsider in October 2007. This appeal followed.
“We review the trial court's ruling on the section 2-619 [(735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2006))] motion to dismiss based on the statute of repose de novo.” Trogi v. Diabri & Vicari, P.C., 362 Ill. App. 3d 93, 95, 839 N.E. 2d 553, 555 (2005).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs argue that the circuit court of Peoria County erred in finding that defendants possess a vested right to the protection of the statute of repose. Under the version of the Act in effect 12 years after plaintiffs reached majority, the trial court concluded, plaintiffs’ causes of action terminated but none had filed suit. Defendants argued they obtained a vested right to the expiration of plaintiffs’ causes of action. At that time the statute read, in pertinent part as follows:
"(b) [I]n no event may an action for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse be commenced more than 12 years after the date on which the person abused attains the age of 18 years." 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (West 1992). Plaintiffs filed suit in April 2006, more than 12 years after reaching majority, and after reaching age 30.
Before April 2006, the Illinois legislature amended section 13-202.2 of the CASS to remove the statute of repose and to clarify the application of the discovery rule in cases of childhood sexual abuse. Following the first amendment to the Act, the statute read, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(b) An action for damages for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse must be commenced within 2 years of the date the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and that the injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse. * * *
(e) This Section applies to actions pending on the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1990 as well as to actions commenced on or after that date. The changes made by this amendatory Act of 1993 shall apply only to actions commenced on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1993." 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (West 1994) (hereinafter 1993 Act).
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court should have applied the version of the Act in effect when they actually filed their complaints against defendants. Plaintiffs argue this includes proceeding without a period of repose. When plaintiffs filed, the statute read, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action for damages for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse must be commenced within 10 years of the date the limitation period begins to run under subsection (d) or within 5 years of the date the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover both
(i) that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and
(ii) that the injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse. The fact that the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred is not, by itself, sufficient to start the discovery period under this subsection (b). Knowledge of the abuse does not constitute discovery of the injury or the causal relationship between any later-discovered injury and the abuse.
* * *
(e) This Section applies to actions pending on the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1990 as well as to actions commenced on or after that date. The changes made by this amendatory Act of 1993 shall apply only to actions commenced on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1993. The changes made by this amendatory Act of the 93rd General Assembly apply to actions pending on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 93rd General Assembly as well as actions commenced on or after that date.” 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b) (West 2006).
Plaintiffs argue that under the current version of the statute the limitations period had not run because none of the plaintiffs had discovered, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, that the acts of childhood sexual abuse occurred or that the abuse caused their injuries. Plaintiffs also argue that the statute of repose does not apply to their causes of action, despite the fact that the statute of repose was in effect twelve years after they reached majority, because the legislature intended the 2003 amendments to the Act to apply retroactively to all claims of childhood sexual abuse.
1. Were Plaintiffs’ Causes of Action Terminated Under the 1991 Statute of Repose following the 1994 Amendment Eliminating the Statute of Repose?
A threshold matter is whether the 2003 amendments to the Act apply retroactively to plaintiffs’ claims. In Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill. 2d 603, 609, 727 N.E.2d 217, 221 (2000), our supreme court explicitly held that, in that case:
"The plaintiff correctly concede[d] that if her action was already barred under the common law discovery rule prior to the enactment of section 13-202.2, then the new statute could not have revived it; under Illinois law, the barring of an action by a statute of limitations creates a vested right in favor of the defendant, and the action cannot later be revived. [Citations.]" Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 609, 727 N.E.2d at 221.
However, Clay is not dispositive of the instant appeal because the court stated explicitly that it had "no occasion here to consider the operation or application of section 13-202.2." Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 609, 727 N.E.2d at 221. Any reliance defendants place on Clay is misplaced.
Plaintiffs cite the Fifth District’s recent decision in Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d 782, 885N.E.2d 376 (2008), in support of their claim that a cause of action survives where the legislature repeals a statute of repose that would have terminated the cause of action.
Plaintiffs argue the repeal revives the cause of action if the language in the amended statute evinces a legislative intent for retroactive application of the amended statute and if retroactive application of the amended statute is not prohibited by the constitution. Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 789, 885 N.E.2d at 382.
The Dallas court did not directly address the issue of retroactivity as it applies to statutes of repose. The specific question in Dallas was whether, “[i]f the current statute of limitations is retroactive, *** the plaintiff’s lawsuit should *** have been dismissed.” (Emphasis added.) Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 788, 885 N.E.2d at 381.
The Dallas court’s holding is limited to a determination of the “retroactivity of the 2003 limitations amendment.” (Emphasis added.) Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 794, 885 N.E.2d at 386.
Nonetheless, the Dallas court’s opinion is instructive. We find that the same analysis it applied to determine that the change in the statute of limitations applied retroactively applies in this case. Applying that analysis, we find that the legislature intended its repeal of the statute of repose to apply retroactively.
The Dallas court recognized that if either the 1991 limitations period or the 1991 period of repose applied to the plaintiff’s case, then either “could serve to bar the plaintiff’s suit.”
Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 788, 885 N.E.2d at 381. The court rejected the defendants’ argument that “the 2003 amendment to the child sexual abuse statute of limitations cannot serve to revive an expired claim and that the legislature never intended for a retroactive application of the statute for the purpose of reviving an expired claim.” Diocese of Dallas, 379Ill. App. 3d at 788, 885 N.E.2d at 381.
The court ultimately found that the legislature intended the amendment to the statute of limitations to apply retroactively and that “retroactive application does not unreasonably infringe on any due process right.” Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 794, 885 N.E.2d at 385.
The Dallas court recognized that dicta in a “First District decision interpreting similar language relating to the application of the 1990 amendment” repealing the statute of repose and changing the limitations period reached the opposite conclusion. Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App.3d at 791, 885 N.E.2d at 383.
However, the Fifth District found that the defendants’ reliance on the First District’s rationale was unpersuasive, because the First District reached that conclusion “seven years before the supreme court decided Commonwealth Edison Co. [v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27, 749 N.E.2d 964 (2001)]."
Before Commonwealth Edison Co. courts followed the vested rights approach to retroactivity, under which legislative intent was largely ignored. Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 792, 885 N.E.2d at 384, quoting Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 34, 749N.E.2d at 969.
Despite stating that it recognizes that "the Illinois Supreme Court *** rejected the vested rights approach to retroactivity and adopted the legislative intent approach," the dissent nonetheless finds that the supreme court’s decision in M.E.H. v. L.H., 177 Ill. 2d207, 685 N.E.2d 335 (1997), is controlling. Slip op. at __. In M.E.H., our supreme court found that the defendant in that case had a vested right to invoke the limitations period as a defense and that the defendant’s vested right could not be taken away without offending the due process protections of the state’s constitution. M.E.H. 177 Ill. 2d at 214-15, 685 N.E.2d at 339.
We reject the dissent’s implication that under the supreme court’s decision in M.E.H. "taking away the right to invoke the statute of repose as a defense to a cause of action is" in and of itself, "constitutionally prohibited." Slip op. at ___.
We find that the M.E.H. court reached its conclusion based on the existence of a vested right. The court reached its decision only after first concluding that “once a statute of limitations has expired, the defendant has a vested right to invoke the bar of the limitations period as a defense to a cause of action.
That right cannot be taken away by the legislature without offending the due process protections of our state’s constitution.” M.E.H., 177 Ill. 2d at 214-15,68 N.E.2d at 339-40.
In Commonwealth Edison Co., the supreme court formally adopted “the Landgraf approach” to assess the retroactivity of a legislative amendment. Now, under Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 128 L. Ed.2d 229, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994), courts “first determine if the legislature expressed its intent relative to retroactivity. If the legislature’s intent is clear, we must give effect to that intent unless constitutional principles otherwise prohibit the application.”
Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 789, 885 N.E.2d at 382, citing Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 38, 749 N.E.2d at 971. The M.E.H. court did not find a general constitutional prohibition against the legislature’s judgment to eliminate a statute of repose. The sole basis for the supreme court’s holding in M.E.H. was the existence of what was then a vested right. Our supreme court has flatly rejected the "vested rights" approach and clearly established an alternate mode of inquiry for determining the retroactive impact of a legislative change that this court must employ on a case-by-case basis. Given the supreme court’s rejection of the vested rights approach we must find that M.E.H. no longer controls the instant appeal.
The Commonwealth Edison Co. court further explained the Landgraf approach as follows:
"A court must consider the nature of a *** measure and the circumstances leading to its adoption before the court may determine "that its retroactive application is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation."‘ [Citation].
In determining whether a retroactive *** measure is "‘so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation’" [citation], courts have considered such factors as the legislative purpose in enacting the amendment [citations], the length of the period of retroactivity [citations], whether [an individual] reasonably and detrimentally relied on the prior law [citations], and whether the [individual] had adequate notice of the change in the law [citation].
Parenthetically, we note that the United States Supreme Court has strictly limited the scope of inquiry under the due process clause of the federal constitution, holding that neither lack of notice nor detrimental reliance are ‘dispositive’ factors in determining whether the retroactive application of a[n] *** amendment violates the due process clause of the federal constitution. [Citation]." Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 43, 749 N.E.2d at 974.
The Dallas court found that under the old approach (the vested rights approach), “courts automatically found that retroactive changes to statutes of limitations and repose violated due process without balancing the considerations set forth by the Commonwealth Edison Co. Court.” Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 792, 885 N.E.2d at 382. See also Galloway v. Diocese of Springfield in Illinois, 367 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1002, 857N.E.2d 737, 741-42 (2006) (Chapman, J., dissenting)
(“The balancing required by Landgraf and Commonwealth Edison Co. marks a significant shift from the approach to due process concerns under the vested rights analysis. *** Those courts found that retroactive application would run afoul of due process because defendants have a vested right in the affirmative defense afforded them by statutes of limitations or repose, but they did not perform the careful balancing mandated under Landgraf and Commonwealth Edison Co. in arriving at this result”).
Although the supreme court has never directly held that the Landgraf approach applies to determining whether a repeal of a statute of repose applies retroactively and Commonwealth Edison Co. did not specifically apply the Landgraf analysis to a statute of repose, the Landgraf approach requires courts, faced with any legislative amendment, to “balance the reasons for and against a retroactive application and consider whether it is fair to apply the change retroactively.”
Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 885 N.E.2d at 384, citing Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 44-45, 749 N.E.2d at 975. The Landgraf approach’s guarantee of fairness strongly supports its application to determining the retroactive applicability of a repeal of a statute of repose as well as to determinations of whether changes to statutes of limitations apply retroactively. The same questions inherent in determining whether a statute of limitations may apply retroactively, e.g., whether the legislature evinced a desire to fix problems inherent in a previous version of the statute, apply to determining whether a change in a statute of repose apply retroactively. Under Landgraf, the court asks whether the legislature changed (in this case repealed) the statute of repose “to fix the problems inherent in [the] previous” statute of repose. Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 885 N.E.2d at 385, citing Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 44, 749 N.E.2d at 975 (approving the legislative motive to correct previously existing law). Moreover, the supreme court did not limit the Landgraf approach to the specific legislative amendment before it but stated it as a general rule for determining retroactivity.
Applying the Landgraf approach to the amendments to the Act, the Dallas court noted that “[a]ll three amendments the legislature made to the statute were motivated by an increasing awareness of the fact that the type of abuse alleged by the plaintiff is by its very nature subject to long-repressed memories.” Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 885 N.E.2d at 385.
The court found that “[a]mendments to the statute that make it easier to file a claim even many years after the alleged abuse occurs evince a legislative intent to make the procedural limits on claims of this sort better suit the nature of the claim. That desire to fix the problems inherent in a previous version of a statute weighs in favor of a retroactive application.” Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 885 N.E.2d at 385.
Although a statute of repose differs from a statute of lmitations and creates a substantive right unlike the purely procedural statute of limitations (Freeman v. Williamson, 383 Ill. App. 3d 933, 939, 890 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (2008)), the legislature has determined that both statutes of limitations and statutes of repose are procedural tools. The supreme court, in adopting the Landgraf approach in Commonwealth Edison Co. has also made clear that the fact that the statute of repose creates a substantive right is no longer determinative.
If the court were to decline to apply a legislative amendment retroactively, it would detrimentally impact the plaintiff's substantive right to a remedy. If the court does determine that retroactive application is appropriate, it may affect the defendant's substantive right to the protections of a repose period.
Under Landgraf, the issue in determining retroactivity is how the substantive rights of the respective parties--either the defendant's right to procedural protections or the plaintiff's right to redress from the alleged wrongs -- will be affected.
Thus, the question is not whether defendants’ substantive right exists or is impacted. The questions is whether the legislature’s act in changing those rights offends due process. The United States Supreme Court has recognized, and our supreme court has agreed, that, “Legislation has come to supply the dominant means of legal ordering, and circumspection has given way to
greater deference to legislative judgments.” Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 37-38, 749 N.E.2d at 971, quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272-73, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 256-57, 114 S. Ct. at 1500-01.
Despite this recognition, even where the legislature has stated its intent that the change in the law apply etroactively, the court is nonetheless bound to determine if there is any constitutional prohibition to following the legislature’s wishes. See Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 38, 749 N.E.2d at 971 (“Under the Landgraf test, if the legislature has clearly indicated what the temporal reach of an amended statute should be, then, absent a constitutional prohibition, that expression of legislative intent must be given effect” (emphasis added)).
