Stories removed from Examiner:

*
For Some reason EXAMINER removed this story about cyber crime, that I took directly from a DOJ press release:

One had $1.14 million in an investment account that he had to forfeit yesterday as part of his plea as the two men from Los Feliz/ Glendale pled guilty today to internet fraud, “The government contends that defendants derived at least $2.4 million from the fraud scheme,” says the Department of Justice release. They obviously had a lot of free time on their hands. Dmitry Nadezhdin, 35, of Glendale, and Viacheslav Berkovich - not always the names they use - would access the websites of trucking brokers, intervene, insert data saying their fictitious trucking would handle the work. They would then get paid for trucking jobs, and the real truckers who did the work never saw payment. But Nadezhdin and Berkovich, not always their real names, would deposit the checks to their local Bank of America.
They got away with it for awhile, but today February 24, 2009, pled guilty to Federal charges of fraudulent use of a Federal Internet site.
Not the brightest crooks, using their local bank, although I’ve been to the Bank of America in the Los Feliz district and it does appear to be run by criminals. I had to take my account somewhere else after they stole money from me last summer, hmm.
In January 2008, Lakes and Berkovich accessed the Internet Truckstop website and learned a Dallas-firm Stevens Transport had brokered a load. Lakes and Berkovich used their fictitious company and entered an agreement to transport the load for $3,400. “Lakes and Berkovich then illicitly used the name of Barkfelt Transport, a legitimate trucking brokerage, to arrange for RK Trucking to transport the load for $4,000,” reads the DOJ release about the crimes.
“RK Trucking in fact transported the load, but never got paid for its work.
“In early February 2008, Lakes and Berkovich received a $3,390 check via the mail from Stevens Transport, which was deposited into an account for Vega Trucking. Berkovich was the account holder for this Bank of America account.”
After plea agreements today, Lakes and Berkovich will probably spend decades in prison. They go up for sentencing June 29 in front of United States District Judge John F. Walter.

8888888888888

EXAMINER
also removed the story I wrote: "I Was a Six Year Old Sexual Predator."
WHY?



BANTER BETWEEN LAWYERS reads like script for true crime series:

When the judge responded, “That's ridiculous!” to an argument by a church attorney in court Wednesday, I realized the drama, duplicity, abuse of the legal system is all in the actual words spoken at hearings and in filed documents, when it comes to the Catholic Church and its handling of pedophile priests. Like the Boston cases came to life on stage in Sin: A Cardinal Deposed by Michael Murphy, I found a revealing scene in the notes I took during the hearing in L.A. Superior Court Department 308 Wednesday April 1st, transcribed blow. The lines here are very close to what will be on the legal transcripts as I'm fast and accurate.
JUDGE EMILIE ELIAS: You're saying the archdiocese doesn't exist here.
LEE POTTS: (Jumps up gets out a few words and then)
JUDGE: No-no-no you can’t (Stops herself) You're saying there is no entity of the Archdiocese of Los Angeles.
POTTS: I don't want to sound like there is not an entity called the Archdiocese. (thinks, hesitates) It’s a geographical construct.
JUDGE: That's ridiculous. You can’t call it a geographical-.
POTTS: Well it’s like, my wife and I lived in Studio City and for the longest time I couldn't convince her that it wasn’t really a city-
(Déjà vu as I have watched Lee Potts do this same word game in 2007, he even used his wife in Studio City as an example, during pretrial hearings on the Clergy Cases back in Judge Haley Fromholz’ court. Those cases never went to trial, they settled around 11 PM the night before first trial set to begin, in July 2007. Potts likes to claim plaintiffs served the wrong party as a way to get cases dismissed, and I believe Fromholz had this same astounded reaction to the claim that there really is no actual Archdiocese of Los Angeles as Judge Emilie Elias has here.)
JUDGE: But your fellow attorney Sean Kneafsey states here that he is the counsel for the Archdiocese of Los Angeles.
POTTS: That's just one stray piece of paper written by one liaison counsel at the last minute the night before a hearing the next day.
JUDGE: It’s emailed on your letterhead. If the notice of service is bad, no problem, you can re-serve. But this GAME you're playing where you say there is no Los Angeles Archdiocese, that is not something I feel comfortable with. You're claiming confirmation of receipt on an entity that doesn't exist. If I served you as the King of Scotland, would you feel you had to confirm receipt?
POTTS: Probably.
JUDGE: Oh b-- (stops herself) (Reads numerous references in Defense motions that use the word “archdiocese.”)
POTTS: (has become deflated as she speaks, then) It says something to the effect - I’ll have to check, you can acknowledge receipt-
J: (Stops him) Don’t do it.
POTTS: But, but-
JUDGE: Then serve again.
POTTS: We never had an option to object to the case as it was never released. They can’t have it both ways.
(I can’t believe Potts is saying this not 30 seconds after trying to say there is no archdiocese, except where church attorneys choose to include archdiocese in their own verbiage. Talk about trying to have it both ways.)
JUDGE: I find this, um, I can’t-
POTTS: An amendment doesn't correct this.
JUDGE: The answer is bring your fellow attorney Kneafsey in and swear him in to say who he represents.
(Potts does not seem enthused or willing to agree to do this, in fact, he only squirms in response)
POTTS: To motion to quash?
JUDGE: I'm not going to grant - I’ll take it under submission, I’ll write an order. . .
[NEXT HEARINGS WILL BE APRIL 20th, 11 AM in Dept. 308, Civil West, which is at 6th and Commonwealth. ]
LA City Buzz Will Be There.
To Read up on past activities in L.A. and national clergy cases go to
City of Angels Network 3 for the L.A. cases in 2007
City of Angels 4 For national coverage in 2008
City of Angels 5: Early 2009, before moving it all over here to LA City Buzz Examiner.
Mr. Potts did not want me to take his picture, and as soon as the light changed, he ran away:

Onward. . .
Read about Sin: A Cardinal Deposed in late March posts here at L.A. City Buzz Examiner by Kay Ebeling.
Closing arguments continue in the Fresno case.
***
LA TIMES runs puff piece on perp priest

The L.A. Times wrote a glowing feature story about one of the "bystanders" in the Franciscan cases that finally ended April 2nd and nothing about the final rulings. If you had any doubt that the Times serves corporate interests over informing the people read “Protesting priest’s path leads repeatedly to jail,” from April 8th, a feature story the Times chose to run days after a monumental ruling in LA Superior Court in a years long legal battle that the Times had been covering until about a year ago. The Times ignored the ruling April 2nd ruling.

Adults who were raped as children and won civil lawsuits with the Franciscans of St. Barbara in 2006 were waiting for the religious order to come through with the second part of the settlement agreement, release of personnel files on the perpetrator friars. The Times had sent a reporter, John Spano, to every hearing until Spano left the Times. Apparently no one took Spano's place.

But then for the Times to ignore the Court Order and instead run a foot-kissing feature story is inexplainable, other than the Times is cowtowing to Catholic Church pressure over the people's right to know the truth. Here at L.A. City Buzz we had been scathing ourselves, here and here Remember the Franciscans of Santa Barbara produced at least 20 perpetrators in a fifty year period. Of their victims. 59 came back as adults and filed lawsuits, there are undoubtedly dozens more, maybe hundreds, damaged souls who happened to grow up near Santa Barbara or be sent to St. Anthony’s Franciscan Seminary as teenage boys.

How one religious order could wreak havoc on a community, men coming up behind children and humping them openly - oh sorry that was another religious order in a different town. . . . There’s so much sex crime against children in the Catholic Church, different towns, same MO with slightly different details - it’s hard not to confuse them.

The Times had the same new information that I had about the final ruling from Judge Peter Lichtman, L.A. Superior Court finally ending the Franciscans’ two year pillaging of the justice system and they have a lot more resources than I do. The Times didn't even run a short news blurb about the ruling. In the stuff I wrote, I was scathing and rightfully so, I am a survivor and I tell you up front, I am biased.
But I'm not the media giant that the L.A. Times is.
So probably five hundred people read the stories here about the ruling that finally ends the lawsuits against the Franciscans, though they were settled in 2006.
The Franciscans of Santa Barbara, with teams of attorneys for their defense fighting one plaintiff attorney,Tim Hale of Santa Barbara, were trying to keep the public from finding out the truth about crimes committed by the Franciscans brothers overseeing the perpetrator priests - claiming vows of poverty while flying around the state with their lawyers - and finally two weeks ago, Judge Lichtman called it to a halt, even warning in his order April 2 covered here April 4 in 2 parts
The final paragraph of Judge Lichtman's April 2nd could have been written through gritted teeth, Lichtman writes: “This Court notes that there is no reason for any further briefing regarding objections to the production and publication of the contested documents. This Court has addressed every argument raised by Defendant Franciscan Friars. In addition, this Court addressed every argument addressed by alleged perpetrators and the bystanders.
“In the interest of justice, this Court even applied the arguments raised by the alleged perpetrators and the bystanders to each of the contested documents. No further arguments remain. As such, the matter is resoved. Signed Judge Peter Lichtman, April 2, 2009.”
Final word
So apparently the monk in brown robe with rope belt in charge of PR for the Franciscans picked up his phone and dialed one of the L.A. Times executives and pleaded for positive news coverage. What could they do? There is really only one friar who ever makes news and since it’s for protesting against nuclear weapons and for world peace, it would be easy to send one of the college interns working for credit instead of pay to do the story.
Whatever.
Reporter Richard C. Paddock stories go back to 2007 in the L.A. Times database, maybe he is a veteran. Anyone who is still working at a mainstream newspaper is too stretched to do decent coverage. The story that ran April 9th about Father Vitale, the monk who shows up prenenially at peace demonstrations in what to me looks like astonishing self promotion. I guess these monks spend so much time in isolated prayer and fasting they have no idea how ridiculous they look to people on the outside.
The Times reporter Paddock wrote:
“Vitale explains in his gravelly voice that he had a higher purpose when he trespassed two years ago at Vandenberg Air Force Base: calling attention to the perils of nuclear war and persuading military personnel to embrace nonviolence.