Notably, in this case, the legislature chose to take away childhood sexual abuse defendants’ substantive right to the protection of the statute of repose at the same time it provided additional substantive rights for the alleged victims of childhood sexual abuse. In finding that a retroactive application of the change in the statute of limitations did not present a constitutional problem, the Dallas court noted as follows:
“In all litigation, the passage of time carries a potential for evidentiary problems. Memories fade. Records might be lost or destroyed. Witnesses might have moved away or died. While these issues with time affect both plaintiffs and defendants alike, we must determine whether the defense has relied on this limitations defense in some way. While there might be cases in which a defendant truly takes actions in reliance upon a limitations period, in this factual context we are unable to conceive of such reliance. The difficulties inherent in defending an action like the plaintiff's case do not stem from a retroactive application of the statute; rather, the difficulties flow from the legislature's judgment that placing this burden on defendants is an acceptable price to pay for tailoring procedural limitations to reflect the nature of the type of injury alleged.” Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 793-94, 885 N.E.2d at 385.
The same considerations apply to determining whether applying the repeal of the statute of repose retroactively to plaintiffs’ claims presents a constitutional problem. We must consider whether the defense has relied on the period of repose and whether any potential difficulties in defending plaintiffs’ complaints “stem from a retroactive application of the statute” repealing the period of repose. Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 794, 885 N.E.2d at 385.
In making that determination, we are required to assess whether placing the burden on defendants to defend plaintiffs’ causes of action “is an acceptable price to pay for tailoring procedural limitations to reflect the nature of the type of injury alleged.” Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 794, 885 N.E.2d at 385.
As to the impact of retroactive application of the repeal of the statute of repose on the defendants in this case, Goodman claims that “[a] proper reading of the Commonwealth Edison Co. case demonstrates that some asserted rights *** do not constitute vested rights which present a ‘constitutional prohibition’ to the retroactive application of a statute” while in contrast “certain rights, such as the defense resulting from the barring of a claim, operate to preclude the etroactive application of a statute that wold resurrect such claims.” This is a mischaracterization of the basis of the supreme court’s decision in Commonwealth Edison Co. and a misstatement of the law announced in Landgraf.
The Commonwealth Edison Co. court relied heavily on the school district’s settled expectations in distinguishing retroactive application of the amended statute in that case from retroactive application of the amended statute in Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 712 N.E.2d 298 (1998). It did not hold that interference with what the court previously would have found to be a “vested right” is constitutionally prohibited. Our supreme court only held that a defendant’s “settled expectations” should be considered in deciding whether to apply a legislative amendment retroactively. Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 39, 749 N.E.2d at 971-72, quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269-70, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 254-55, 114 S. Ct. at 1499
("A statute does not operate ‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment [citation] or upsets expectations based in prior law.
Rather, the court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. The conclusion that a particular rule operates ‘retroactively’ comes at the end of a process of judgment concerning the nature and extent of the change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event.
*** However, retroactivity is a matter on which judges tend to have ‘sound...instinct[s],' [citation] and familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations offer sound guidance").
The court has made clear that “[i]n assessing the fairness of a retroactive application, relevant considerations include *** the legislature's motive in enacting the statutory change *** and *** whether the parties detrimentally relied on the prior version of the law.” Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 885 N.E.2d at 384-85, citing Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 44-45, 749 N.E.2d at 975.
Applying that analysis in this case, we find that the legislature’s repeal of the statute of repose “weighs in favor of a retroactive application” of the legislature’s repeal of the statute of repose. See Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 885 N.E.2d at 385, citing Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 44, 749 N.E.2d at 975.
As to the legislature’s motive in enacting the statutory change, the court has already held that a problem inherent in the old version of the statute (including the statute of repose) was that it did not suit the nature of claim. In this case the nature of the claim is one which “by its very nature [is] subject to long-repressed memories.” Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 885 N.E.2d at 385, citing Pedigo v. Pedigo, 292 Ill. App. 3d 831, 839, 686 N.E.2d at 1185(1997).
Any statute of repose applicable to incidents of childhood sexual abuse inherently fails to recognize that the nature of the claim is subject to long-expressed memories. Applying the repeal of the statute of repose retroactively to allow plaintiffs to bring suit long after the alleged abuse occurred would correct that problem and bring the current application of the law into line with the nature of the claim.
Turning to whether any of the parties have detrimentally relied on the prior version of the law, none of the defendants have pointed to any detrimental reliance they have placed on the termination of plaintiffs’ causes of action. Even assuming the defendants are relying on the difficulty in defending against plaintiffs’ claims concerning incidents that occurred long ago, that fact is insufficient to tip the scales against retroactive application of the elimination of the repose period.
The Dallas court’s reasoning is instructive. That court wrote as follows: “In all litigation, the passage of time carries a potential for evidentiary problems. Memories fade. Records might be lost or destroyed. Witnesses might have moved away or died. While these issues with time affect both plaintiffs and defendants alike, we must determine whether the defense has relied on this limitations defense in some way. While there might be cases in which a defendant truly takes actions in reliance upon a limitations period, in this factual context we are unable to conceive of such reliance.
The difficulties inherent in defending an action like the plaintiff's case do not stem from a retroactive application of the statute; rather, the difficulties flow from the legislature's judgment that placing this burden on defendants is an acceptable price to pay for tailoring procedural limitations to reflect the nature of the type of injury alleged.” Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 793-94, 885 N.E.2d at 385.
Both defendants and plaintiffs face similar evidentiary difficulties in this litigation. Defendants have pointed to no actual actions they took in reliance on the repose period. No records were destroyed. No witnesses died. The legislature has determined that it previously failed to recognize that allegations of this type are subject to repressed memories and may require significant time before a plaintiff brings a cause of action. The legislature determined that placing the burden on defendants to defend old claims of this type is generally an acceptable price to pay to allow victims of sexual abuse to seek redress. Defendants point to no unique facts in this case that would make their burden any higher than the burden the legislature chose to place on defendants in this type of case.
Therefore none of defendants’ difficulties in defending this case, had they actually alleged any, would actually result from retroactive application of the statute of repose. Rather, any such difficulties flow naturally from defending claims of this type.
We hold that retroactive application of the legislature’s repeal of the statute of repose is consistent with the legislature’s motive in enacting the statutory change and that the defendants have not relied on the statute of repose to their detriment. The legislature’s repeal of the statute of repose applies to plaintiffs’ claims. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ complaints are not barred by the statute of repose.
2. Are Plaintiffs’ Causes of Action Barred by the Statute of Limitations.
Plaintiffs argue the applicable statute of limitations is that stated in the 2003 statute. Plaintiffs argue that because, when they filed suit, they had not discovered the “causal relationship between any later-discovered injury and the abuse,” the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations. Defendants argue that the statute of limitations in the pre-1993 statute is the applicable statute of limitations, that under that version of the Act the statute of limitations expired when plaintiffs reached majority, and, therefore, that plaintiffs failed to timely file their
complaint.
“When a change in law affects only the remedy or the law of procedure, a right of action will be enforced under the new procedure without regard to whether it accrued before or after the change in the law, and without regard to whether or not suit had been instituted.” Becharas v. Cummings, 292 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 1107-1108, 687 N.E.2d 95, 97, citing In re Pronger, 118 Ill. 2d 512, 522, 517 N.E.2d 1076 (1987), citing Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill. 591, 597, 114 N.E.2d 686 (1953).
We find that the 2003 amendments to the Act apply to plaintiffs’ claims. The legislature evinced an intent that its amendment to the Act apply retroactively. Under Landgraf, the only question remaining for the court is whether retroactive application of the amendment would offend due process. As previously discussed, the retroactive application of the legislature’s repeal of the statute of repose does not offend due process. It would be illogical, therefore, for us to hold that retroactive application of the statute of limitations offends due process.
Finally, retroactive application of the legislature’s amendment to the statute of limitations does not in itself offend due process for the same reasons retroactive application of the repeal of the statute of repose does not offend due process. For all of the foregoing reasons, the statute of limitations in the 2003 Act applies to plaintiffs’ complaints.
The 2003 Act reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
“(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action for damages for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse must be commenced within 10 years of the date the limitation period begins to run under subsection (d) or within 5 years of the date the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover both (i) that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and (ii) that the injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse.
The fact that the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred is not, by itself, sufficient to start the discovery period under this subsection (b). Knowledge of the abuse does not constitute discovery of the injury or the causal relationship between any later-discovered injury and the abuse. ***
(d) The limitation periods under subsection (b) do not begin to run before the person abused attains the age of 18 years ***.” 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b), (d) (West 2006).
Plaintiffs filed their complaints in April 2006. They argue that their complaints allege sufficient facts to raise material questions of fact as to when they discovered that the acts defendants allegedly committed constituted an “act of childhood sexual abuse” and that their injuries were “caused by the childhood sexual abuse.” 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b) (West 2006).
“Normally, the question of when a party knew or should have known both of an injury and its probable wrongful cause is one of fact, unless the facts are undisputed and only one conclusion may be drawn from them. [Citation.] Thus, the court may make such a determination upon a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment so long as such conclusion is the only one to be drawn from plaintiff's pleading. [Citation.]
Strict scrutiny is applied to determine whether the state of the victim's awareness was such that could reasonably have put him on notice of the nexus between the abuse and the injuries. [Citation.]" Benton v. Vonnahmen, 288 Ill. App. 3d 199, 206, 679 N.E.2d 1270, 1275 (1997).
Defendant Goodman argues that plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to toll the statute of limitations using the discovery rule because (a) plaintiffs failed to allege exactly when they discovered their cause of action under the discovery rule and because (b) the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaints demonstrate that they were aware of the alleged misconduct when it occurred and that the alleged misconduct resulted in harm.
It is insufficient that plaintiffs knew or even suspected that defendants alleged misconduct was wrongful and that defendants’ wrongful conduct harmed them. The legislature has clearly provided:
“The fact that the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred is not, by itself, sufficient to start the discovery period under this subsection (b). Knowledge of the abuse does not constitute discovery of the injury or the causal relationship between any later-discovered injury and the abuse.” 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b) (West 2006).
Goodman’s argument fails to address that plaintiffs alleged that they did not discover the causal relationship between the acts (regardless of whether they were wrongful and who was to blame) and their injuries.
Finally, Goodman cites no authority for his proposition that plaintiffs must allege exactly when they discovered their causes of action. He cites D.P. v. M.J.O., 266 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 1034-35, 640 N.E.2d 1323, 1327 (1994), where the court wrote as follows:
“In the instant case however, the pleadings regarding the plaintiffs' belated discovery of the connection between their abuse and their symptoms is sparse and conclusory. Unlike the pleadings in Franke v. Geyer, the pleadings in this case do not provide any basis upon which to evaluate whether the state of the plaintiffs' awareness was sufficient to have put them on notice of that connection at any earlier time.
"Accordingly, the trial court was premature in dismissing counts I and IV pursuant to defendant's fact motion brought under section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure. No extrinsic facts outside of the pleadings were offered by the movant from which any evaluation could have been made as to whether the state of the plaintiffs' awareness was sufficient to put them on notice of the connection between the abuse and the injury.” D.P., 266 Ill. App. 3d at 1034-35, 640 N.E.2d at 1327.
Goodman argues that plaintiffs’ factual allegations are not sufficient to invoke the discovery rule because they do not allege an exact date plaintiffs discovered their causes of action. Nothing in the D.P. court’s language provides that a plaintiff must allege an exact date of “discovery” to invoke the discovery rule.
Goodman does not attack the quality of plaintiffs’ factual allegations. The D.P. court based its decision on the quality of the plaintiff’s allegations in that case, finding them to be “sparse and conclusory.” D.P., 266 Ill. App. 3d at 1034-35, 640 N.E.2d at 1327.
Goodman only attacks the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ factual allegations. We find that under the plain language of the Act plaintiff’ allegations are sufficient to invoke the discovery rule as defined in the Act.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs’ complaints are not barred by the statute of repose found in the Act when plaintiffs reached majority. Plaintiffs’ causes of action are not barred by the statute of limitations because plaintiffs have pled adequate facts to invoke the discovery rule and filed their complaints within the period of limitations following discovering both “(i) that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and (ii) that the injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse.”
Because plaintiffs’ complaints were timely filed, we need not reach plaintiffs’ arguments that equitable principles also serve to toll the statute of limitations or that plaintiffs’ allegations of repressed memories tolled the statute of limitations.
The circuit court of Peoria County’s order granting summary judgment in defendants’ favor is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
O’BRIEN, P.J., concurs.
CARTER, J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent because I believe the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the 1991 statute of repose, which barred anyone over the age of 30 from bringing an action for damages based upon childhood sexual abuse. Each of the plaintiffs here reached the age of 30 before the statute of repose was repealed in 1994. While the majority relies upon one Fifth District case, Doe v. Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d 782, 885 N.E.2d 376 (2008), I agree with the analysis set forth in a case decided by another Fifth District panel, Galloway v. Diocese of Springfield in Illinois, 367 Ill. App. 3d 997, 857 N.E.2d 737 (2006). In Galloway, the court recognized that the Illinois Supreme Court in Commonwealth Edison v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 21, 749 N.E.2d 964 (2001), rejected the vested rights approach to retroactivity and adopted the legislative intent approach of the United States Supreme Court set forth in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 128 L. E. 2d 229, 114 US. Ct. 1483(1994). Galloway 367 Ill. App. 3d at 999-1000, 857 N.E.2d at 739-40. Under this test, “if the legislature has clearly indicated what the temporal reach of an amended statute should be, then, absent a constitutional prohibition, that expression of legislative intent must be given effect.” Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d at 38, 749 N.E.2d at 971 (2001). The supreme court recognized in Commonwealth Edison, however, that cases decided under the vested rights approach to retroactivity remain relevant insofar as they define interests protected from legislative interference by the due process clause. Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d at 47, 749 N.E.2d at 976. Prior to its decision in Commonwealth Edison, the supreme court decided the question at issue in the instant case, namely, whether the 1991 statute of repose applied to the plaintiffs’ action where the time limit was not in effect when the abuse occurred and was repealed before the action was filed. M.E.H. v. L.H., 177 Ill. 2d 207, 685 N.E.2d 335 (1997). The supreme court found that the defendant in that case had a vested right to invoke the limitations period as a defense, and that this right could not be taken away without offending the due process protections of the state’s constitution. M.E.H., 177 Ill. 2d at 214-15, 685 N.E.2d at 339. I agree with the Galloway court that M.E.H. remains good law. Galloway, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 1000, 857 N.E.2d at 740. While Commonwealth Edison “switches the focus of the first step of the retroactivity analysis from ‘vested rights’ to legislative intent, it did not overrule the ruling in M.E.H. that taking away the right to invoke the statute of repose as a defense to a cause of action is constitutionally prohibited.” Galloway, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 1000, 857 N.E.2d at 739. Thus, I would find that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of repose, and cannot be revived. In addition, I would find that the plaintiffs did not bring suit within a reasonable time period after the period of repose went into effect, and that the statute of repose was not tolled by the plaintiffs’ claims that their memories of abuse were suppressed. M.E.H., 177 Ill. 2d at 217, 685 N.E.2d at 340. Finally, I would find that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the period of repose should be tolled due to fraudulent concealment of the abuse by the defendants. See Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill. 2d 603, 613, 727 N.E.2d 217, 223 (2000). Therefore, I would affirm the trial court’s decision granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss, and must dissent.
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IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit:
Plaintiff-Appellant, Peoria County, Illinois,
v.
Defendants-Appellees: Holy Family Catholic Church formerly known as St. Mary’s Catholic Church, and St. Patrick’s Catholic Church and Daniel R. Jenky, Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Peoria, a Religious Corporation, and the Catholic Diocese of Peoria, a Religious Corporation, Defendants.
The Honorable:
Joe R. Vespa, Kevin R. Galley, Judges Presiding
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JUSTICE McDADE delivered the opinion of the court:
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Posted by City of Angels, commentary at City of Angels 5
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Sunday, February 15, 2009
Wednesday, September 24, 2008
Opposition to Fransciscan request to lump Ongoing Public Nuisance case in Santa Barbara with Clergy Cases in LA
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Posted by City of Angels Network
DAVID L. NYE (Bar #67009)
TIMOTHY C. HALE (Bar #184882)
NYE, PEABODY, STIRLING & HALE, LLP
33 West Mission St., Suite 201
Santa Barbara, California 93101
Telephone: (805) 963-2345
Facsimile: (805) 563-5385
Attorneys for Plaintiff
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
County of Los Angeles
COORDINATION PROCEEDING SPECIAL TITLE (RULE 1550(b))
THE CLERGY CASES I
This s Document Relates to:
MARY JONES, an individual,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Franciscan Friars of California, Inc.; Old Mission Santa Barbara; and Does 5 through 100, Inclusive.
Defendants.
Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 1265207
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COORDINATION PROCEEDING
No. 4286
PLAINTIFF OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST TO ADD ON SANTA BARBARA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT CASE NO. 1265207 AND FOR STAY; DECLARATION OF TIMOTHY HALE
California Rule of Court Rule 3.544(b)
Dept.: 308
Coordination Judge: Honorable Emilie H. Elias
Plaintiff Mary Jones submits this Opposition to the Request to Add On Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 1265207 and for Stay filed by Defendant Franciscan Friars of California, Inc. (AFranciscans@) and Defendant Old Mission Santa Barbara (AOld Mission@).
I.
INTRODUCTION
Secrecy is the name of the Franciscans’ deadly game. For decades the Franciscans of the Province of St. Barbara (Province) have concealed and protected Franciscan perpetrators of childhood sexual abuse. Instead of notifying law enforcement and empowering the public to protect their children, the Franciscans’ have sheltered these predators and thereby thrown to the wolves children in the communities throughout the Western United States where the Franciscans conduct their ministry.
Starting at least as early as 1964, and continuing as recently as the abuse committed in Idaho by former Franciscan Louis Ladenburger in 2007, Franciscan corporate practices have created countless victims of childhood sexual abuse, and continue to put an even greater number of today’s children at risk to be sexually assaulted by predators whose identities and propensities are known only to the Franciscans.
No community has suffered greater harm to its children, as a result of Franciscan criminal conduct, than Santa Barbara. Since 1964 the Franciscans have allowed no less than twenty-four (24) Franciscan perpetrators to live in Santa Barbara without any warning to the community. The tragic results have been at least fifty-nine (59) Santa Barbara children sexually assaulted by Franciscans since 1964. These numbers would be outrageous anywhere, but are particularly shocking for a city with a population of approximately 90,000.
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The subject lawsuit seeks a court order ending the secrecy. The Franciscans’ corporate practice is a continuing Public Nuisance.
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The subject lawsuit seeks a court order ending the secrecy. The Franciscans’ corporate practice is a continuing Public Nuisance.
It has stifled the ability of law enforcement to protect the public and prosecute these men by concealing their identities until the criminal statutes of limitations have expired. And it has rendered the civil process the last resort for the public to end these practices. Numerous million dollar settlements have not changed the Franciscans’ approach to managing perpetrators and sacrificing children. Equitable, proactive relief is now sought to force the Franciscans to change their ways.
The subject Request to Add On is consistent with the Franciscans’ policy of secrecy. With twenty-four (24) Franciscan perpetrators and fifty-nine (59) victims since 1964, Santa Barbara is the epicenter in the Province of the harm caused by the Franciscans. As they have done so often with their perpetrators, it comes as no surprise that the Franciscans now seek to transfer this case as far away from Santa Barbara as possible, to a comparably disinterested community in Los Angeles where the lawsuit will most likely be ignored. Justice requires this case be heard in Santa Barbara, the community most severely injured by the Franciscans’ conduct.
II.
BACKGROUND
In 1998, plaintiff’s counsel, Nye, Peabody, Stirling & Hale, LLP, began litigating claims involving the criminal conduct of Franciscan perpetrators and hierarchy in Santa Barbara. Since the inception of that litigation the Franciscans’ defense strategy has been consistent and unwavering: preserve the Franciscans’ secrets by narrowing the focus of each lawsuit filed to one victim and one perpetrator. This strategy’s sole purpose is to keep the public ignorant by shifting attention away from the despicable Franciscan corporate practice of concealing the identities, propensities, and current assignments and/or residences of Franciscan perpetrators.
After nearly eleven years of litigation, the Franciscans’ strategy is failing. As a result of discovery and investigation conducted since 1998, plaintiff’s counsel has identified no less than twenty-five (25) Franciscan perpetrators assigned or in residence in Santa Barbara since 1936, and sixty (60) Santa Barbara children who have been sexually assaulted by these men. This tragedy is the result of the Franciscan corporate practice of concealing perpetrators of childhood sexual abuse.
*************
The subject Request for Add On continues the Franciscans’ battle for secrecy.
***********************
The subject Request for Add On continues the Franciscans’ battle for secrecy. Nothing has changed. Once again they are attempting inappropriately to narrow the focus of a lawsuit to one Franciscan perpetrator, one Franciscan victim. A cursory review of the First Amended Complaint makes clear the true focus of the lawsuit: the threat to all children at any location where the Franciscans continue to conduct their business, and the heightened threat to Santa Barbara children where the Franciscans have dumped so many of their perpetrators without any warning to the community. The Franciscans have created a continuing Public Nuisance.
In a preemptive attack on the Public Nuisance cause of action, the Franciscans describe it as Aan attempt to plead around the >Hightower= bar.@ Although a continuing Public Nuisance cause of action is not subject to Hightower, this theory was not incorporated in plaintiff’s complaint in response to that opinion.
Plaintiff’s counsel does not believe this misstatement was an intentional effort by defense counsel to mislead the Court. Rather, this misstatement is the result of defense counsel’s never having represented the Franciscans, to plaintiff’s counsel’s knowledge, prior to this lawsuit. They apparently are unaware that plaintiff’s counsel first began alleging the Franciscans’ conduct constituted a continuing Public Nuisance in 2000, six years before the Hightower opinion was published.
Plaintiff’s counsel first filed a lawsuit against the Franciscans in 1998, Allen v. Van Handel et al., Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 228296. Early in Allen the Franciscan defense strategy of preserving secrecy by narrowing the focus of each lawsuit to one perpetrator, one victim, became clear. As investigation and discovery continued in Allen the Franciscans’ motivation for pressing this strategy became obvious: the Franciscan hierarchy had allowed the adjoining properties of St. Anthony’s Seminary and the Old Mission Santa Barbara to serve for decades as a feeding ground for Franciscan predators.
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"The Franciscan hierarchy had allowed the adjoining properties of St. Anthony’s Seminary and the Old Mission Santa Barbara to serve for decades as a feeding ground for Franciscan predators."
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It quickly became apparent that thanks in large part to a purportedly independent inquiry in 1994 that actually was a Franciscan-controlled whitewash, the public remained unaware of the continuing threat posed to their children by the Franciscans. Consequently, plaintiff’s counsel began to research theories of liability to counter the Franciscans’ defense strategy of narrowing the focus of each lawsuit, and to end the Franciscans’ dangerous culture of secrecy.
After substantial legal research it became clear the Public Nuisance cause of action was the ideal theory to address and terminate the Franciscans’ criminal conduct. Consequently, leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint alleging the Public Nuisance cause of action was sought in Allen in 2000. Since that date, every complaint plaintiff’s counsel has filed against the Franciscans has included the Public Nuisance cause of action. In short, the Franciscans’ contention the Public Nuisance cause of action was "creatively added" to plaintiff’s complaint Ato plead around the >Hightower= bar@ is patently false.
No court has ever issued an order addressing the viability of the Public Nuisance cause of action against the Franciscans. Shortly after the Fourth Amended Complaint was filed in Allen in 2000, the Franciscans settled that lawsuit before the Santa Barbara court could rule on their demurrer to the Public Nuisance cause of action. Since then, the Franciscans have settled fourteen more claims on behalf of plaintiffs represented by plaintiff’s counsel, all resolved before any court addressed the Public Nuisance cause of action.
III.
ARGUMENT
When civil actions share a common question of fact or law with actions coordinated pursuant to section 404 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff or defendant may request an order from the judge assigned to hear the coordinated actions to coordinate the add-on action. Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. ' 404.4.
Cases considered for coordination must share common questions of fact or law. The determination of whether cases share common questions of fact or law is a "threshold" standard, since it must be satisfied at the outset of the coordination procedure. Keenan v. Superior Court, 111 Cal.App.3d 336, 342 (1980).
A. Plaintiff Concedes Her Lawsuit Meets The Threshold Requirement.
Plaintiff does not dispute that her lawsuit shares some common questions of law and fact with the Clergy Cases. Many of the causes of action utilized in the Master Complaint in the coordination are incorporated into plaintiff’s complaint. And as in the Clergy Cases, Plaintiff alleges that, while a minor, she was sexually abused by a member of the clergy acting under the supervision and control of the Roman Catholic Church.
However, unlike the Clergy Cases, the subject complaint alleges the sexual abuse of plaintiff was a symptom of a problem much bigger than the oversimplification continually argued for by the Franciscans, i.e. the criminal acts of a rogue Franciscan against a solitary victim. In fact, it is here the subject complaint drastically departs from the Master Complaint and alleges detailed facts -
the Franciscan corporate practice of concealing the identities of their pedophilic brethren and transferring them into unexpecting communities - and theories
- the continuing Public Nuisance created by this conduct - that set it apart from any prior pleading ever addressed in this coordination or any other court.
Thus, while the complaint may meet the threshold requirement, the balancing test which is the next and final step in the process merits denying the Request for Add On. Justice will be denied, and children will be placed at risk, if the subject lawsuit is transferred from Santa Barbara to Los Angeles.
B. Promoting The Ends Of Justice - The Balancing Test.
Once the threshold requirement is satisfied, the coordination judge must determine whether coordination will serve to "promote the ends of justice." Code of Civ. Proc. ' 404.1 mandates that the coordination judge take into account:
(1) whether the common question of fact or law is predominating and significant to the litigation;
(2) the convenience of the parties, witnesses, and counsel;
(3) the relative development of the actions and the work product of counsel;
(4) the efficient utilization of judicial facilities and manpower;
(5) the calendar of the courts;
(6) the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments; and
(7) the likelihood of settlement of the action without further litigation should coordination be denied.
Consideration of these factors involves a "weighing and balancing . . . to determine whether coordination . . . best serves the ends of justice in the particular case." Pesses v. Superior Court, 107 Cal.App.3d 117, 126 (1980). Here, denying the request for coordination will best serve the ends of justice.
(1) The Unique Questions Of Fact And Law In Plaintiff's Case Are Predominating And Significant.
Defendants all but concede this point, but attempt to minimize their concession by labeling the Public Nuisance cause of action as a creatively adde "attempt to plead around the >Hightower= bar.
The focus of the First Amended Complaint is the pattern of conduct of the Franciscan hierarchy. The abuse of plaintiff is a symptom of that conduct, and gives her standing as one of the special injuries required for her to prosecute a nuisance claim on behalf of the general public. No court, in the coordination or otherwise, has ever issued an order addressing the viability of the nuisance theory in this context with these facts. These unique questions of fact and law are predominant and significant, and distinguish this lawsuit from any other in the coordination.
Accordingly, this factor weighs against granting the Franciscans’ request.
(2) The Inconvenience To The Parties, Witnesses, And Counsel Merits Denial Of The Petition.
The witnesses, parties, and counsel will be substantially inconvenienced if forced to participate in the coordinated action in Los Angeles.
At the start of this coordinated proceeding in 2003, three of the four law firms representing twenty-five survivors (25) of Franciscan sexual abuse were located in the counties of Los Angeles and Orange. Those three law firms filed lawsuits against the Franciscans in Los Angeles. A number of the twenty-five survivors of Franciscan sexual abuse also lived in the counties of Los Angeles and Orange. And defense counsel for the Franciscans were located in downtown Los Angeles. Thus, prior to the 2006 Franciscan global settlement, there was at least an argument to be made that convenience of the parties, witnesses, and counsel supported coordination of the Franciscan lawsuits.
Now, to plaintiff’s counsel’s knowledge, this is the only currently pending Franciscan lawsuit in California. Plaintiff Mary Jones lives in Northern California in Fairfax. Defendant Old Mission is located in Santa Barbara, with its agent for service of process in Oakland, CA. Defendant Franciscans’ corporate offices are located in Oakland. The Franciscans’ new defense counsel are located in San Francisco. Plaintiff’s counsel are located in Santa Barbara. And most if not all of the key witnesses of which plaintiff’s counsel are aware are located in Santa Barbara or Northern California.