"The biggest threat to the world is our nuclear arsenal," he tells Magistrate Judge Rita Coyne Federman.

More than two dozen family members and friends, including actor Martin Sheen, are in the courtroom to show support for the friar and his three co-defendants.
*********************
Okay here’s where I have to stop and have a smoke or I’ll give in to my gag reflex. You can read the LA TImes story here if you really want to: If you don't want to bother reading the LA Times story, let me just share this wonderful quote from Martin Sheen about Father Vitale:
"He's one of my heroes," said Sheen, a longtime friend who has been arrested with Vitale in Nevada. "He is one of the great peacemakers."
My God, I can see that LA Times guy just writing down whatever they say and printing it. That's journalism?
Tim Hale, the plaintiff attorney in Santa Barbara who fought the teams of Franciscan law firms and won, had this to say in response:
Fr. Vitale joined the Franciscan Order's Province of St. Barbara at a time when there was an explosion of sexual abuse of children by Franciscans, including the abuse of at least fifty-nine Santa Barbara children. Despite repeated opportunities to address this criminal conduct he has failed miserably. At least as early as 1982 Fr. Vitale found himself on the front lines of the sex-abuse scandal while serving as Provincial Minister.
************************************
HALE: Are children any less deserving of the passion for a cause Father Vitale devotes to protesting nuclear war?

*******************************************************************
That year one of the survivors of sexual abuse by Fr. Mario Cimmarrusti (22 known victims) reported his abuse to Fr. Vitale. Fr. Vitale said that he "was not surprised," and that "others had complained" about Fr. Cimmarrusti. Fr. Vitale also said that the Franciscans had sent Fr. Cimmarrusti to Mexico but that he got into similar trouble with the Mexican authorities, who wanted to throw Fr. Cimmarrusti in prison. Fr. Vitale did not specify what events except that they were of a sexual nature with children and that the Province had made arrangements with the Mexican authorities to have Fr. Cimmarrusti deported in lieu of serving prison time. Fr. Vitale told the survivor that Fr. Cimmarrusti had been assigned to a place where he would not come in contact with children, and offered assurances that Fr. Cimmarrusti would never be again be assigned to a ministry that would place Cimmarrusti in contact with children. However, in the early 1990's the survivor learned Fr. Cimmarrusti had in fact been transferred to a parish duties in the San Juaquin Valley without any warning to the community.
*************************
HALE: Vitale was given yet another opportunity to help prevent childhood sexual abuse by his fellow Franciscans. Fr. Vitale provided no warning to parishioners or the surrounding community

****************************************************************

Similarly, while serving as pastor at St. Boniface in San Francisco in 2002, Fr. Vitale was given yet another opportunity to help prevent childhood sexual abuse by his fellow Franciscans. The Franciscans had previously settled a lawsuit for sexual abuse by Fr. Steve Kain in the 1990s. Nevertheless, when the Franciscans assigned Fr. Kain to St. Boniface, Fr. Vitale provided no warning to parishioners or the surrounding community.

Fr. Vitale's nonviolent protest against nuclear war and other societal ills is admirable. However, it is tragic he has not directed the same passion towards preventing childhood sexual abuse by his fellow Franciscans. Are children any less deserving of the passion for a cause Father Vitale devotes to protesting nuclear war?
***********************
The L.A. Times didn't write a paragraph, even though up to last year they had a seasoned report er with knowledge of the clergy cases, John Spano, covering the ongoing hearings between Franciscans law firm teams and Tim Hale fighting alone on behalf of the plaintiffs. Tim Hale won last week and the Times went looking for a positive story to run about the Franciscans.
They had to dig. There is one Santa Barbara Franciscan who pops up in the news like a carnival shooting target. Father Louis Vitale, who has been showing up at progressive demonstrations
“Dressed in the traditional brown robe and the knotted rope belt that signifies vows of poverty, chastity and obedience,” writes the Times. From the days of Martin Luther King to last year when again as reported in the Times, “Vitale explains in his gravelly voice that he had a higher purpose when he trespassed two years ago at Vandenberg Air Force Base: calling attention to the perils of nuclear war and persuading military personnel to embrace nonviolence.”
Oh give me a break says a friend of mine in Santa Barbara who has followed the fight with the Franciscans over their handling of pedophile brothers from the beginning.
Here is the extent of local news coverage, other than here at L.A. City Buzz, on the Court order re Franciscan privacy rights at the Injury Board website:



Los Angeles Judge Orders Franciscans to Open Clergy Files
InjuryBoard.com - ‎Apr 6, 2009‎
... saying doing so would violate their privacy rights. An attorney for the Franciscans had no immediate comment. Have an opinion about this post?
*

THE ILLUSIVE DEPOSITION OF GEORGE NEVILLE RUCKER
and other disappearing documents from L.A. Clergy Cases


L.A. Mid-Wilshire Superior Court bldg. (Kay Ebeling 2009)Last week I tried to track down the rest of the documents from Clergy Cases 2007, so I called the Superior Court media office, explained that the cases were moved from one courthouse to another, that “30 bankers boxes” of documents were to be released to the public in January. Will the remaining docs be scanned in with the rest of the JCCP docs, and will we ever have easy access to civil case documents in Room 106 of Superior Court downtown again? Asking the PIO got me no answer to either questial at all.
I'm learning, I have to be more aggressive, just go right up and ask anyone I see. So before the hearing April 20th in Department 308, I asked both Donald Steier defense attorney for the pedophile priests and Tony DeMarco plaintiff attorney for hundreds of the priests’ crime victims, “What is the deposition that the judge agreed to keep sealed? I think it’s with law enforcement, the deposition of George Neville Rucker. The judge ordered it to be returned to the party who provided it. Who is that party?”
What deposition? Both attorneys seemed flummoxed. Which order which judge?
Steier guffawed to me: “There are so many depositions in these cases, you think I remember one more than any other one? I can't remember everything. . . . "
I'm trying to get Steier to stop running this tape by interrupting: “With Rucker, the only document the judge seems to agree with you needs to remain sealed. Who did the deposition?”
But Steier was going on and on, “I can’t remember everything I do, I can’t remember everything I write or say,” then from a foot higher than me he is in my face saying: “I don't remember a lot of things, I don't even remember who you are.”
Silence. Okay, there’s jocularity between opposing parties and then there’s arrogance. I went into the courtroom convinced the new mantra for American liars is “I don't remember, I don't recall,” we've heard it in U.S. Senate hearings and every time a Catholic Church hierarchy person goes under oath.
FYI, from Order of Judge Emilie Elias
#3. Lodged Deposition transcript of Neville Rucker
Tentative Rulings: #3 is a lodged document and should be removed from the files and returned to the party who provided same to the Court.
(From: "Tentative Ruling Re: Purportedly Sealed and Lodged Documents" February 24, 2009)
****************************
The 11 o'clock hearing began and the rogue deposition of George Neville Rucker came up, who has it, where is it, what is in it, and how can the judge rule on whether it should be sealed if she doesn't even know what it is. Here is the gist of what was said in the hearing April 20th. (I do transcription for a living for TV production so I'm REAL fast and accurate. Most of the following lines would be found in the Hearing transcript if you could ever afford to buy one. )
JUDGE: I don't understand why a privilege log.
SEAN KNEAFSEY: Just categories of information such as nonparties including employees of the archbishop.
(Sean Kneafsey is one of several teams from several law firms that represent the L.A. Archdiocese corporation in these cases.)
(Judge Elias doesn't understand why it should be sealed.)
KNEAFSEY: For some reason it got put in the public court file, we believe it should remain sealed.
JUDGE: Okay the Miani one and then another one?
KNEAFSEY: The Miani one was filed under seal and there has been no argument over it. With the Rucker privilege log, that was erroneously filed in support of a motion to compel by a plaintiff’s lawyer. It has information such as names of individuals, it should have been lodged under seal with notice to all parties. I don't believe parties for Father Rucker realized until later that it hand’t been filed under seal when it should have been.
JUDGE: But you don’t represent the priests.
STEIER: He’s just articulating on my behalf, your honor, thank you. The only reason these documents were ever prepared was in response to motion to compel discovery. There would be no other reason for a privilege log to begin with.
JUDGE: What is the name of the priest again?
(ME: Oh no, the Judge does not even know the name of George Neville Rucker ? It’s bad enough no one seems to know where the deposition transcript is. )
JUDGE: I’ll consider putting them back under seal, if we can ever find them.
KNEAFSEY: We have a list of what box all the documents are in, and I can submit the location to you.
JUDGE: Oh this document is in one of the exhibit rooms. I don't know if there still is anything in the exhibit room. We don’t know, we're working on it now.
DEMARCO: There has to be good cause to keep them under seal. There still has to be good cause even if they're discovery. That said, these documents, the prior protective order pertained to specific information, if the opponent wants it sealed it should be only to that information.
JUDGE: Here’s the thing, I don't have them. What you've given me is a privilege log.
KNEAFSEY: I have copies of it in my officer, your honor. All the boxes were numbered and all the files were numbered so we can give directions to whoever has those documents as to where they're located.
JUDGE: The only person objecting is the one person whose name is in it. I need a copy of what was in the privilege logs. I don't have the privilege logs because they're over in those boxes. (OVERLAPPING DISCUSSION) Give me the box number and the location. I'm happy to look at them, but I don't believe I’ve ever even gotten them.
KNEAFSEY: Your honor has already ruled that discovery documents are sealed,
JUDGE: They don’t fall under two point five oh. Just get me a copy of them, as soon as I see them, I’ll rule. These seem to be the only documents left.
***************************
So, no one really knows where the Rucker deposition is.
If I want to see it, someone with a conscience reading this blog who knows where it is will get it to me. I could try calling the lawyers again, but which one?
********************************************
AFTER THE HEARING WAS OVER, the Judge Elias talked casually to DeMarco and Kneafsey. The Court Reporter was not listening, but I was standing behind the barrier that keeps the public from coming through and strangling attorneys …. I mean, I was standing there, already packed up my Acer but grabbed some paper and started taking notes, obviously listening as Judge Emilie Elias talked over the problem with the remaining documents with the two attorneys.
Some of the paralegals are “not putting them in the right envelopes” or other mistakes, so the Clerks are rejecting them and turning them back.
JUDGE: The Clerks know this stuff. The Plaintiffs want some of these documents sealed too. They have personal information about employment, their names.
Apparently this is a logistics problem in civil court with a lot of cases and Judge Elias is on a committee of judges and others who are trying to resolve the problem.
JUDGE: we do an education program on sealing documents for everyone. Everyone who wants to do it right.
[OVERLAPPING CONVERSATION]: SOMEONE: That creates a lot more work:
JUDGE: [INTERRUPTS] Following laws takes work.
She set up a breakfast meeting for their paralegals to meet with her in June.
The Wheels of Justice Grind Slo-o-o-o-owly…..
So frustrating to me coming to the Commonwealth courthouse to cover these little hearings. In the courtroom next door for a good two months now has been the Diet Doctor Jury Trial with cameras and a packed courtroom, lots and lots of testimony. I sat in on it for a few minutes last week and realized I was surrounded by angry plaintiffs, nudging each other, giving out collective harrumphs as the corporate side testified.
Why can’t people who were raped as children by priests and essentially got their innocence and understanding of sex destroyed - why do we so rarely get to experience justice?
*************************
DEMARCO IS TRYING TO GET A NEW TRIAL IN THE FRESNO CASE
Where the Jury awarded $0 to two plaintiffs.
Problem is in order to get a new trial, plaintiffs have to petition the same judge who apparently agreed pretrial with defendants on issues such as Introduction of evidence, so in the end in the Fresno trial there were days like this reported at Injury Board
In what had to be one of the more bizarre moments in court proceedings this morning, one of the plaintiff's attorneys was allowed to question Bishop Madera regarding the existence of the Ramierez documents (documents that would contradict Madera's earlier testimony), but was not allowed to ask about the actual documents, refer to the documents' contents or discuss any details of the complaints, including when the letters were written. This led Bishop Madera to deny any memory of these documents, but the Bishop constantly challenged the plaintiff's attorney by answering, "If such documents exist, why don't you show them to me?" The attorney then held up the document in front of the Jury, prompting the Defense to object that the document was not in evidence. The Judge, based on his earlier instructions, was forced to sustain all objections regarding this individual matter. This occurred for 45 minutes.

ABC News Fresno affiliate reported:
Bishop (John) Steinbock's testimony drew an emotional response. He said, "I never have returned anyone to ministry that I believe was guilty of sex abuse." But the victims' attorneys grew angry asking, what about Father Eric Swearingen? A former altar boy claimed Father Swearingen molested him at churches in Fresno and Bakersfield twenty years ago. In 2006, a jury found that allegation true. But that case ended in a mistrial because the jurors could not agree on whether the church ignored the abuse. Despite jurors believing Swearingen molested a child, the Bishop allowed Swearingen to remain a priest. To this day, Father Swearingen is a pastor at Holy Spirit. Bishop Steinbock stood by the father saying, "I do not believe that was credible at all .. I believe he was absolutely innocent."
Here is some sense of how the Hispanic culture prevents justice from happening in priest sex abuse cases where the jury pool is mostly Hispanic Catholic: From Abuse Tracker by Kathy Shaw April 20th.
The Priest’s Kids
PARAGUAY
Ex-Christian
[this article is also posted in Spanish]
A very small percentage of Hispanics are non-Catholics. I never was one, and I wrote on my blog the reasons a long time ago. One of the reasons was that growing up I learned about Catholic priests in my country being famously promiscuous. Often it was heard that they chose a special female on an exclusive basis that everybody knew as the “priest’s woman” (la mujer del cura).
Fernando Lugo, the president of Paraguay, it appears, used to be a bishop. And now that he left the priesthood to be involved in politics, at least two women have come forward to declare they had a child by him.

*************
DELETED PARAGRAPH:
The same week the LA Archdiocese began to realize they were losing the fight to seal documents, Room 106 where you could easily view documents closed for renovation, then reopened with everything still operating except the two rows of monitors where you used to be able to sit for 20 minutes, or longer if no one was waiting, and get hours of research done. Now there are two terminals combined in a room with every other service provided to the public, half a dozen people are in line for the terminals most of the time. You can spend ten minutes doing research, and then get back in the end of the line. With the thousands of documents about the 510 cases against the L.A. Archdiocese, it takes a good five minutes to even access the one you want to read. Routine civil cases usually have one case file, so people in the main public room can still ask for the paper file and sit down and read it. But with 510 civil cases that settled after two years of pretrial litigation, there is no way a journalist trying to research the Clergy Cases can get access to the documents well enough access to do meaningful research. So L.A. Superior Court has found a way to keep the public from reading the case files against Roger Mahony and the Catholic Church in Los Angeles.
There is more in my notes from the April 20th hearing. Mainly the judge wants to postpone decisions until the Hightower Decision comes down from the Supreme Court. LA City Buzz has to do some more reading….
Onward. . .



Author: Kay Ebeling
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Comments
Albino Luciani says:
www.bishop-accounability.org/abusetracker for daily verified & vetted reporting on the Rog "Mahal" Mahony pedo cult, costing laity literally mutiple billions of diverted and stolen offetory plate dollars, massively hiked insurance liability premiums per parish, and squanderd or sold laity paid for assets and real estate.

THE SOLUTION? "STOP DONATING LAITY!" as St. Peter Damien correctly asserted.

Ciao,

Albino Luciani,
MURDERED POPE
April 22, 9:12 PM
LA Archdiocese Watcher says:
Thanks Kay, no doubt the Church is pulling out all the stops to blackmail the DOJ, again, like they did during the Bush Adminstration.

I heard one of the arguments (old and tried) used during the Federal AJ shake-up, caused by the pedo Mahony Church lobbying, during the Bush Adminsitration, was "we bury the dead, don't mess with us or we'll mess with you".

The truth is, 9 out of 10 RC's don't have a funeral at all anymore, and only a small % of those who do, have a priest anywhere near it.

In an article online today, interviewing the new Archbishop Dolan, in NYC, there was admission that "90% of all sexual abuse victims of the Roman Catholic Church have yet to even come forward" which Dolan DID NOT REFUTE!

If the JJ Criminal Justice Report (free online at www.bishop-accountability.org) is to be believed, there were at least 14,000 kids sodomized or raped by RC priests and bishops and cardinals, in the last 40 or so years.

If 90% have not come forward, that means the real number of kids sexually assaulted exceeds 140,000 in just the USA with the Bishops allowing it to happen, repeatedly for many decades!

Back to Cruiser Rucker, yep, Mahony knew all about it and DID NOTHING, which is consistent with Mahony's M-O, except to keep it under wraps.

When it was more than obvious Rucker would be prosecuted, Mahony tried to get him out of the country, also consitent with Mahony's M-O (just like many, many dozens he personally did make or pay to flee).

Rucker fought the exportation, stayed, was prosecuted, convicted, and jailed.

Rucker handed his CRYSTAL CRUISES gig off to a non pedo priest (retired and by all reports truly a good man) doing hospital duty in LA, now living and serving Masses up in the Monterey Diocese, where they just busted another pedo pastor a few days ago, in Salinas, and Richard Garcia, the Bishop there, is trying to distance himself from, in knowledge of the felonies, but did know ahead of time, and knew there was a high probablity kids would be assaulted.

Garcia is clearly complicit as an accessory to sodomy and child endangerment; yet again, having been an enabler in the Diocese of Scaramento under pedo aid & abettor Weigand.

Thank you for your good work Kay.
April 22, 2:18 PM
kay, LA City Buzz Examiner says:
No, Watcher, all I get is "no comment" from US DOJ who won't even confirm there is a Grand Jury going on re Mahony. But the luxury cruise story is a new one. Email me at cityofangelslady@yahoo.com if you can give me more info for a story here. . . WOW, what a place to put a pedophile, on a cruise line working among kids.

So many more people were damaged by these guys than anyone knows of so far.
April 22, 11:12 AM
LA Archdiocese Watcher says:
Neville Rucker had the exclusive, and lucrative income gig, of being the Archdiocese priest, assigned to CRYSTAL CRUISES, as a chaplain, for many years, prior to his sentencing and jail time.

Because CRYSTAL would consider it BAD PR, and the attacks occurred on the HIGH SEAS, out of the jurisdiction of the domestic landed authorities, it was never reported that many children were attacked by Rucker, on these luxury cruises.