In fact, out of the twenty-eight (28) depositions taken in Franciscan cases litigated in the coordinated proceedings, only four (4) took place in Los Angeles, with the vast majority going forward in and/or far north of Santa Barbara. Accordingly, with the global settlement of the twenty-five Franciscan claims in 2006, the convenience factor now weighs strongly against coordination.
(3) The Status Of Plaintiff’s Lawsuit Case Does Not Support The Franciscans’ Request For Coordination.
Plaintiff’s lawsuit is at a preliminary stage of development. Defendants recently accepted service, and have not yet filed their responsive pleading. Plaintiff was about to serve written discovery when Defendants filed their Request for Add On and Stay. Plaintiff also was about to notice depositions for witnesses whose health and age create the risk their testimony may be lost. In short, the Request for Add
On and Stay has already delayed and slowed the proceedings. Additionally, as the only currently filed Franciscan lawsuit, and the only clergy abuse lawsuit proceeding on a Public Nuisance theory, this lawsuit cannot be consolidated with like cases in a single, efficient forum. To the contrary, there are no like cases to consolidate it with.
(4) Coordination Will Not Foster The Efficient Utilization of Judicial Facilities And Manpower, And Minimize The Burden Upon The Calendar Of The Courts.
Coordination will not result in a more efficient use of judicial resources. This lawsuit shares no common defendants with any other currently filed lawsuits. While there are some common factual allegations with current coordinated lawsuits, none of those coordinated lawsuits are based on allegations and evidence of a continuing Public Nuisance. Accordingly, as there is no risk of multiple courts making disparate rulings related to the continuing Public Nuisance theory, coordination will not result in a more efficient use of judicial resources.
It is also worth noting that courts around the state and outside the coordination continue to rule on the same issues that the Franciscans contend must be decided only by this Court. Five years of coordination have produced a substantial body of caselaw to guide these courts. There will be no duplication of effort if this case proceeds separately. The resolution of this lawsuit can be accomplished just as efficiently by the Santa Barbara trial court.
(5) There Is No Risk Of Duplicative Or Inconsistent Rulings, Orders, And Judgments.
Whereas the remaining coordinated lawsuits have as their foundations childhood sexual abuse by a Roman Catholic Priest or brother, such abuse in Plaintiff’s lawsuit is simply one of the special injuries required for plaintiff to prosecute a Public Nuisance claim on behalf of the general public. The foundation for Plaintiff’s lawsuit is the Franciscan corporate practice of concealing the identities of their pedophilic brethren and transferring them into unsuspecting communities. Plaintiff’s counsel has indisputable evidence of nearly forty-five years of the Franciscans’ corporate practice placing children at risk and creating a continuing Public Nuisance. No other law firm in the history of this coordination has developed such a detailed and continuing history of criminal conduct by a single Roman Catholic entity as a result of ten years investigating and litigating against that entity. As a result, no other firm has filed a lawsuit based on a continuing Public Nuisance. (6) Coordination Will Not Increase The Likelihood Of Settlement Of The Action Without Further Litigation.
Settlement is no more likely in the context of the coordination, and is less likely in Los Angeles than in Santa Barbara.
The parties have already discussed mediation. The Franciscans proposed and plaintiff agreed to mediation dates. Plaintiff even agreed to mediate before, among others, the Honorable Ronald Sabraw, the coordination/trial court judge who presided over Hightower. However, the Franciscans appear to have lost interest in mediation. Adding this case to a coordination proceeding where there are no other Franciscan lawsuits pending will not increase the likelihood of settlement without further litigation. In fact, it likely will decrease the likelihood of settlement.
Numerous communities have seen their children harmed and put at risk by the Franciscan efforts to conceal and cover up their continuing corporate practice of handling their perpetrators. However, with twenty-four Franciscan perpetrators and fifty-nine victims identified since 1964 in a city of approximately 90,000 residents, no city has been harmed more gravely than Santa Barbara. Transferring this case out of Santa Barbara to Los Angeles, a community with a comparably far smaller interest in the Franciscans’ conduct, plays into the Franciscan corporate practice of secrecy by keeping the communities who most need to know in the dark, and will do nothing to enhance the likelihood of settlement. If anything, it will encourage the Franciscans to believe they have once again flown under the radar and will not be held accountable for their conduct in the community where so many of these crimes have been committed. The determination of whether this conduct constitutes a Public Nuisance should be made by a trier of fact from the community in which the conduct occurred.
IV.
DEFENDANTS’ PETITION FOR A STAY OF DISCOVERY SHOULD BE DENIED
Defendants offer no support nor any reason for their request for a discovery stay. While such a stay may have been necessary at one time due to the remarkably high volume of coordinated cases, and the resulting chaos 600+ concurrent discovery disputes could have produced, those high volume days are long since past in Clergy I. Defendants’ sole motivation for requesting the stay is to continue the Franciscans’ ongoing practice of delaying litigation for as long as possible. Obviously, this is not a legitimate basis for requesting a discovery stay.
Additionally, numerous Franciscan witnesses with critical information are aged and infirm, and their testimony is at risk to be lost with each passing day. As a result, Plaintiff will be highly prejudiced by a stay of discovery, particularly where these defendants demand discovery stays while knowing they have and will continue to argue they are incapable of defending themselves due to the loss of key witnesses.
Accordingly, plaintiff requests that Defendants’ request for a discovery stay be denied.
V.
CONCLUSION
Survivors in clergy abuse cases in Northern and Central California are not being deprived of their right to have their lawsuits heard in the communities where the crimes were committed or covered up. Doe v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton et al., Case No. C057895 was filed in Stockton and is currently pending before the Third District Court of Appeal on statute of limitations issues shared by many of the currently coordinated lawsuits. Similarly, Dengler v. Doe 1, Case No. A116907 was filed in Sonoma and was decided last year by the First Appellate District. And Neff v. Doe 1 et al., involving the same plaintiff’s counsel and defense counsel in this lawsuit, is one of a number clergy abuse cases currently pending in Northern California trial courts. All of these matters have been or will be guided by the substantial body of caselaw generated in this coordinated proceeding, with no plaintiff deprived of his or her right to file their lawsuit where most appropriate.
The Santa Barbara Superior Court has presided over Franciscan litigation in the past, and is just as capable as the courts in Northern and Central California of applying the caselaw produced by the coordinated proceeding.
The Archdiocese of Los Angeles is not a defendant in this lawsuit.
The factors that once supported adding prior Franciscan cases to the coordination are no more.
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The Franciscans’ Request for Coordination is an obvious attempt to avoid being held accountable in a court in the community most victimized by the Franciscan conduct set forth in plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.
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The Franciscans’ Request for Coordination is an obvious attempt to avoid being held accountable in a court in the community most victimized by the Franciscan conduct set forth in plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff respectfully requests the Request to Add On Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 1265207 and for Stay be denied.
DATED: September 24, 2008
NYE, PEABODY, STIRLING & HALE LLP
By:
DAVID L. NYE
TIMOTHY C. HALE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
DECLARATION OF TIMOTHY C. HALE
I, Timothy C. Hale, declare as follows:
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice in all of the courts of the State of California, and am one of the attorneys representing plaintiff Mary Jones in the above action. I am a partner in the law firm of Nye, Peabody, Stirling & Hale, LLP (ANPSH@).
2. I have personal knowledge of the statements set forth in this declaration, except for those stated on information and belief, and if called as a witness in this matter, could and would competently testify thereto.
3. I make this declaration in support of plaintiff’s Opposition to the Request to Add On Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 1265207 and for Stay filed by Defendant Franciscan Friars of California, Inc. (AFranciscans@) and Defendant Old Mission Santa Barbara (AOld Mission@).
4. In 1998 the Santa Barbara law firm of Nye, Peabody, Stirling & Hale, LLP, began litigating claims involving the criminal conduct of Franciscan perpetrators and hierarchy in Santa Barbara. I joined the team of lawyers working on the Franciscan cases in 1999.
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5. Since our first lawsuit against the Franciscans their defense strategy has been consistent and unwavering: preserve the Franciscans’ secrets as much as possible by narrowing the focus of each lawsuit filed to one victim and one perpetrator.
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5. Since our first lawsuit against the Franciscans their defense strategy has been consistent and unwavering: preserve the Franciscans’ secrets as much as possible by narrowing the focus of each lawsuit filed to one victim and one perpetrator.
6. After the scandal first broke in Santa Barbara in 1989, the Franciscans’ retained large defense firms, Sedgwick Detert in particular, who utilized their tremendous resources to implement this strategy quite effectively for nearly ten years, battering smaller plaintiffs’ firms into settling lawsuits for relatively small amounts while limiting the focus of discovery to the perpetrator rather than on the enabling conduct of the Franciscan hierarchy.
7. NPSH first filed a lawsuit against the Franciscans in 1998, Allen v. Van Handel et al., Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 228296. Early in Allen the Franciscan defense strategy of preserving secrecy by narrowing the focus of each lawsuit to one perpetrator, one victim, became clear. As investigation and discovery continued in Allen the Franciscans’ motivation for pressing this strategy became obvious: the Franciscan hierarchy had allowed the adjoining properties of St. Anthony’s Seminary and the Old Mission Santa Barbara to serve for decades as a feeding ground for Franciscan predators.
8. It also quickly became apparent during Allen that the public remained unaware of the continuing threat posed to their children by the Franciscans. This was due in large part to the Franciscans’ creation of a purportedly independent inquiry in 1994 that actually was a Franciscan-controlled whitewash. The Franciscans’ AIndependent Board of Inquiry@ was tasked with investigating abuse allegations at St. Anthony’s Seminary, the property adjoining the Old Mission in Santa Barbara. The Board issued its report in 1994, confirming there had been twelve Franciscan perpetrators, but identifying none of them. It also made no reference to numerous instances of notice of abuse received by the Franciscans. These omissions were less than surprising given that one of the Board’s member was a Franciscan from another Province, and, more importantly, given that the Franciscans’ Provincial Minister had to approve the report before it was released to the public.
9. As the Sedgwick firm in Allen continued aggressively to press the Franciscan strategy of narrowing the focus of each lawsuit and the scope of discovery to one perpetrator and one victim, our investigation in Allen was revealing a shocking pattern of conduct by Franciscans with regards to their managing Franciscan perpetrators for whom they had received notice were sexually abusing Santa Barbara children.
As a result of the growing body of evidence of the Franciscans’ deadly approach to managing Franciscan perpetrators, and in response to the Sedgwick firm’s continuing efforts to narrow the scope of discovery, the lead trial attorneys for the plaintiff tasked myself and another associate with researching theories of liability to counter the Franciscans’ defense strategy.
10. After substantial legal research it became clear to us the Public Nuisance cause of action was the ideal theory to respond to the Franciscans’ narrowing strategy. Consequently, we sought leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint alleging the Public Nuisance cause of action in Allen in 2000. Since that date, every complaint we have filed against the Franciscans has included the Public Nuisance cause of action. At the time I drafted the Public Nuisance cause of action, there was no Hightower opinion, nor was there any concern over the statute of limitations for the plaintiff in Allen. The Franciscans’ contention the Public Nuisance cause of action was Acreatively added@ Ato plead around the >Hightower= bar@ is patently false.
However, I do not believe this misstatement was an intentional effort by Tobin & Tobin to mislead the Court. This is not our first case with their firm, and we have always known them to be honest and highly skilled clergy abuse defense attorneys. That said, to my knowledge, they have never represented the Franciscans prior to this lawsuit, and presumably are unaware that NPSH first began alleging the Franciscans’ conduct constituted a continuing Public Nuisance six years before the Hightower opinion was published.
11. To my knowledge, no court has ever issued an order addressing the viability of the Public Nuisance cause of action against the Franciscans. Shortly after the Fourth Amended Complaint was filed in Allen in 2000, the Franciscans settled that lawsuit before the Santa Barbara court could rule on their demurrer to the Public Nuisance cause of action. Since then, the Franciscans have settled fourteen more claims on behalf of plaintiffs represented by NPSH, all resolved before any court addressed the Public Nuisance cause of action.
12. Three lawsuits on behalf of five plaintiffs represented by NPSH were part of the first group of cases released in this coordinated proceeding. Each complaint alleged Public Nuisance. However, all five of those claims settled and were dismissed long before Judge Fromholz ruled on the Omnibus Demurrers. As a result, the court order on the Omnibus Demurrers does not consider or even mention the Public Nuisance cause of action.
13. After nearly eleven years of almost uninterrupted investigation and discovery against the Franciscans we have identified no less than twenty-five (25) Franciscan perpetrators assigned or in residence in Santa Barbara since 1936, and sixty (60) Santa Barbara children who have been sexually assaulted by these men. Twenty-four (24) of those Franciscan perpetrators and fifty-nine (59) of those victims have been in Santa Barbara post -1964.
14. At the start of this coordinated proceeding in 2003, three of the four law firms representing eleven (11) of the twenty-five survivors (25) of Franciscan sexual abuse were located in the counties of Los Angeles and Orange. Those three law firms filed lawsuits against the Franciscans in Los Angeles. A number of the twenty-five survivors of Franciscan sexual abuse also lived in the counties of Los Angeles and Orange. And defense counsel for the Franciscans, Lewis Brisbois, were located in downtown Los Angeles. All of those twenty-five claims were part of the 2006 global settlement involving the Franciscans.
15. To my knowledge this is the only currently pending Franciscan lawsuit in California. Plaintiff Mary Jones lives in Northern California in Fairfax. Defendant Old Mission is located in Santa Barbara, with its agent for service of process in Oakland, CA. Defendant Franciscans’ corporate offices are located in Oakland. Tobin & Tobin are located in San Francisco. NPSH is located in Santa Barbara. And most if not all of the key witnesses of which I am aware are located in Santa Barbara or Northern California. In fact, out of the twenty-eight (28) depositions taken in Franciscan cases in the coordinated proceedings, only four (4) took place in Los Angeles, with the vast majority going forward in and/or far north of Santa Barbara.
16. Settlement is much less likely to occur if this case is litigated in Los Angeles rather than in Santa Barbara. The parties have already discussed mediation. The Franciscans proposed and plaintiff agreed to mediation dates. Plaintiff even agreed to mediate before, among others, the Honorable Ronald Sabraw, the coordination/trial court judge who presided over Hightower. However, the Franciscans appear to have lost interest in mediation. Adding this case to a coordination proceeding where there are no other Franciscan lawsuits pending will not increase the likelihood of settlement without further litigation.
In fact, it likely will decrease the likelihood of settlement. Transferring this case out of Santa Barbara to Los Angeles, a community with a comparably far smaller interest in the Franciscans’ conduct, plays into the Franciscan corporate practice of secrecy by keeping the communities who most need to know in the dark, and will do nothing to enhance the likelihood of settlement. If anything, it will encourage the Franciscans to believe they have once again flown under the radar and will not be held accountable for their conduct in the community where so many of these crimes have been committed. The determination of whether this conduct constitutes a Public Nuisance should be made by a trier of fact from the community in which the conduct occurred.