Some of the attacks occurred during the Tim Manning and Vicar General Bejamin Hawkes (a known and proven pedophile) era, and others under one Roger M. Mahony.

Roger was happy to have Neville off shore where he was less of a 'distraction'.

Any news Kay on the Criminal Grand Jury investigation on our felonious and demonic meglomaniac Cardinal Mahony?
April 22, 10:59 AM

*

Ron Howard is proving he may really be Opie, ignoring the 800 pound gorilla in the room with the release of Angels & Demons May 15th. In the story an assassin kidnaps four cardinals and plans to kill them and to blow up The Vatican. And the reason for all this pent-up anger has something to do with something that happened about seven hundred years ago?????? If there is any reason people in 2009 would get angry at the Catholic Church, it would likely be the serial felonies from recent decades, crimes against thousands of children, some who made it to adulthood. Pedophilia in the Catholic Church destroyed lives, and are crimes where the Church continues to use manipulation of civil law and criminal justice, and outright abuse of power, to keep the truth about its crimes from coming out.

Isn’t the pedophile crisis a little bit more topical than something the Illuminati may or may not have done in 1300? Funniest thing is the Catholic Church is criticizing Howard for the film Angels & Demons, when from what I see, the film is an apology Howard is making to the church for making DaVinci Code. Howard and others from the production are making an embarrassing number of public appearances to get out the word, “Hey, no this is just fiction. We really love the Catholic Church.” (see below). I wish everyone from Dan Brown to the screenwriters to the producers paid more attention to what is going on in the real world to write their fiction.

Hey, Ron Howard et al, there is a mound of REAL LIFE evidence against thousands of pedophile priests and the bishops who aided and enabled them at bishopaccountability.org, or my old website City of Angels, which is now City of Angels Productions, but we have no money. Why is Ron Howard still bothering with silly fiction when real life is much stranger than fiction, and a whole shipload more fascinating, stories that have never been told before. Especially when it comes to the stories of pedophile priests in the Catholic Church and the efforts the church has gone through to keep the real story stifled. Oh well City of Angels will do the story, it will just take a little time.

Ron Howard: Catholics Will Enjoy Angels & Demons
Seattle Post Intelligencer - ‎Apr 21, 2009‎
... surrounding The Da Vinci Code, director Ron Howard is trying to get ahead of any criticism that his latest film, Angels & Demons, is anti-Catholic. ...

Angels and Demons not anti-Catholic: Ron Howard
Hindustan Times - ‎Apr 22, 2009‎
"Let me be clear: neither I nor Angels & Demons are anti-Catholic. And let me be a little controversial: I believe Catholics, including most in the ...



Director Ron Howard defends "Angels & Demons"
Reuters - ‎Apr 21, 2009‎
... defended his film adaptation of "The Da Vinci Code" author Dan Brown's "Angels & Demons" from criticism that it smears the Roman Catholic Church, ...


Catholic Church demands ban on film
Hindu - ‎Apr 21, 2009‎
New Delhi (PTI): The Catholic Church in India has demanded a ban on the release of a film based on Dan Brown's bestseller "Angels and Demons", alleging that ...



Ron Howard Illuminates Angels & Demons: "Catholics Will Enjoy"
E! Online - ‎Apr 20, 2009‎
Looking to nip the inevitable religion controversy in the bud, the director of the upcoming Angels & Demons is already defending the Da Vinci Code sequel's
*****************

Onward...



*
What Happened to Lizzie & Kay

When Hollywood Highland Mall Went Up


Weekly rental motel where we lived while money ran outWhen we moved into For Rent Luxury Apartments on Franklin in 1998, the neighborhood was dark and scary. We never went down the hill to the boulevard a block away. Hookers there did things hookers nowhere else would do, and storefronts sold the paraphernalia to go with it. There were lap dance bars, adult peep shows, and just a darkness, it would seem dark even at high noon on a summer day on Hollywood Boulevard near Highland in the 1990s. But my daughter and I could stay up the hill on Franklin, and just always go east or west when we pulled out of the garage, never down to the boulevard, and afford a luxury rental at a low rent neighborhood rate.
Then in 2003 Hollywood Highland Mall opened and my landlady started to find reasons to knock on the door and threaten eviction.
I should have been more careful. I’d seen this apartment manager’s tactics before. Within the first months we moved in, the neighbor across the hall looked at me hollow-eyed as he carried his belongings out of his home, saying he had no idea where he would go. You watch, he said, after about three years, because of the rent control, they still find ways to raise the rent, or if they can’t do that, they find a way to make you move out, so they can charge the next tenant even higher rent.

*************************



It was a fluke. Mid-October 2003 I got in an argument with the manager that ended up with me saying, “Okay, then I give 30 days’ notice,” and I stormed off wondering why she was the one looking victorious. After a week I realized I was not going to find to an apartment anywhere near the $1100 I was paying then for the two-bedroom (Yes, cheap for L.A. even in 2003). Now even shabby one-bedrooms were $1250).

So all apologetic and humble I knocked on the manager’s door and said, you know what, I'm not leaving on the 15th after all-
And she interrupted.
“It’s too late, I’ve already rented your apartment for $1500 and they are ready to move right in, so I need you to vacate by the 15th, too late, you signed the papers.” Slam.
Okay, I know now that I could have fought back, my landlord did not really evict me, legally we could have stayed in the apartment.
No sheriff would have carried me and my daughter out of our home.
But see, I'm a crime victim and at that time I was a little depleted, living with PTSD. On top of that, in 1997 there was a murder in my family, and the inheritance I’d counted on all my life was embezzled and gone.
The perpetrators in both crimes walked free, while me, in 1998- 2005 or so, I was kind of in a daze, stunned, all the fight was gone out of me. It didn't even dawn on me to fight my landlord at that time. I just said, oh well, that's what she says so that's what we have to do, Lizzie, start packing. . . . So my daughter and I became homeless. We put most our stuff into storage and moved into a weekly rent motel. I figured I’d take whatever apartment I could find in the next week, but in the next month, I could not find anything.
*********************************

This self perpetuating downslide happened. We were in the motel another week and another week and I had less and less money paying for increasingly cheaper weekly rent motels and soon all the cash was gone.
Oh, I forgot to mention, back then I was doing the same job I do now, work that is all done from home. Since now I didn't have a home, I didn't have a place to do the job. I tried carrying the equipment up from the car and working from the motel room, using the internet café down the street to send files back and forth with my bosses. That fell apart after about a week…
Now what I find suspicious is that in 2003 when Hollywood Highland Mall had just gone up, the rent for every single apartment within ten miles suddenly went up the exact same amount. Everywhere in L.A., even in the dregs of Echo Park or below Wilshire, every single 1-bedroom apartment now cost $1250. Landlords had evidently colluded, gotten together and decided from now on everyone in L.A. will pay $1250 for a one bedroom. I don't know if it’s legal or ethical, but somehow the rents in L.A. went up the same amount all at the same time, in 2003, and to make it worse, there were hardly any vacancies, so you applied for an apartment and then competed with all the other people, auditioning for the same home.
This was all new to me in 2003. Now it’s just the way things are. I think I’ve figured it out. Every landlord charges at minimum whatever the Government is willing to pay for Section 8 units, and of course that “Fair Market Rate” is inflated not really a fair rate but definitely the market rate.
I am 60 years old, I have been on my own since I was 17, right here in Hollywood, and never in my whole life have I had a hard time finding an apartment and moving in. Now, my teenage daughter and I were in a kinda skanky motel, paying $325 a week.
We ended up being homeless for two years, a lot of that time we slept in our car on the streets of Hollywood. I’d park up in the hills so we’d feel safer as we slept, until we ran out of gas.
We moved into the Seven Star Motel about a week before Thanksgiving. I asked around and found out where poor people go for Thanksgiving dinner, and made a note to go there - and network with other homeless people.
I was so clueless about the world I was about to enter.
Part Two coming soon.
NOTE: My friends have been telling me for years I should write about the period my daughter and I were homeless in L.A. It was 2003-2005, almost two years to the date, from Thanksgiving to Thanksgiving. I think I'm finally distanced enough from the experience to be able to write about it, so I decided to do the story as a series here at L.A. City Buzz Examiner.
PHOTO: I love the Internet. When I wrote this Friday I realized I should run out now and get a shot of that motel. Instead I went to Google Images and found exactly the shot I would have taken. The photo of the Seven 7 Motel looks right at the room we had, right over the back entrance to the garage, with a window looking South, where anyone walking up LaBrea could see right into our room. From there I started my phone campaign trying to find help for my daughter and me, from that room I went out each morning trying to find a place for us to live before our money ran out.

*

Case filed by plaintiff who is child molester in prison could set standard

May 13, 6:09 PM

Thomas Hightower watched from Mule Creek State Prison in Ione, California, as the Diocese of Sacramento agreed in July 2005 to pay $35 million to settle 33 claims of sexual abuse by priests, including 16 against Tacoma priest Mario Blanco. There were 17 cases filed, presumably the 17th was Hightower’s left unsettled. Yes, pedophile priest named in 17 lawsuits, Mario Blanco was still serving as a priest in 2005 in Tacoma, Washington.

Perpetrator priest Blanco In fact, while at least 17 men dealt with interrogatories from Catholic Church attorneys and lengthy litigation on their cases, Mario Blanco was being flown around the state by Mel Gibson. A man who became close to the priest in the 12 years he was at the Tacoma church and kept his schedule for several years said:

“Blanco traveled to such cities as Redding, Calif., Spokane, Tucson, Ariz., Denver and Los Angeles. The priest was so respected that the actor Gibson regularly flew Blanco to Southern California to celebrate Mass for a group of traditionalists. He said the actor also took the priest to Mexico to buy vestments and other items for the church.
From: Accused Priest Led a Public Life
The News Tribune [Tacoma WA]

A description of how Blanco insinuated himself into families’ lives in and around Sacramento from the Sacramento Bee:
According to diocesan records and people who remember him. Blanco was a talented musician who started church youth bands. That's how the the family of one of his plaintiffs met him
They recount how their parents were thrilled that Blanco paid attention to their sons, especially when he told them he wanted to start a band featuring their kids.

"My parents thought it was going to take them somewhere ... that he was going to make their kids famous," says Chico Chavez.

He says his father worked long hours as a landscaper. Their mother was often ill and spent much of her time in bed. There were 10 children. Blanco taught the kids music, and their father was so happy that he built a makeshift stage area in a corner of the basement. The Norteno-style band called "Crysol" played at several churches throughout the diocese, according to a church news clipping from the time. They cut two records in Spanish.

Over time, Blanco became a frequent visitor to the Chavez house.

Chico Chavez claims in his suit that the priest assaulted him repeatedly beginning when he was young. He says he was too ashamed and frightened to tell anyone and that the priest threatened the family. Chavez says it wasn't until he was a teenager, and told his brothers David and Javier that he had been abused, that they told him they had also been assaulted by Blanco.

Jaime says he fought off the priest. But Jaime also became increasingly hostile -- he picked lots of fights at school -- over the priest's presence in their home.

The boys say that when they told their parents about the abuse, their father became angry, accusing them of telling lies about the priest. But the boys made it clear they didn't want the priest around.

But they say Blanco did come back.

Each of the Chavez brothers describes waking up in the middle of the night and seeing that the priest had been staring at them through a window while they slept in the basement. They say he threatened them, and they chased the priest down the street. After that, they started sleeping with the baseball bats by their sides.

Their father declined to speak to The Bee. Their mother died in 1992.

Blanco said he does not remember the incident
From Dec. 20, 2003 Sacramento Bee story
*****************************
So the attorneys are not the only ones waiting for a decision in Hightower and Quarry.
I am too.
Stay tuned here at LA City Buzz Examiner.
******************************************
Tim Hale, Santa Barbara attorney, helped me understand Hightower
"Hightower came out during heart of coordinating proceeding and claimed the plain language statute 340.1 was not the plain language of the statute," Hale said.
"As to why Hightower could impact so many other cases, as you know, most survivors never come to terms with what happened to them. Hell, some never even remember it, instead taking their nightmares to their graves. And for those few who do remember they were abused and recognize the harm the abuse caused, quite often that recognition does not come until much later in life after years of struggling with various demons they did not realize originated with their abuse.
“The end result of this is very few people make the connection between injury and abuse before they turn 26.
“Under Hightower, anyone who was 26 or older in 2003 does not have the right to make a claim under CCP 340.1's standard of making the connection between the injury and the abuse. This arbitrary cut-off could not have been intended by the legislature, but that is exactly what Hightower holds.
“The result is the dismissal of any case filed by someone who was over the age of 26 in 2003 (unless they had completely repressed their memory of the abuse, in which case there is case law that some courts -- not Judge Elias -- believe allows the plaintiff to avoid the Hightower result).”
The march of justice goes on. . . slowly

The decision affects anyone who wants to file a civil lawsuit for child sex abuse, but cases against the Catholic Church were being thrown out in L.A. because of a 2006 decision in a case litigated by Thomas Hightower, a plaintiff who filed his own briefs from a cell in Mule Creek State Prison.

The Bishop of Oakland won the case against Thomas Hightwoer on appeal, saying the suit was time barred by the Statute of Limitations, thus making all cases filed after the age 26 cap since December 2003 invalid. Now another appellate decision on the Quarry case in February 2009 disagrees with Hightower and says cases filed after age 26 are valid.

“The main difference is that Quarry was litigated by professional plaintiff attorneys,” says a plaintiff attorney in Santa Barbara.

Any day now the California Supreme Court could either agree to take the Quarry appeal, or refuse to take Quarry, making Hightower law. “The main difference is that Quarry was litigated by professional plaintiff attorneys,” says a plaintiff attorney in Santa Barbara.

The outcome of this case could keep plaintiffs from being able to file lawsuits as adults about sexual assault they experienced as a child in the state of California, except under strict guidelines that either no longer exist or continue to exist since the passage of CCP 340.1 in 2002.

Blanco, Hightower perpAttorneys and judges in the California Clergy Cases are now “waiting for Hightower,” as future civil cases re child sexual assault in this state hinge on this decision coming up any day now in the California Supreme Court. In hearings last month, Judge Emilie Elias referred indirectly to the February 2 Quarry decision and delayed action on several Los Angeles cases re Catholic priests saying, “My intent is to stay any more of the Hightower motions until we see if the Supreme Court takes them.
“I'm just not going to hear them until we see what's happening.”
Judge Elias has already dismissed about a dozen child sex assault lawsuits against the Catholic Church that have come before her since January 2008 when she took over the Clergy Cases from retiring Judge Haley Fromholz, based on the 2006 decision in the Hightower appeal. One after the other, Elias granted the LA Archdiocese’s motions to dismiss - based on the Second District Court of Appeal decision in the case of Hightower vs. the Roman Catholic Bishop of Sacramento, now on appeal, which said the Legislature did NOT remove the age 26 cap. She stopped dismissing cases when the February 2, 2009 Quarry decision came out, and now everyone is waiting for the California Supreme court.
The Deck Once Again Stacked in Church’s Favor
The church will have managed to stack the deck entirely in its favor if the state Supreme Court turns down Quarry and retains Hightower, because Hightower was filed by a plaintiff filing motions for himself from state prison, where he is incarcerated as a hild sexual molester himself.
How could the Hightower case become the case that decides the future of child sex assaults lawsuits in California?
A decision as important as the Hightower appeals court decision in August 2006, litigated for plaintiffs by a damaged man in prison, if left in place, could return the State to pre- CCP 340.1 thinking. When the Legislature created the one-year window for lawsuits to be filed in 2003, most lawyers agree the legislators also removed age 26 cap from the statute of limitations.
The Bishop of Sacramento was able to get an appellate court to disagree. Fighting against one plaintiff filing motions from prison.
“Under Hightower, anyone who was 26 or older in 2003 does not have the right to make a claim under CCP 340.1's standard of making the connection between the injury and the abuse,” explains attorney Tim Hale in Santa Barbara. “This arbitrary cut-off could not have been intended by the Legislature, but that is exactly what Hightower holds.”
The Quarry decision from the First Appellate Court in Alameda in February 2009 counters Hightower, saying:
“Effective 2003 the Legislature deleted the age 26 cutoff as against a narrow category of third party defendants who had both the knowledge and the ability to protect against abusive behavior but failed to do so. Anyone discovering that childhood abuse was the cause of their injuries after 2003 could sue these—more culpable—defendants without regard to the age 26 cutoff.”

The Hightower decision reads:
“The statute of limitations ran out on Hightower's claims in 1977.”

Hightower’s case if full of errors, and it is different from almost every other child sex assault case in California. Yet the decision in this case filed by a prison inmate, fighting singlehandedly all the way to the Supreme Court against the Roman Catholic Church, could affect all future cases filed for sexual abuse that include a third party, not just against the Catholic church, but any guilty third party that was negligent and allowed sex crimes against the child now an adult filing a lawsuit to continue.
Where the third party - any employer or a corporate entity - is at fault, as has been the case with thousands of cases against the Catholic Church, the appellate decision in this weak case filed by Thomas Hightower, a prison inmate without an attorney, could affect the future of child sexual assault tort law in California.
Background on the unique case of Thomas Hightower:

Mule Creek State Prison, where Hightower residesThe Hightower case like so many
Is a story in itself:
Thomas Hightower claims he got his “letter to bishop stating intent to sue” postmarked from Mule Creek State Prison mail December 23, 2003, putting his “motion” into the one year window for civil suits re sexual assault that the California Legislature opened in Civil Codes: 340.1 -
What is it this one plaintiff’s case - filed by a prison inmate acing on his own behalf; indeed the appeal briefs that led to the Second District appeal decision were filed by Hightower acting as his own attorney from prison - why is this the case that is used to go all the way to the California Supreme Court?
Hightower’s case is not at all similar to the more than 600 civil cases filed in California during that one-year window in 2003 or any cases filed since. Yet this weird case might be used to set the standard for all future child sex assault lawsuits in the state.
Once again the cards are stacked in favor of the Roman Catholic Church, who we know had teams of attorneys from several law firms fighting against Hightower, as they do with all their cases in California. All that power is fighting one damaged man in prison, who says he is a child molester himself because of the damage done to him by Mario Blanco?
Hightower’s case was too muddled to set a standard
From the Hightower appellate decision:
“January 14, 2004, the Sacramento court refused to file the document as a complaint because Hightower did not include the filing fee or a fee waiver request,” reads the Hightower decision.
“He alleged that as a state prison inmate he had an extra year to file his complaint under section 352.1 and that the delayed discovery rule for repressed childhood memories applied."
The Hightower case is extremely unusual and should not be allowed to affect future cases in California.
Hightower made a lot of mistakes filing from prison: More from the Hightower decision:
“Apart from a general statement that beginning at the age of 12 he was sexually abused by a priest of the Sacramento Archdiocese from 1970 to 1972, the document contains no allegations concerning a basis of liability against the bishop, does not mention damages, and seeks no relief. Finally, Hightower confirmed at the hearing on the bishop's demurrers that he filed the December 2003 document in order to put the court on notice that he was suing the bishop, that a formal complaint was being prepared, and that he eventually planned to file a complaint.”
He told the court in a hearing: “This is what I'll be suing for, and the formal complaint is being composed just as fast as I can get it composed.”
The case in the Quarry Decision is more likely similar to future cases: In Quarry, six brothers claim they were sexually abused by a Catholic priest in the 1970’s, when they were children. They sued defendant Doe I (Bishop of Alameda) in 2007 for damages due to adult-onset psychological injuries allegedly caused by that abuse. When they sued, they ranged in age from 43 to 40, but they did not discover until 2006 that the cause of their adulthood psychological injuries was the childhood sexual abuse.
The Bishop demurred to the complaint, arguing that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations of Code of Civil Procedure[1] section 340.1.
The appellate court disagreed and said:
“Plaintiff need only allege the onset of psychological injury or illness after the age of majority and that he commenced his action within three years of the time he discovered or reasonably should have discovered such psychological injury or illness was caused by the childhood sexual abuse. (§ 340.1, subd. (a).)” (Id. at p. 1186.)
NOTE: Once again, the Church never denies these crimes took place, they just hire teams of attorneys to block justice for the crime victims.
More about Hightower’s case that reads like a drama:
Thomas Hightower watched from Mule Creek State Prison in Ione, California, as the Diocese of Sacramento agreed in July 2005 to pay $35 million to settle 33 claims of sexual abuse by priests, including 16 against Tacoma priest Mario Blanco. (there were 17 cases filed, presumably the 17th was Hightower’s left unsettled.
Yes, Mario Blanco was still serving as a priest in 2005 in Tacoma, Washington.

In fact, while at least 17 men dealt with interrogatories from Catholic Church attorneys and lengthy litigation on their cases, Mario Blanco was being flown around the state by Actor Mel Gibson:

8&&&&&&&&&

Contempt. Now I understand the use of that word for disrupting the court. Listening to arguments by attorneys for the Franciscans of Santa Barbara in L.A. Superior Court last week, I had to take on physical restraints to keep myself from jumping up and hollering. Especially when they they mentioned the Friars’ vows of poverty, I kept wanting to somehow get it on the record: Vow of poverty? Then how can they have three law firms in here representing them? And when have these brothers ever had to skip a meal to feed their kids, or sacrifice to pay bills? All their bills are paid for them. What do they really know of poverty?

If a person jumps up and starts screaming in a hearing, does the Court Reporter take it down? Do you get to go on the record one last time before they throw you out of there forever?

Equally astounding was the Franciscans now, three years after the Santa Barbara settlements, claim the documents about the perpetrators have to be secret due to the father son relationship between the hierarchy and the brothers below them.

“These are adult men,” Judge Peter Lichtman pointed out after pointing out that he had already pointed all this out several hearings back and repeated it several times since then. The church attorney then threatened to appeal because he thought the judge was laughing at him.

That was me laughing out loud at you back in the viewing area.

But here is the part that makes me need even more anger management:

What's missing from our current state of civil justice: The voice of the plaintiffs, the crime victims, like me, aren’t even part of these procedures. There is one plaintiff attorney who sticks it out hearing after hearing, Tim Hale of Santa Barbara, but he is forced to respond to the church's ludicrous claims, I don't know if anyone ever mentions the crime victims. I am in the lone one, sitting in the back silent, taking notes.

“When have you ever gone a day without food so your kids would have something to eat?” Vow of poverty?

No matter how superfluous and redundant and ridiculous the arguments, the Court has to listen, be attentive, judicial, as there is always the threat of an appeal. Apparently you can win an appeal because the judge grinned during your argument in trial court

Contempt. I'm filling up with contempt, scrawling on a yellow pad...

And a father son relationship? So now the priests aren't just pedophiles but they are committing incest too, is that the church’s argument? Sorry, guys, but the judge may be listening. The public - like Me - we see right through you. And sorry, priests, but after all these years, if you are still in there schmoozing with the bishops, you are just as guilty as Goeghan and Shanley from Boston. So sit there and start taking some grief. To me, Catholic priests have lost all claim to respect. If you are still in there with them, you are one of them.

Of all the groups who can’t claim knowledge of parent-child relationships, I think Catholic Priests come out way on top.

Maybe if these priests had been able to marry and have kids in the first place, they would have seen the damage done to children and never raped us in the first place.

Superfluous ludicrous arguments made by people with no real right to make them, in 20-minute intervals of meaningless rhetoric, talking away in front of the court.

Like battery bunnies.

They just keep going and going, filing motions and motions, scheduling hearings and hearings, and getting away with it. Catholic Church lawyers with endless budgets can take a phrase in a plaintiff argument and write a 75 or 126 page objection with declarations from all the excess monsignors etcetera who are sitting around collecting salaries, they might as well do something, have them file an friend of the defendant affidavit.

The judge and the plaintiffs apparently have no choice but to respond, go through this theatrical demonstration of a hearing as though the Church legal motions were reasonable. But they're usually ludicrous, the result an endless supply of cash supplied to a growing class of nearly amoral attorneys.

So in the end, as long as you can afford to file motions, you will win your case, since the person who runs out of money first loses.

That's American Civil Jurisprudence today. No wonder I'm thinking about learning to make stink bombs. . . .

NOTE: The morning hearing Tuesday about Los Angeles Documents was continued to April 1st.

This is Part 3 of the story.

Here is part one which is much more angry.

Here is Part Two which is even angrier

I’m listening to the 500 dollar an hour or more attorney talking in front of the courtroom about vows of poverty. Poor Father Chinnici. “He stood up in a public forum in 1993 at the Board of Inquiry," pleads his attorney, and now whatever the Friar wrote has to remain secret. So this priest sitting next to me is trying to hide what he wrote in a personnel file after the Santa Barbara Board of Inquiry in 1993? You totalitarian freak! That is PUBLIC INFORMATION. How dare you claim “authorship” with your tacky suede shirt. No author would dress like that.



I am still waiting for the replacement battery for my laptop so instead am scrawling on a yellow pad these notes: My contempt grows as the Nicholas Heldt says the friars who abetted the perpetrators “had no choice back then because of their vows of obedience and poverty.”

That's how you display your poverty, in your little overfed face and hands that never saw hard work, you sit there and have three attorneys arguing in front of a judge saying you have a right to hide what you wrote about these pedophile freaks.

What kind of a pedophile freak are you?

“This was the most important decision of Father Chinnicci’s life,” spoke the overpaid, overfed attorney for the Franciscans, and I scrawled in my notes: “This wimpy priest on my left can’t handle the trauma of the public seeing what he wrote, and “This was the most important decision of his life”?

Oh too bad.

And that's all I wrote, there’s nothing else.

I start ranting whenever I think about this stuff.

It's so bad i have to stop and dance to this video a few times, for ANGER MANAGEMENT:

In Court Tuesday wanted so much to scream at them all: Where is the crime victim here? You're all going to stand here jabbering about ancillary issues, and the judge has already admitted that everything we say here is going to end up in an appeals court, so this is really all about some kind of display, some theatrical carrying out of justice, that has nothing to do with the crimes that were committed.

In 2 hours of hearings, the word pedophile was never mentioned, sodomy, forced oral sex, children forced to be penetrated over and over again before they even reached puberty, none of that is comin up.

In 2 hours of hearings, the word pedophile was never mentioned

They're debating issues that have NOTHING AT ALL TO DO with the crimes that were committed. I want to blow up the whole building. So instead I go across the street, have a smoke, and go take pictures. Here’s some more of my notes:

An element of sleeze emanates from the attorneys from three law firms who show up to represent Franciscan Friars and various ancillary issues, as the church digs deep into its bottomless briefcase full of cash to pay for attorneys to make up issues that are meaningless, do nothing but take up the Court’s time as judges are forced to listen to everything these overpaid idiots say in front of them, or they will end up having their decisions overturned in Appeals Court. Everything in Trial Court is done to prepare for Appeals Court, kinda like the way every medical decision is made by an insurance company in today’s upside down America. One of them Nicholas Heldt, who I showed compared to people he resembles in a previous post

As court begins he introduces the creep on my left: “Father Joseph Chinnicci, sitting in the courtroom, is one of the bystanders.” Ooh. Creeps. He’s all pasty white like he never sees sunlight, he’s wearing these clothes that look like they never get washed and he might sleep in them, they're all wrinkled and worn out.