17. Survivors in clergy abuse cases in Northern and Central California are not being deprived of their right to have their lawsuits heard in the communities where the crimes were committed or covered up. Doe v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton et al., Case No. C057895 was filed in Stockton and is currently pending before the Third District Court of Appeal on statute of limitations issues shared by many of the currently coordinated lawsuits. Similarly, Dengler v. Doe 1, Case No. A116907 was filed in Sonoma and was decided last year by the First Appellate District. And Neff v. Doe 1 et al., involving NPSH and Tobin & Tobin, is one of a number clergy abuse cases of which I am aware that currently are pending in Northern and Central California trial courts.
18. The Santa Barbara Superior Court has presided over Franciscan litigation, such as Allen, in the past, and is just as capable as the courts in Northern and Central California of applying the caselaw produced by the coordinated proceeding.
19. As a result of discovery conducted to date, I am aware of numerous Franciscan witnesses with critical information who are aged and infirm, and whose testimony is at risk to be lost with each passing day. For instance, Br. Sam Cabot, the likely perpetrator in this case, has had open-heart surgery in recent years and is known to be in poor health. The Provincial Ministers who are responsible for this pattern of conduct are all, with one possible exception, in their late 60s, 70s, and in some cases, 80s. As a result, plaintiff will be highly prejudiced by a stay of discovery.
I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration was executed on this 19th day of September 2008, at Santa Barbara, California.
TIMOTHY C. HALE
Posted by City of Angels Network
DAVID L. NYE (Bar #67009)
TIMOTHY C. HALE (Bar #184882)
NYE, PEABODY, STIRLING & HALE, LLP
33 West Mission St., Suite 201
Santa Barbara, California 93101
Telephone: (805) 963-2345
Facsimile: (805) 563-5385
Attorneys for Plaintiff
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
County of Los Angeles
COORDINATION PROCEEDING SPECIAL TITLE (RULE 1550(b))
THE CLERGY CASES I
This s Document Relates to:
MARY JONES, an individual,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Franciscan Friars of California, Inc.; Old Mission Santa Barbara; and Does 5 through 100, Inclusive.
Defendants.
Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 1265207
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COORDINATION PROCEEDING
No. 4286
PLAINTIFF OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST TO ADD ON SANTA BARBARA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT CASE NO. 1265207 AND FOR STAY; DECLARATION OF TIMOTHY HALE
California Rule of Court Rule 3.544(b)
Dept.: 308
Coordination Judge: Honorable Emilie H. Elias
Plaintiff Mary Jones submits this Opposition to the Request to Add On Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 1265207 and for Stay filed by Defendant Franciscan Friars of California, Inc. (AFranciscans@) and Defendant Old Mission Santa Barbara (AOld Mission@).
I.
INTRODUCTION
Secrecy is the name of the Franciscans’ deadly game. For decades the Franciscans of the Province of St. Barbara (Province) have concealed and protected Franciscan perpetrators of childhood sexual abuse. Instead of notifying law enforcement and empowering the public to protect their children, the Franciscans’ have sheltered these predators and thereby thrown to the wolves children in the communities throughout the Western United States where the Franciscans conduct their ministry.
Starting at least as early as 1964, and continuing as recently as the abuse committed in Idaho by former Franciscan Louis Ladenburger in 2007, Franciscan corporate practices have created countless victims of childhood sexual abuse, and continue to put an even greater number of today’s children at risk to be sexually assaulted by predators whose identities and propensities are known only to the Franciscans.
No community has suffered greater harm to its children, as a result of Franciscan criminal conduct, than Santa Barbara. Since 1964 the Franciscans have allowed no less than twenty-four (24) Franciscan perpetrators to live in Santa Barbara without any warning to the community. The tragic results have been at least fifty-nine (59) Santa Barbara children sexually assaulted by Franciscans since 1964. These numbers would be outrageous anywhere, but are particularly shocking for a city with a population of approximately 90,000.
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The subject lawsuit seeks a court order ending the secrecy. The Franciscans’ corporate practice is a continuing Public Nuisance.
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The subject lawsuit seeks a court order ending the secrecy. The Franciscans’ corporate practice is a continuing Public Nuisance.
It has stifled the ability of law enforcement to protect the public and prosecute these men by concealing their identities until the criminal statutes of limitations have expired. And it has rendered the civil process the last resort for the public to end these practices. Numerous million dollar settlements have not changed the Franciscans’ approach to managing perpetrators and sacrificing children. Equitable, proactive relief is now sought to force the Franciscans to change their ways.
The subject Request to Add On is consistent with the Franciscans’ policy of secrecy. With twenty-four (24) Franciscan perpetrators and fifty-nine (59) victims since 1964, Santa Barbara is the epicenter in the Province of the harm caused by the Franciscans. As they have done so often with their perpetrators, it comes as no surprise that the Franciscans now seek to transfer this case as far away from Santa Barbara as possible, to a comparably disinterested community in Los Angeles where the lawsuit will most likely be ignored. Justice requires this case be heard in Santa Barbara, the community most severely injured by the Franciscans’ conduct.
II.
BACKGROUND
In 1998, plaintiff’s counsel, Nye, Peabody, Stirling & Hale, LLP, began litigating claims involving the criminal conduct of Franciscan perpetrators and hierarchy in Santa Barbara. Since the inception of that litigation the Franciscans’ defense strategy has been consistent and unwavering: preserve the Franciscans’ secrets by narrowing the focus of each lawsuit filed to one victim and one perpetrator. This strategy’s sole purpose is to keep the public ignorant by shifting attention away from the despicable Franciscan corporate practice of concealing the identities, propensities, and current assignments and/or residences of Franciscan perpetrators.
After nearly eleven years of litigation, the Franciscans’ strategy is failing. As a result of discovery and investigation conducted since 1998, plaintiff’s counsel has identified no less than twenty-five (25) Franciscan perpetrators assigned or in residence in Santa Barbara since 1936, and sixty (60) Santa Barbara children who have been sexually assaulted by these men. This tragedy is the result of the Franciscan corporate practice of concealing perpetrators of childhood sexual abuse.
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The subject Request for Add On continues the Franciscans’ battle for secrecy.
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The subject Request for Add On continues the Franciscans’ battle for secrecy. Nothing has changed. Once again they are attempting inappropriately to narrow the focus of a lawsuit to one Franciscan perpetrator, one Franciscan victim. A cursory review of the First Amended Complaint makes clear the true focus of the lawsuit: the threat to all children at any location where the Franciscans continue to conduct their business, and the heightened threat to Santa Barbara children where the Franciscans have dumped so many of their perpetrators without any warning to the community. The Franciscans have created a continuing Public Nuisance.
In a preemptive attack on the Public Nuisance cause of action, the Franciscans describe it as Aan attempt to plead around the >Hightower= bar.@ Although a continuing Public Nuisance cause of action is not subject to Hightower, this theory was not incorporated in plaintiff’s complaint in response to that opinion.
Plaintiff’s counsel does not believe this misstatement was an intentional effort by defense counsel to mislead the Court. Rather, this misstatement is the result of defense counsel’s never having represented the Franciscans, to plaintiff’s counsel’s knowledge, prior to this lawsuit. They apparently are unaware that plaintiff’s counsel first began alleging the Franciscans’ conduct constituted a continuing Public Nuisance in 2000, six years before the Hightower opinion was published.
Plaintiff’s counsel first filed a lawsuit against the Franciscans in 1998, Allen v. Van Handel et al., Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 228296. Early in Allen the Franciscan defense strategy of preserving secrecy by narrowing the focus of each lawsuit to one perpetrator, one victim, became clear. As investigation and discovery continued in Allen the Franciscans’ motivation for pressing this strategy became obvious: the Franciscan hierarchy had allowed the adjoining properties of St. Anthony’s Seminary and the Old Mission Santa Barbara to serve for decades as a feeding ground for Franciscan predators.
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"The Franciscan hierarchy had allowed the adjoining properties of St. Anthony’s Seminary and the Old Mission Santa Barbara to serve for decades as a feeding ground for Franciscan predators."
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It quickly became apparent that thanks in large part to a purportedly independent inquiry in 1994 that actually was a Franciscan-controlled whitewash, the public remained unaware of the continuing threat posed to their children by the Franciscans. Consequently, plaintiff’s counsel began to research theories of liability to counter the Franciscans’ defense strategy of narrowing the focus of each lawsuit, and to end the Franciscans’ dangerous culture of secrecy.
After substantial legal research it became clear the Public Nuisance cause of action was the ideal theory to address and terminate the Franciscans’ criminal conduct. Consequently, leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint alleging the Public Nuisance cause of action was sought in Allen in 2000. Since that date, every complaint plaintiff’s counsel has filed against the Franciscans has included the Public Nuisance cause of action. In short, the Franciscans’ contention the Public Nuisance cause of action was "creatively added" to plaintiff’s complaint Ato plead around the >Hightower= bar@ is patently false.
No court has ever issued an order addressing the viability of the Public Nuisance cause of action against the Franciscans. Shortly after the Fourth Amended Complaint was filed in Allen in 2000, the Franciscans settled that lawsuit before the Santa Barbara court could rule on their demurrer to the Public Nuisance cause of action. Since then, the Franciscans have settled fourteen more claims on behalf of plaintiffs represented by plaintiff’s counsel, all resolved before any court addressed the Public Nuisance cause of action.
III.
ARGUMENT
When civil actions share a common question of fact or law with actions coordinated pursuant to section 404 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff or defendant may request an order from the judge assigned to hear the coordinated actions to coordinate the add-on action. Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. ' 404.4.
Cases considered for coordination must share common questions of fact or law. The determination of whether cases share common questions of fact or law is a "threshold" standard, since it must be satisfied at the outset of the coordination procedure. Keenan v. Superior Court, 111 Cal.App.3d 336, 342 (1980).
A. Plaintiff Concedes Her Lawsuit Meets The Threshold Requirement.
Plaintiff does not dispute that her lawsuit shares some common questions of law and fact with the Clergy Cases. Many of the causes of action utilized in the Master Complaint in the coordination are incorporated into plaintiff’s complaint. And as in the Clergy Cases, Plaintiff alleges that, while a minor, she was sexually abused by a member of the clergy acting under the supervision and control of the Roman Catholic Church.
However, unlike the Clergy Cases, the subject complaint alleges the sexual abuse of plaintiff was a symptom of a problem much bigger than the oversimplification continually argued for by the Franciscans, i.e. the criminal acts of a rogue Franciscan against a solitary victim. In fact, it is here the subject complaint drastically departs from the Master Complaint and alleges detailed facts -
the Franciscan corporate practice of concealing the identities of their pedophilic brethren and transferring them into unexpecting communities - and theories
- the continuing Public Nuisance created by this conduct - that set it apart from any prior pleading ever addressed in this coordination or any other court.
Thus, while the complaint may meet the threshold requirement, the balancing test which is the next and final step in the process merits denying the Request for Add On. Justice will be denied, and children will be placed at risk, if the subject lawsuit is transferred from Santa Barbara to Los Angeles.
B. Promoting The Ends Of Justice - The Balancing Test.
Once the threshold requirement is satisfied, the coordination judge must determine whether coordination will serve to "promote the ends of justice." Code of Civ. Proc. ' 404.1 mandates that the coordination judge take into account:
(1) whether the common question of fact or law is predominating and significant to the litigation;
(2) the convenience of the parties, witnesses, and counsel;
(3) the relative development of the actions and the work product of counsel;
(4) the efficient utilization of judicial facilities and manpower;
(5) the calendar of the courts;
(6) the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments; and
(7) the likelihood of settlement of the action without further litigation should coordination be denied.
Consideration of these factors involves a "weighing and balancing . . . to determine whether coordination . . . best serves the ends of justice in the particular case." Pesses v. Superior Court, 107 Cal.App.3d 117, 126 (1980). Here, denying the request for coordination will best serve the ends of justice.
(1) The Unique Questions Of Fact And Law In Plaintiff's Case Are Predominating And Significant.
Defendants all but concede this point, but attempt to minimize their concession by labeling the Public Nuisance cause of action as a creatively adde "attempt to plead around the >Hightower= bar.
The focus of the First Amended Complaint is the pattern of conduct of the Franciscan hierarchy. The abuse of plaintiff is a symptom of that conduct, and gives her standing as one of the special injuries required for her to prosecute a nuisance claim on behalf of the general public. No court, in the coordination or otherwise, has ever issued an order addressing the viability of the nuisance theory in this context with these facts. These unique questions of fact and law are predominant and significant, and distinguish this lawsuit from any other in the coordination.
Accordingly, this factor weighs against granting the Franciscans’ request.
(2) The Inconvenience To The Parties, Witnesses, And Counsel Merits Denial Of The Petition.
The witnesses, parties, and counsel will be substantially inconvenienced if forced to participate in the coordinated action in Los Angeles.
At the start of this coordinated proceeding in 2003, three of the four law firms representing twenty-five survivors (25) of Franciscan sexual abuse were located in the counties of Los Angeles and Orange. Those three law firms filed lawsuits against the Franciscans in Los Angeles. A number of the twenty-five survivors of Franciscan sexual abuse also lived in the counties of Los Angeles and Orange. And defense counsel for the Franciscans were located in downtown Los Angeles. Thus, prior to the 2006 Franciscan global settlement, there was at least an argument to be made that convenience of the parties, witnesses, and counsel supported coordination of the Franciscan lawsuits.
Now, to plaintiff’s counsel’s knowledge, this is the only currently pending Franciscan lawsuit in California. Plaintiff Mary Jones lives in Northern California in Fairfax. Defendant Old Mission is located in Santa Barbara, with its agent for service of process in Oakland, CA. Defendant Franciscans’ corporate offices are located in Oakland. The Franciscans’ new defense counsel are located in San Francisco. Plaintiff’s counsel are located in Santa Barbara. And most if not all of the key witnesses of which plaintiff’s counsel are aware are located in Santa Barbara or Northern California.
In fact, out of the twenty-eight (28) depositions taken in Franciscan cases litigated in the coordinated proceedings, only four (4) took place in Los Angeles, with the vast majority going forward in and/or far north of Santa Barbara. Accordingly, with the global settlement of the twenty-five Franciscan claims in 2006, the convenience factor now weighs strongly against coordination.
(3) The Status Of Plaintiff’s Lawsuit Case Does Not Support The Franciscans’ Request For Coordination.
Plaintiff’s lawsuit is at a preliminary stage of development. Defendants recently accepted service, and have not yet filed their responsive pleading. Plaintiff was about to serve written discovery when Defendants filed their Request for Add On and Stay. Plaintiff also was about to notice depositions for witnesses whose health and age create the risk their testimony may be lost. In short, the Request for Add
On and Stay has already delayed and slowed the proceedings. Additionally, as the only currently filed Franciscan lawsuit, and the only clergy abuse lawsuit proceeding on a Public Nuisance theory, this lawsuit cannot be consolidated with like cases in a single, efficient forum. To the contrary, there are no like cases to consolidate it with.
(4) Coordination Will Not Foster The Efficient Utilization of Judicial Facilities And Manpower, And Minimize The Burden Upon The Calendar Of The Courts.
Coordination will not result in a more efficient use of judicial resources. This lawsuit shares no common defendants with any other currently filed lawsuits. While there are some common factual allegations with current coordinated lawsuits, none of those coordinated lawsuits are based on allegations and evidence of a continuing Public Nuisance. Accordingly, as there is no risk of multiple courts making disparate rulings related to the continuing Public Nuisance theory, coordination will not result in a more efficient use of judicial resources.
It is also worth noting that courts around the state and outside the coordination continue to rule on the same issues that the Franciscans contend must be decided only by this Court. Five years of coordination have produced a substantial body of caselaw to guide these courts. There will be no duplication of effort if this case proceeds separately. The resolution of this lawsuit can be accomplished just as efficiently by the Santa Barbara trial court.
(5) There Is No Risk Of Duplicative Or Inconsistent Rulings, Orders, And Judgments.
Whereas the remaining coordinated lawsuits have as their foundations childhood sexual abuse by a Roman Catholic Priest or brother, such abuse in Plaintiff’s lawsuit is simply one of the special injuries required for plaintiff to prosecute a Public Nuisance claim on behalf of the general public. The foundation for Plaintiff’s lawsuit is the Franciscan corporate practice of concealing the identities of their pedophilic brethren and transferring them into unsuspecting communities. Plaintiff’s counsel has indisputable evidence of nearly forty-five years of the Franciscans’ corporate practice placing children at risk and creating a continuing Public Nuisance. No other law firm in the history of this coordination has developed such a detailed and continuing history of criminal conduct by a single Roman Catholic entity as a result of ten years investigating and litigating against that entity. As a result, no other firm has filed a lawsuit based on a continuing Public Nuisance. (6) Coordination Will Not Increase The Likelihood Of Settlement Of The Action Without Further Litigation.
Settlement is no more likely in the context of the coordination, and is less likely in Los Angeles than in Santa Barbara.
The parties have already discussed mediation. The Franciscans proposed and plaintiff agreed to mediation dates. Plaintiff even agreed to mediate before, among others, the Honorable Ronald Sabraw, the coordination/trial court judge who presided over Hightower. However, the Franciscans appear to have lost interest in mediation. Adding this case to a coordination proceeding where there are no other Franciscan lawsuits pending will not increase the likelihood of settlement without further litigation. In fact, it likely will decrease the likelihood of settlement.
Numerous communities have seen their children harmed and put at risk by the Franciscan efforts to conceal and cover up their continuing corporate practice of handling their perpetrators. However, with twenty-four Franciscan perpetrators and fifty-nine victims identified since 1964 in a city of approximately 90,000 residents, no city has been harmed more gravely than Santa Barbara. Transferring this case out of Santa Barbara to Los Angeles, a community with a comparably far smaller interest in the Franciscans’ conduct, plays into the Franciscan corporate practice of secrecy by keeping the communities who most need to know in the dark, and will do nothing to enhance the likelihood of settlement. If anything, it will encourage the Franciscans to believe they have once again flown under the radar and will not be held accountable for their conduct in the community where so many of these crimes have been committed. The determination of whether this conduct constitutes a Public Nuisance should be made by a trier of fact from the community in which the conduct occurred.
IV.
DEFENDANTS’ PETITION FOR A STAY OF DISCOVERY SHOULD BE DENIED
Defendants offer no support nor any reason for their request for a discovery stay. While such a stay may have been necessary at one time due to the remarkably high volume of coordinated cases, and the resulting chaos 600+ concurrent discovery disputes could have produced, those high volume days are long since past in Clergy I. Defendants’ sole motivation for requesting the stay is to continue the Franciscans’ ongoing practice of delaying litigation for as long as possible. Obviously, this is not a legitimate basis for requesting a discovery stay.
Additionally, numerous Franciscan witnesses with critical information are aged and infirm, and their testimony is at risk to be lost with each passing day. As a result, Plaintiff will be highly prejudiced by a stay of discovery, particularly where these defendants demand discovery stays while knowing they have and will continue to argue they are incapable of defending themselves due to the loss of key witnesses.
Accordingly, plaintiff requests that Defendants’ request for a discovery stay be denied.
V.
CONCLUSION
Survivors in clergy abuse cases in Northern and Central California are not being deprived of their right to have their lawsuits heard in the communities where the crimes were committed or covered up. Doe v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton et al., Case No. C057895 was filed in Stockton and is currently pending before the Third District Court of Appeal on statute of limitations issues shared by many of the currently coordinated lawsuits. Similarly, Dengler v. Doe 1, Case No. A116907 was filed in Sonoma and was decided last year by the First Appellate District. And Neff v. Doe 1 et al., involving the same plaintiff’s counsel and defense counsel in this lawsuit, is one of a number clergy abuse cases currently pending in Northern California trial courts. All of these matters have been or will be guided by the substantial body of caselaw generated in this coordinated proceeding, with no plaintiff deprived of his or her right to file their lawsuit where most appropriate.
The Santa Barbara Superior Court has presided over Franciscan litigation in the past, and is just as capable as the courts in Northern and Central California of applying the caselaw produced by the coordinated proceeding.
The Archdiocese of Los Angeles is not a defendant in this lawsuit.
The factors that once supported adding prior Franciscan cases to the coordination are no more.
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The Franciscans’ Request for Coordination is an obvious attempt to avoid being held accountable in a court in the community most victimized by the Franciscan conduct set forth in plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.
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The Franciscans’ Request for Coordination is an obvious attempt to avoid being held accountable in a court in the community most victimized by the Franciscan conduct set forth in plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff respectfully requests the Request to Add On Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 1265207 and for Stay be denied.
DATED: September 24, 2008
NYE, PEABODY, STIRLING & HALE LLP
By:
DAVID L. NYE
TIMOTHY C. HALE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
DECLARATION OF TIMOTHY C. HALE
I, Timothy C. Hale, declare as follows:
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice in all of the courts of the State of California, and am one of the attorneys representing plaintiff Mary Jones in the above action. I am a partner in the law firm of Nye, Peabody, Stirling & Hale, LLP (ANPSH@).
2. I have personal knowledge of the statements set forth in this declaration, except for those stated on information and belief, and if called as a witness in this matter, could and would competently testify thereto.
3. I make this declaration in support of plaintiff’s Opposition to the Request to Add On Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 1265207 and for Stay filed by Defendant Franciscan Friars of California, Inc. (AFranciscans@) and Defendant Old Mission Santa Barbara (AOld Mission@).
4. In 1998 the Santa Barbara law firm of Nye, Peabody, Stirling & Hale, LLP, began litigating claims involving the criminal conduct of Franciscan perpetrators and hierarchy in Santa Barbara. I joined the team of lawyers working on the Franciscan cases in 1999.
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5. Since our first lawsuit against the Franciscans their defense strategy has been consistent and unwavering: preserve the Franciscans’ secrets as much as possible by narrowing the focus of each lawsuit filed to one victim and one perpetrator.
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5. Since our first lawsuit against the Franciscans their defense strategy has been consistent and unwavering: preserve the Franciscans’ secrets as much as possible by narrowing the focus of each lawsuit filed to one victim and one perpetrator.
6. After the scandal first broke in Santa Barbara in 1989, the Franciscans’ retained large defense firms, Sedgwick Detert in particular, who utilized their tremendous resources to implement this strategy quite effectively for nearly ten years, battering smaller plaintiffs’ firms into settling lawsuits for relatively small amounts while limiting the focus of discovery to the perpetrator rather than on the enabling conduct of the Franciscan hierarchy.
7. NPSH first filed a lawsuit against the Franciscans in 1998, Allen v. Van Handel et al., Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 228296. Early in Allen the Franciscan defense strategy of preserving secrecy by narrowing the focus of each lawsuit to one perpetrator, one victim, became clear. As investigation and discovery continued in Allen the Franciscans’ motivation for pressing this strategy became obvious: the Franciscan hierarchy had allowed the adjoining properties of St. Anthony’s Seminary and the Old Mission Santa Barbara to serve for decades as a feeding ground for Franciscan predators.
8. It also quickly became apparent during Allen that the public remained unaware of the continuing threat posed to their children by the Franciscans. This was due in large part to the Franciscans’ creation of a purportedly independent inquiry in 1994 that actually was a Franciscan-controlled whitewash. The Franciscans’ AIndependent Board of Inquiry@ was tasked with investigating abuse allegations at St. Anthony’s Seminary, the property adjoining the Old Mission in Santa Barbara. The Board issued its report in 1994, confirming there had been twelve Franciscan perpetrators, but identifying none of them. It also made no reference to numerous instances of notice of abuse received by the Franciscans. These omissions were less than surprising given that one of the Board’s member was a Franciscan from another Province, and, more importantly, given that the Franciscans’ Provincial Minister had to approve the report before it was released to the public.
9. As the Sedgwick firm in Allen continued aggressively to press the Franciscan strategy of narrowing the focus of each lawsuit and the scope of discovery to one perpetrator and one victim, our investigation in Allen was revealing a shocking pattern of conduct by Franciscans with regards to their managing Franciscan perpetrators for whom they had received notice were sexually abusing Santa Barbara children.
As a result of the growing body of evidence of the Franciscans’ deadly approach to managing Franciscan perpetrators, and in response to the Sedgwick firm’s continuing efforts to narrow the scope of discovery, the lead trial attorneys for the plaintiff tasked myself and another associate with researching theories of liability to counter the Franciscans’ defense strategy.
10. After substantial legal research it became clear to us the Public Nuisance cause of action was the ideal theory to respond to the Franciscans’ narrowing strategy. Consequently, we sought leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint alleging the Public Nuisance cause of action in Allen in 2000. Since that date, every complaint we have filed against the Franciscans has included the Public Nuisance cause of action. At the time I drafted the Public Nuisance cause of action, there was no Hightower opinion, nor was there any concern over the statute of limitations for the plaintiff in Allen. The Franciscans’ contention the Public Nuisance cause of action was Acreatively added@ Ato plead around the >Hightower= bar@ is patently false.
However, I do not believe this misstatement was an intentional effort by Tobin & Tobin to mislead the Court. This is not our first case with their firm, and we have always known them to be honest and highly skilled clergy abuse defense attorneys. That said, to my knowledge, they have never represented the Franciscans prior to this lawsuit, and presumably are unaware that NPSH first began alleging the Franciscans’ conduct constituted a continuing Public Nuisance six years before the Hightower opinion was published.
11. To my knowledge, no court has ever issued an order addressing the viability of the Public Nuisance cause of action against the Franciscans. Shortly after the Fourth Amended Complaint was filed in Allen in 2000, the Franciscans settled that lawsuit before the Santa Barbara court could rule on their demurrer to the Public Nuisance cause of action. Since then, the Franciscans have settled fourteen more claims on behalf of plaintiffs represented by NPSH, all resolved before any court addressed the Public Nuisance cause of action.
12. Three lawsuits on behalf of five plaintiffs represented by NPSH were part of the first group of cases released in this coordinated proceeding. Each complaint alleged Public Nuisance. However, all five of those claims settled and were dismissed long before Judge Fromholz ruled on the Omnibus Demurrers. As a result, the court order on the Omnibus Demurrers does not consider or even mention the Public Nuisance cause of action.
13. After nearly eleven years of almost uninterrupted investigation and discovery against the Franciscans we have identified no less than twenty-five (25) Franciscan perpetrators assigned or in residence in Santa Barbara since 1936, and sixty (60) Santa Barbara children who have been sexually assaulted by these men. Twenty-four (24) of those Franciscan perpetrators and fifty-nine (59) of those victims have been in Santa Barbara post -1964.
14. At the start of this coordinated proceeding in 2003, three of the four law firms representing eleven (11) of the twenty-five survivors (25) of Franciscan sexual abuse were located in the counties of Los Angeles and Orange. Those three law firms filed lawsuits against the Franciscans in Los Angeles. A number of the twenty-five survivors of Franciscan sexual abuse also lived in the counties of Los Angeles and Orange. And defense counsel for the Franciscans, Lewis Brisbois, were located in downtown Los Angeles. All of those twenty-five claims were part of the 2006 global settlement involving the Franciscans.
15. To my knowledge this is the only currently pending Franciscan lawsuit in California. Plaintiff Mary Jones lives in Northern California in Fairfax. Defendant Old Mission is located in Santa Barbara, with its agent for service of process in Oakland, CA. Defendant Franciscans’ corporate offices are located in Oakland. Tobin & Tobin are located in San Francisco. NPSH is located in Santa Barbara. And most if not all of the key witnesses of which I am aware are located in Santa Barbara or Northern California. In fact, out of the twenty-eight (28) depositions taken in Franciscan cases in the coordinated proceedings, only four (4) took place in Los Angeles, with the vast majority going forward in and/or far north of Santa Barbara.
16. Settlement is much less likely to occur if this case is litigated in Los Angeles rather than in Santa Barbara. The parties have already discussed mediation. The Franciscans proposed and plaintiff agreed to mediation dates. Plaintiff even agreed to mediate before, among others, the Honorable Ronald Sabraw, the coordination/trial court judge who presided over Hightower. However, the Franciscans appear to have lost interest in mediation. Adding this case to a coordination proceeding where there are no other Franciscan lawsuits pending will not increase the likelihood of settlement without further litigation.
In fact, it likely will decrease the likelihood of settlement. Transferring this case out of Santa Barbara to Los Angeles, a community with a comparably far smaller interest in the Franciscans’ conduct, plays into the Franciscan corporate practice of secrecy by keeping the communities who most need to know in the dark, and will do nothing to enhance the likelihood of settlement. If anything, it will encourage the Franciscans to believe they have once again flown under the radar and will not be held accountable for their conduct in the community where so many of these crimes have been committed. The determination of whether this conduct constitutes a Public Nuisance should be made by a trier of fact from the community in which the conduct occurred.
17. Survivors in clergy abuse cases in Northern and Central California are not being deprived of their right to have their lawsuits heard in the communities where the crimes were committed or covered up. Doe v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton et al., Case No. C057895 was filed in Stockton and is currently pending before the Third District Court of Appeal on statute of limitations issues shared by many of the currently coordinated lawsuits. Similarly, Dengler v. Doe 1, Case No. A116907 was filed in Sonoma and was decided last year by the First Appellate District. And Neff v. Doe 1 et al., involving NPSH and Tobin & Tobin, is one of a number clergy abuse cases of which I am aware that currently are pending in Northern and Central California trial courts.
18. The Santa Barbara Superior Court has presided over Franciscan litigation, such as Allen, in the past, and is just as capable as the courts in Northern and Central California of applying the caselaw produced by the coordinated proceeding.
19. As a result of discovery conducted to date, I am aware of numerous Franciscan witnesses with critical information who are aged and infirm, and whose testimony is at risk to be lost with each passing day. For instance, Br. Sam Cabot, the likely perpetrator in this case, has had open-heart surgery in recent years and is known to be in poor health. The Provincial Ministers who are responsible for this pattern of conduct are all, with one possible exception, in their late 60s, 70s, and in some cases, 80s. As a result, plaintiff will be highly prejudiced by a stay of discovery.
I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration was executed on this 19th day of September 2008, at Santa Barbara, California.
TIMOTHY C. HALE
Friday, June 27, 2008
MORE PROOF: Sick priests put in parishes: Minutes of the March 1967 meeting of Servants of Paraclete, 6 pages scanned in here today
***
Hundreds of pages of Servants of the Paraclete documents are below or linked from this post.

*****
MINUTES
of the March 13, 1967, meeting of Paracletes leaders, six pages beginning at left, at first appears to be a dull read, especially in this 1960s typewriter 9 point cloistered type.

But take time to digest, read through it, it reveals the back and forth discussion that took place between Director Fr. Gerald Fitzgerald, with his pure spiritual approach and John. A Salazar, Ph.D., whose influence was growing.

In the heat of debate over use of private cars for members going to do weekend supply priest work in the region:
“Fr. Feit remarked: ABUSUS NON TOLLET USUS. Everybody laughed.”
(On Page 5 below.)
The Latin translates roughly to:
"The abuse does not abolish the use"
Father John Feit said that in Latin during the meeting as they began arguing, and it made everybody laugh.
Ha. Ha.
Pages 4-6 are below:
Page 5

Page 6

The talk gets hotter after the coffee break. On Page 4 to 6. The minutes show they discussed
The logistics of getting these priests in alcoholism and pedophilia rehab out to their “supply priest” work on weekends in the community.
Should the pedophile priests on weekend leave use private cars?
How much should pedophile priests be paid to do “supply” work in local parishes?
Priests in rehab at Via Coeli, the foremost treatment center for priests identified as pedophiles, served in the local New Mexico parishes on weekends, unsupervised, moving freely through nearby towns on weekend leave, then returning to Via Coeli Mondays to continue treatment for alcoholism and or pedophilia and other “psycho-sexual problems.”
More PROOF
The Catholic Church in New Mexico sent sick priests to do supply work regularly in the parishes within close driving distance of Jemez Springs.
Onward.
MORE DOCUMENTS HERE:
AND HERE
SALESIAN CONNECTION as it was cases against that religious order that produced these docs in the Los Angeles 2003 lawsuits.
.
THE L.A. Connection through St. John Seminary
.
Hundreds of pages of Servants of the Paraclete documents are below or linked from this post.

*****
MINUTES
of the March 13, 1967, meeting of Paracletes leaders, six pages beginning at left, at first appears to be a dull read, especially in this 1960s typewriter 9 point cloistered type.

But take time to digest, read through it, it reveals the back and forth discussion that took place between Director Fr. Gerald Fitzgerald, with his pure spiritual approach and John. A Salazar, Ph.D., whose influence was growing.

In the heat of debate over use of private cars for members going to do weekend supply priest work in the region:
“Fr. Feit remarked: ABUSUS NON TOLLET USUS. Everybody laughed.”
(On Page 5 below.)
The Latin translates roughly to:
"The abuse does not abolish the use"
Father John Feit said that in Latin during the meeting as they began arguing, and it made everybody laugh.
Ha. Ha.
Pages 4-6 are below:

Page 5

Page 6

The talk gets hotter after the coffee break. On Page 4 to 6. The minutes show they discussed
The logistics of getting these priests in alcoholism and pedophilia rehab out to their “supply priest” work on weekends in the community.
Should the pedophile priests on weekend leave use private cars?
How much should pedophile priests be paid to do “supply” work in local parishes?
Priests in rehab at Via Coeli, the foremost treatment center for priests identified as pedophiles, served in the local New Mexico parishes on weekends, unsupervised, moving freely through nearby towns on weekend leave, then returning to Via Coeli Mondays to continue treatment for alcoholism and or pedophilia and other “psycho-sexual problems.”
More PROOF
The Catholic Church in New Mexico sent sick priests to do supply work regularly in the parishes within close driving distance of Jemez Springs.
Onward.
MORE DOCUMENTS HERE:
AND HERE
SALESIAN CONNECTION as it was cases against that religious order that produced these docs in the Los Angeles 2003 lawsuits.
.
THE L.A. Connection through St. John Seminary
.
Thursday, June 26, 2008
Added June 26
***********
"This diocese is so indebted to you," writes the
Bishop of San Diego to Gerald Fitzgerald in 1954. In the 1950 letter below, Bishop Buddy pledges a thousand dollars to Fitzgerald and Via Coeli.
Again, Click to enlarge and print.
First the 1950 letter:

1953 Fitzgerald to Buddy

1954 Buddy to Fitzgerald

1954 Fitzgerald to Buddy

1955 Fitzgerald to Buddy

1956 - Fitzgerald to Buddy

**********

1947 LETTER
"Help Us Help Priests"
At this Apostolate "we have begun here at Jemez Springs"
Thanks to
"Generosity and enlightened charity of the Cardinal Archbishop of New York"
1947 Letter (above left) in a way an introduction, emphasizing that the Paracletes are “Priest to Priest” help, they do not involve the laity in the therapy or the fundraising. Letter shines rare light on the foundation of Servants of the Paracletes, under the guidance of the bishop of Santa Fe, made possible by the “charity of our Cardinal Archdiocese of New York.”
Fr. Gerald, ever the promoter, introduces the letter, “Help us Help Priests” as “we have begun here at Jemez Springs an Institution”
Re not involving the Laity:
“In general we prefer to seek this aid from those who partake of Christ’s Priesthood.”
They only raise funds and promote the Paracletes to the priesthood.
We don’t want our parishioners finding out some of these priests are freaks.

1954 Letter
At left, The paper, the margins, even the typewriter apparently is the same.
Fr. Gerald apparently knocked out these poetic appeals for building fund fees over and over to bishops around the country. Here in 1954, again to Bishop Buddy, same as in 1947 letter above:
"We cannot turn these men away simply because they do not have a claim to justice upon some Bishop or religious community."
Hmm, seems to refer to legal problems these priests bring with them to Jemez Springs.
Aiding and abetting
anyone?
*************
So for anyone raped by a pedophile priest in a San Diego diocese parish since 1947, the hierarchy in San Diego were actively interacting with Servants as the Paraclete as far back as 1947, as shown in the letters above. So they knew about pedophile priests, they could have handled the problem. Your rapes did not need to happen.
*************
Aiding and abetting
anyone?
"This diocese is so indebted to you," writes the
Bishop of San Diego to Gerald Fitzgerald in 1954. In the 1950 letter below, Bishop Buddy pledges a thousand dollars to Fitzgerald and Via Coeli.
Again, Click to enlarge and print.
First the 1950 letter:

1953 Fitzgerald to Buddy

1954 Buddy to Fitzgerald

1954 Fitzgerald to Buddy

1955 Fitzgerald to Buddy

1956 - Fitzgerald to Buddy

**********

1947 LETTER
"Help Us Help Priests"
At this Apostolate "we have begun here at Jemez Springs"
Thanks to
"Generosity and enlightened charity of the Cardinal Archbishop of New York"
1947 Letter (above left) in a way an introduction, emphasizing that the Paracletes are “Priest to Priest” help, they do not involve the laity in the therapy or the fundraising. Letter shines rare light on the foundation of Servants of the Paracletes, under the guidance of the bishop of Santa Fe, made possible by the “charity of our Cardinal Archdiocese of New York.”
Fr. Gerald, ever the promoter, introduces the letter, “Help us Help Priests” as “we have begun here at Jemez Springs an Institution”
Re not involving the Laity:
“In general we prefer to seek this aid from those who partake of Christ’s Priesthood.”
They only raise funds and promote the Paracletes to the priesthood.
We don’t want our parishioners finding out some of these priests are freaks.

1954 Letter
At left, The paper, the margins, even the typewriter apparently is the same.
Fr. Gerald apparently knocked out these poetic appeals for building fund fees over and over to bishops around the country. Here in 1954, again to Bishop Buddy, same as in 1947 letter above:
"We cannot turn these men away simply because they do not have a claim to justice upon some Bishop or religious community."
Hmm, seems to refer to legal problems these priests bring with them to Jemez Springs.
Aiding and abetting
anyone?
*************
So for anyone raped by a pedophile priest in a San Diego diocese parish since 1947, the hierarchy in San Diego were actively interacting with Servants as the Paraclete as far back as 1947, as shown in the letters above. So they knew about pedophile priests, they could have handled the problem. Your rapes did not need to happen.
*************
Aiding and abetting
anyone?
Monday, June 23, 2008
Ongoing scanning and posting of the Paracletes Documents for City of Angels Network
*****
By Kay Ebeling
We will continue to scan and upload Paracletes Documents at City of Angels 11 over next week, then leave them here for the next months.

Add the letter on the right in with Island Letters from a previous post. Here we see the Paracletes have to get rid of the Island of Tortola, where they have sent problem priests to keep them away from the public. Dated November 1960. (Click to enlarge and print)

The second page, 1960 technology photocopy is at right. Father Gerald worked hard to establish these colonies to keep the pedophiles away from parishes, but by 1960 he was losing to a secular AA 12 step influenced form of treatment.
********************
Fitzgerald Pioneered Direct Mail Marketing sending letters to Archbishops All Over The Country about the Paracletes and their work with Problem Priests
********************************

April 9, 1950 Letter from Fr. Gerald Fitzgerald to Bishop Charles Buddy of San Diego is at right, click to enlarge and print.
This is a fundraising letter for the already thriving Via Coeli treatment center for priests with problems including sex with children. It states they are treating priests "from more than 35 dioceses and 9 religious orders."
***********
The word "homosexual" in a 1950-60's letter between priests does not mean what the word means to us today.
*****************
In letters from the 1950s and 1960s concerning Servants of the Paracletes, the "padres" often use euphemisms. “Psycho sexual problems” was an official term, but it was agreed (in other documents here) that “homosexual acts” included pedophilia.
And they were likely sex acts with children if they also involved the poice and criminal charges.
April 9, 1950 letter Quotes of Note:
Our institution is in no way Diocesan or provincial, and, due to the charity of our ecclesiastical superior, priests are received here from all over the country.
Demonstrates how they kept the Servants of the Paracletes work secret from parishioners and lay members of the churches.
Fundraising appeals were direct to the bishops. This letter was most likely typed and retyped, with a different address put in at the top, then the generic greeting and content of letter.
The April 1950 letter was likely sent to bishops all over the country since it states they are treating priests "from all over the country."
Hard to believe the bishops and their nearby colleagues did not know about pedophilia amidst all the fund raising and promotional work of Fr. Gerald Fitzgerald.
'nother quote from the letter:
“Hence this direct appeal to the Hierarchy for donations to build and equip a proper, modest monastic retreat house unit.
AND AGAIN proving the work of Paracletes with problem priests was no secret from church hierarchy, from April 9, 1950 letter:
"At the present moment we have priests at Via Coeli from more than 35 diocesses and archdioceses and from 9 religious communities."
**********
The June 1953 Letter
***********************

June 21, 1953,Letter at right, (click to enlarge and print) another fundraising appeal as: “where else shall we find means to care for these most abject and despised of men.”
Another national appeal to bishops “all over the country” to “All the Archbishops” including another invitation to visit and tour.
Again, how can bishops claim they had no knowledge of priest pedophiles when Fr. Gerald, as he pioneered direct mail marketing techniques, bothered them for donations regularly, and reminded them of the Servants of the Paracletes work.
QUOTES
from the June 21, 1953 letter.
Fitzgerald is
ASKING:
“Of the Archbishops and Bishops of our country: from the Archbishops and the Archdioceses of America a yearly donation.”
“Last year less than half the Hierarchy gave anything directly to this apolstolate of priestly succoring."
FINALLY: Y’ALL COME DOWN VISIT
“We invite Your Excellency to visit us at any time in this Vally of the Blessed Sacrament, Jemez Springs, New Mexico.”
**********
NOTE FROM KAY: I'm swamped at work, working double shift so I can take time off next month and go to Chicago. So all this week, I'm doing a Renovation Nation tape, a Hulk Hogan Celebrity Wrestling tape, and then scanning a document, one after the other over the next week. . . onward.
*****
By Kay Ebeling
We will continue to scan and upload Paracletes Documents at City of Angels 11 over next week, then leave them here for the next months.

Add the letter on the right in with Island Letters from a previous post. Here we see the Paracletes have to get rid of the Island of Tortola, where they have sent problem priests to keep them away from the public. Dated November 1960. (Click to enlarge and print)

The second page, 1960 technology photocopy is at right. Father Gerald worked hard to establish these colonies to keep the pedophiles away from parishes, but by 1960 he was losing to a secular AA 12 step influenced form of treatment.
********************
Fitzgerald Pioneered Direct Mail Marketing sending letters to Archbishops All Over The Country about the Paracletes and their work with Problem Priests
********************************

April 9, 1950 Letter from Fr. Gerald Fitzgerald to Bishop Charles Buddy of San Diego is at right, click to enlarge and print.
This is a fundraising letter for the already thriving Via Coeli treatment center for priests with problems including sex with children. It states they are treating priests "from more than 35 dioceses and 9 religious orders."
***********
The word "homosexual" in a 1950-60's letter between priests does not mean what the word means to us today.
*****************
In letters from the 1950s and 1960s concerning Servants of the Paracletes, the "padres" often use euphemisms. “Psycho sexual problems” was an official term, but it was agreed (in other documents here) that “homosexual acts” included pedophilia.
And they were likely sex acts with children if they also involved the poice and criminal charges.
April 9, 1950 letter Quotes of Note:
Our institution is in no way Diocesan or provincial, and, due to the charity of our ecclesiastical superior, priests are received here from all over the country.
Demonstrates how they kept the Servants of the Paracletes work secret from parishioners and lay members of the churches.
Fundraising appeals were direct to the bishops. This letter was most likely typed and retyped, with a different address put in at the top, then the generic greeting and content of letter.
The April 1950 letter was likely sent to bishops all over the country since it states they are treating priests "from all over the country."
Hard to believe the bishops and their nearby colleagues did not know about pedophilia amidst all the fund raising and promotional work of Fr. Gerald Fitzgerald.
'nother quote from the letter:
“Hence this direct appeal to the Hierarchy for donations to build and equip a proper, modest monastic retreat house unit.
AND AGAIN proving the work of Paracletes with problem priests was no secret from church hierarchy, from April 9, 1950 letter:
"At the present moment we have priests at Via Coeli from more than 35 diocesses and archdioceses and from 9 religious communities."
**********
The June 1953 Letter
***********************

June 21, 1953,Letter at right, (click to enlarge and print) another fundraising appeal as: “where else shall we find means to care for these most abject and despised of men.”
Another national appeal to bishops “all over the country” to “All the Archbishops” including another invitation to visit and tour.
Again, how can bishops claim they had no knowledge of priest pedophiles when Fr. Gerald, as he pioneered direct mail marketing techniques, bothered them for donations regularly, and reminded them of the Servants of the Paracletes work.
QUOTES
from the June 21, 1953 letter.
Fitzgerald is
ASKING:
“Of the Archbishops and Bishops of our country: from the Archbishops and the Archdioceses of America a yearly donation.”
“Last year less than half the Hierarchy gave anything directly to this apolstolate of priestly succoring."
FINALLY: Y’ALL COME DOWN VISIT
“We invite Your Excellency to visit us at any time in this Vally of the Blessed Sacrament, Jemez Springs, New Mexico.”
**********
NOTE FROM KAY: I'm swamped at work, working double shift so I can take time off next month and go to Chicago. So all this week, I'm doing a Renovation Nation tape, a Hulk Hogan Celebrity Wrestling tape, and then scanning a document, one after the other over the next week. . . onward.
*****
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