(PART 3 TOMORROW)

Here is the Santa Barbara Board of Inquiry Report which says Father Chinnici was in charge of depositions:

INDEPENDENT BOARD OF INQUIRY
Regarding St. Anthony's Seminary
P.O. Box 1065
Santa Barbara, California 93102

Presentation of Board's Report
November 29, 1993
[Note: This web page was scanned from a printed copy of the presentation by Geoffrey B. Stearns, Esq., in the Ray & Anne Higgins Archive. For a picture of Stearns and the other panelists at the presentation, see Molested at St. Anthony's, by Andrew Rice, Santa Barbara Independent, December 2-9, 1993.]
I'm Geoffrey Stearns, Chairperson of the Board.
With me are my fellow board members: Kathleen Baggarley, Keith Mar and Ray Higgins. Our out-of-town members, Father Dismas Bonner and Eugene Merlin were not able to be here because of the demands of their respective professional commitments and schedules.
The purpose of our meeting is to present to you the final report of the Independent Board of Inquiry Regarding St. Anthony's Seminary; to highlight some of its key portions; and to make copies of it available for distribution. Before beginning a discussion of the report's content, I'd ask you to bear with me while I attempt to create a context for it.
As most of you know, our Board was convened by the Franciscan Province in January of this year, when we met with Father Chinnici to receive background and briefing about the problem of sexual abuse at the seminary, as it was then understood. I don't think any board member could anticipate the magnitude and importance of the task that lay ahead.
I do think we shared a sincere willingness to do whatever we could to find out the truth and report it, to help as many victims as possible, and to come up with [page 2 begins] sound ideas to try to prevent a tragedy like this from reoccurring in the future. At this point, I would like to acknowledge and appreciate my board colleagues for their dedication, professionalism, intelligence, humanity, humor and good-will. I am extremely proud to have been part of a group of this caliber, and am grateful for an opportunity to experience firsthand what I truly believe we have achieved—a comprehensive and effective pastoral response to an extremely confusing and painful situation.
Once you have had an opportunity to review the report, I believe most of you will find it to be a serious and thoughtful document—one that is accessible to the reader, thorough and sensitive in its approach to very troubling subject matter, and helpful to those among both the clergy and the laity who wish to continue to proactively address the issue of clerical sexual abuse. Ultimately, our hope is that the report will help promote healing for all concerned.
As you might expect, the majority of our report is devoted to our Findings and Recommendations. The findings section discusses the nature and extent of the abuse; its effects on victims, families and the community; and the dispositions of offending friars. It was written to convey the true nature and extent of the abuse, while preserving [page 3 begins] the security, and sense of security of those victims who came forward and spoke in reliance on our pledge of confidentiality. No names or other information that could lead to identification of a victim were included. We had no authority to release offenders' names; that decision lies with the Province and the offenders themselves. However, we also do believe that in some cases, disclosure of offenders' names would lead to identification of a victims. In the couple of instances where victims' experiences are set forth verbatim, we were careful to obtain their informed written releases.
Turning to the findings themselves, we found that in the years in question (1964 - 1987), a serious problem of sexual abuse of minors by friars existed at the seminary. We have identified eleven friars as perpetrators of sexual abuse; a twelfth friar was identified as probably having engaged in pre-abusive conduct, sometimes referred to as "grooming".
Of the students who have thus far come forward as a result of the Board's outreach effort, thirty four were identified as victims of sexual abuse, and one additional student as the object of "grooming" by a friar. One of the friars had seven known victims; another friar had eighteen known victims; the other friars had either two victims or one victim. Without going into graphic detail now, I will [page 4 begins] indicate that the report describes a wide range of serious sexually abusive behaviors perpetrated under a variety of circumstances, spread among the friars in a somewhat even fashion.
With respect to the disposition of offenders, first of all, I want to state that no offending friar is either assigned to ministry or placed in Santa Barbara County. Further, I believe that we have forged an ongoing, collaborative process with Father Chinnicci to assist him in making dispositions that are safe and secure, and solidly based on the recommendations of experienced sex-offender evaluators.
Of the twelve identified friars, one is deceased; one was criminally prosecuted and left the order; one left the order before final profession; and as to a fourth friar, who is suspected of grooming, more information is being awaited before a final disposition is completed.
Of the remaining eight friars, seven have been sent by the Province to highly respected professionals, experienced in working with sexual offenders and recommended by this Board, where they are currently in various stages of assessment and treatment. The eighth was evaluated by a forensic sex offender evaluator agreed upon by himself and the Provincial Minister. These eight friars are either [page 5 begins] restricted from ministry and contact with minors pending completion of evaluation or have such restrictions in place as were recommended by their evaluation and/or treatment professionals.
It must be emphasized that oversight of the offenders is an ongoing process. The permanent board will know who and where these friars are, and will continue to work with the Provincial Minister to modify or refine any given disposition as new information surfaces or therapy progresses.
Similarly, in other ways this report marks the end of one phase and the beginning of the next. We have set forth a comprehensive set of recommendations concerning: (1) prevention of further abuse through screening, training, formulation of guidelines and provision of support for friars; (2) methods of dealing with both known, and any newly reported offenders in a timely and effective manner; (3) ongoing pastoral response to, and support of victims and families; (4) a proactive stance for the Province towards laity in general, e.g., through ongoing education and other prevention work; and (5) the scope and functions of the permanent board, referred to as the Independent Response Team, which will operate on a Province-wide basis.
We are gratified by the number of victims and family members whom we have been able to help by providing the [page 6 begins] therapy they need and deserve. We believe there will be other victims that will come forward when they are ready and able, and that they will be assisted by a permanent board with effective and sensible processes, implemented in a caring and humane way.
We want to express our appreciation to Father Chinnici and the Province for their dedication to this painful and necessary task and for their support of our work. We wish to convey to the victims and their families our deepest admiration and respect. We thank the Greater Community for its support and valuable input along the way. And lastly, we would like to leave you with our belief that a process has been created and set in motion that has worked, is working, and will continue to work; and thus is worthy and deserving of the trust and support all of concerned.
GEOFFREY STEARNS
Chairperson

Father Joseph P. Chinnici claims his vow of poverty earms him special treatment using two attorneys who flew down with him from San Francisco. If the poverty claim doesn't work, then it’s a parent child relationship, and if that doesn't work then it was a psychiatrist-patient relationship, whatever will let Franciscan Friars keep the truth about their sex crimes against children from becoming public. Father Chinnici was the point of many arguments in the courtroom of Peter Lichtman Tuesday as the beige skin white haired blank faced priest wants to keep his life a secret. Well here is his resume, which I found easily on line. So much for your anonymity, little weasel man who thinks poverty has something to do with wearing tacky shoes.

Here's a lesson for the priest about poverty lifestyles: Next time watch who you sit next to while you carry out this rape of jurisprudence in L.A. Superior Court. That was me next to you, a journalist who is also a very damaged member of the crime victim community you Catholics created. Thousands of children got raped by you priests and then you have the nerve to sit next to me in court? It’s YOUR Religious order, Father Chinnici, the Franciscan Friars of Santa Barbara that allowed 24 priests to rape at least 60 children in that one small beach town. For more information read the story linked below. Then read thefrightened little priest's "curriculum Vitae" copy and pasted below.




Franciscan Head. . .

These attorneys have a topless budget they are using to abuse the American Court system and keep the public from finding out what their clients, the Roman Catholic Church, turned loose on the California landscape the last part of the Twentieth Century, so below is Curriculum Vitae of Fr. Joseph Cannici, found easily on line, with more to come.

The Catholic Church will go to any length to keep from having to release not to the public but just to a judge for review, documents that may tell the story of the Franciscan Friars of Santa Barbara’s contribution to the pedophile epidemic in the Catholic Church including a letter that will put Father Chinnici in the public eye. There will be another post following this one shortly, plus more posts about Tuesday’s hearings. Here is Chinnici's resume:

Joseph P. Chinnici, O.F.M.

Curriculum Vitae
1508 Arch Street
Berkeley, California 94708
510-845-1124
Franciscan School of Theology
1712 Euclid Ave.
Berkeley, California 94709
Roman Catholic Priest, Ordained June 17, 1972
Professed member of Order of Friars Minor, Province of Saint
Barbara, 1965; solemn profession, December 6, 1970
Pastoral and Administrative Experience:
1971-1972: Deacon, Priest, Holy Family Parish, Pueblo, Colorado
1972-1976: Chaplain, Our Lady's Convent School, Abingdon, England
1976- : Retreat Director
1979-1984: Director of Formation for Franciscan friars studying theology
1979-1984: Provincial Definitor, Province of Saint Barbara
1979-1985: Assistant Academic Dean, Franciscan School of Theology, Berkeley, California
1984-1988: Vicar Provincial, Province of Saint Barbara
1988-1997: Provincial Minister (CEO), Province of Saint Barbara, Order of Friars Minor
1998-2001 Commission for the Restructuring of the Order of Friars Minor, Curia Generalizia
deiFrati Minori, Rome, Italy.
2000-2005 Academic Dean, Franciscan School of Theology,Berkeley, California
2000- Chairman, Commission on the Retrieval of the Franciscan Intellectual Tradition,
English Speaking Conference, Order of Friars Minor.
2001-2003 Convenor, Council of Deans, Graduate Theological Union
Fall, 2003 Acting President, Franciscan School of Theology, Berkeley, California
Educational Background:
B.A. : San Luis Rey College, San Luis Rey, California
June 2, 1968
Major: Philosophy
M.A. : Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, California
June 11, 1971
Major: Theology; Honors: Church History
M.Div. : Franciscan School of Theology, Berkeley, California
June 2, 1972
D.Phil. : University of Oxford, Oxford, England
February 28, 1976
Thesis: "John Lingard and the English Catholic
Enlightenment"
Major field: Modern Church History

Prrofessional Experience:

1975-1980 Associate Professor of Church History, Franciscan School of Theology, Berkeley
1976-1988 Doctoral Faculty, Committees, Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, California
1980- Professor of Church History, Franciscan School of Theology, Berkeley, California
1987 Catholic Daughters of the Americas Chair of Church History, Catholic University of
America (Spring only)
1998 Visiting Scholar, St. Paul Seminary, School of Divinity, University of St. Thomas, St. Paul,
Minnesota
1999-: Doctoral Faculty, Graduate Theological Union
1999-: Visiting Faculty, The Franciscan Institute, St.
Bonaventure University, St. Bonaventure, New York
Membership in Professional Associations:
American Catholic Historical Association
Committee on Nominations, 1984-1987
American Historical Association
United States Catholic Historical Society
Publications:
I. Books and Editorships:
The English Catholic Enlightenment, Shepherdstown, West Virginia: Patmos Press, 1980
Ed., Devotion to the Holy Spirit in American Catholicism, New York:
Paulist Press, 1985.
Living Stones: The History and Structure of Catholic Spiritual Life in the United States, New
York: Macmillan, 1989
Living Stones: The History and Structure of Catholic Spiritual Life in the United States, second
edition with new preface, New York: Orbis Books, 1996.
With Sr. Angelyn Dries, O.S.F., eds., Prayer and Practice in the American Catholic Community,
Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Press, 2000.
General Editor, The Franciscan Heritage Series:
I. Kenan B. Osborne, OFM, The Franciscan Intellecltual Tradition,
Tracing Its Origins and Identifying Its Central Components, with
Introduction by Joseph P. Chinnici, OFM, v-xiii, (St.Bonaventure,
NY: The Franciscan Institute, 2003).
II. Ilia Delio, OSF, A Franciscan View of Creation, Learning to Live
in a Sacramental World, with Introduction by Joseph P. Chinnici,
OFM, v-xv, (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 2003).
In Jim O’Toole, ed., Habits of Devotion, Catholic Religious Practice in Twentieth-Century
America (Ithaca, NewYork: Cornell University Press, 2004), “The Catholic Community at Prayer,
1926-1976,” 9-87.
Articles, 2000-2004
“Poverty: An Image for the Franciscan Presence in the World,” Laurentianum 41 (2000), 413-437,
reprinted in Greyfriars Review 16 (2002), 95-117.
“Deciphering Religious Practice: Material Culture as Social Code in the Nineteenth Century,” U.S.
Catholic Historian 19.3 (Summer 2001): 1-19.
“Negotiating the Social Gaps: Practicing a Trinitarian Expereince in the Tradition of the Evangelical
Life,” The Cord 51 (May/June 2001), 138-152.
“Institutional Amnesia and the Challenge of Mobilizing our Resources for Franciscan Theology,” in
Elise Saggau, OSF, ed., The Franciscan Intellectual Tradition, Washington Theological Union
Symposium Papers 2001 (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 2002), 105-150.
“Penitential Humanism: Rereading the Sources to Develop a Franciscan Urban Spirituality,” in
Roberta A. McKelvie, OSF, ed., Franciscans in Urban Ministry (St. Bonaventure University, NY:
The Franciscan Institute, 2002), 105-150.
“The Credentials of Truth and Honesty,” U.S. Catholic Historian 20.2 (Spring 2002), 55-61.
“Maria Maddalena Bentivoglio,” New Catholic Encyclopedia (2002).
“Suffering, Spirituality, and Evangelization: The Catholic Experience, 1930-1996,” forthcoming for
The Catholic Commission on Intellectual and Cultural Affairs.
“Reception of Vatican II in the United States,” Theological Studies 64.3 (September 2003), 461-
494.
“Freedom’s Freedom: A Conversation with John McGreevy,” U.S. Catholic Historian 21.4 (Fall
2003), 93-99.
“Religious Life in the Twentieth Century: Interpreting the Languages,” U.S. Catholic Historian 22.1
(Winter 2004), 27-47.
Review of Kenneth Baxter Wolf, The Poverty of Riches, St. Francis of Assisi Reconsidered, in
Spiritus 4 (Spring 2004), 98-101.
“Hierarchy, Power, and the Franciscan Family in the American Church,” The Cord 54 (September-
October 2004), 222-262.
“Theo-History and the California Frontier,” Boletin, The Journal of the California Mission Studies
Association 21.2 (2004), 55-63.
III. Public Academic Presentations, 2000-2004
“From Sectarian Suffering to Compassionate Solidarity: Joseph Cardinal Bernardin and the
Americna Catholic Language of Suffering,” sponsored by the Cushwa Center for the Study of
American Catholicism, March 9, 2000.

“Seminary Education, Ecclesial Development and American Culture,” at the American Catholic
Historical Association Annual Meeting, January 10, 2004.
“Confession: Performance, Social Meaning, and Change 1945-1989,” at the Catholic University of
America, sponsored by the Center for American Catholic Studies, March 19, 2004.
“The Problem of John Courtney Murray,” Guest Lecture, Graduate Theological Union Berkeley,
Sponsored by the Jesuit School of Theology at Berkeley, October 21, 2004.
“Changing Religious Practice and the End of Christendom in the United States 1965-1986,” at the
American Catholic Historical Association Annual Meeting, January 7, 2005.
IV. Pastoral Work, 2004-05
Retreat, “Celebrating Life, Forgiving Debts,” San Damiano Retreat, Danville, California, January 16-
18, 2004.
Series of In-Service trainings at St. Anthony’s Foundation, San Francisco: “Training in Franciscan
organizational charism., Spring and Fall 2004.
Spriitual Asisstant to Protiuncula Fraternity, Napa California, twice monthly meetings.
Four day workshop/retreat to Poor Clare Abbesses and counselors, Easton, Pennsylvania, September
16-21, 2004.
Retreat on Saint Bonaventure, Poor Clare Monastery, Bloomington, Minnesota, February 2005.

More information in this story I wrote last year, click headline to go there:



When 24 pedophile priests from one town rape 60 children, it is a Public Nuisance. SOL Breakthrough suit filed against Franciscans in Santa Barbara
*****
By Kay Ebeling

Since 1964, the Franciscan Friars of Santa

*************8

(w/Videos) Unfortunately reports on the pedophile epidemic in the Catholic Church came out during the 'Flashpan Era' of American journalism, where the story is only as important as the number of cameras pointed in its direction. The cameras never stay longer than they need to produce a five minute story, so there is no place in modern journalism for articles that require legwork, weeks of interviewing, hours of waiting in boring courtrooms, and reading through mounds of documents. No corporate media outlet will pay a reporter to be that unproductive in today’s media. Plus by the time a reporter can do that much research, the Flash in the Pan would be on another topic. So the total story of pedophilia in the Catholic Church is yet to come out for mainstream readers. The result when it comes to the pedophile epidemic in the Catholic Church is, they got away with it.

In past decades the church has turned five thousand, (5000) pedophiles loose on the American landscape and thousands of children were fondled, penetrated, and seriously damaged as a result. (THOUSANDS OF CHILDREN . (Read bishopaccountability accounts http://bishopaccountability.org/ ) These criminals were so empowered by the treatment they got from church hierarchy that by the sixties and seventies in Southern California the pedophile priests did not even hide what they were doing. It was obvious.

The predators came into elementary school classrooms and catechism classes, picked out the same vulnerable sad miserable children, took them off somewhere, the children came back even more sad and miserable. Or pedophiles stood on playgrounds and had children dive deep in the pockets of their priest robes for candy, having children fondle them openly.

These sex crimes against children went on for years and years in one archdiocese after archdiocese, with the same modus operandi, or patterns of crime, right in front of the lay workers and other priests, the pedophilia was just part of the culture. The crimes took play with the knowledge and enabling of bishops and monsignors who were charged with supervising the priests. The story of pedophile priests is one part that mainstream readers have barely received, they don’t yet have a grasp on the totality of the horror, otherwise there would be more of a public outcry.

Instead Nobody Has Really Done Anything About It. Settlements go to maybe ten percent of the crime victims and usually result in additional secrecy. There has been no accountability for the crimes, no guilt declared, no real criminal conviction to match the extent of the crimes.

The predators came into elementary school classrooms and catechism classes, picked out the same vulnerable sad miserable children, took them off somewhere, the children came back even more sad and miserable. Or pedophiles stood on playgrounds and had children dive deep in the pockets of their priest robes for candy, having children fondle them openly.

The story did not BREAK like shattered glass as news of pedophile priests broke across the country, but instead the story just fell and chipped a small amount, rendered the glass no longer safe to use, yet the church continues business as usual like we thousands of crime victims aren’t even here, or act like an occasional Healing Mass at the churches where we were raped is going to help. (Story continues after these two videos)

VIDEOS: Comedy piece by a Brit found on YouTube: Boys Boys Boys (Pedo Priests) Plus 2nd video: Activists track down a pedophile priest and confront him at his home, alert the Minneapolis neighborhood.

Illinois Court decision re statute of respose Jan 9. 2009, posted here at City of Angels 11

*
JUSTICE McDADE delivered the opinion of the court:

In June 2007 the circuit court of Peoria County granted defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims to recover damages for sexual abuse on the grounds plaintiffs’ claims were timebarred. The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motions to reconsider in October 2007.

For the reasons that follow, we reverse:

BACKGROUND

In this consolidated appeal, plaintiffs all allege to have been the victims of separate and numerous acts of sexual abuse while in their minority by the individual defendants, all Catholic priests.

Plaintiffs allege that at the times the abuse occurred, defendants, the Catholic Diocese of Peoria, and Bishop Daniel Jenky, individually, and the defendants’ respective churches, employed or controlled the individual defendants as parish priests.

Plaintiffs all filed their complaints after reaching majority and after reaching age 30. Defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds the statute of repose applicable to plaintiffs’ causes of action expired prior to plaintiffs’ filing of their complaints.

Defendants premised their motions to dismiss on the statute of repose contained in the 1991 Childhood Sexual Abuse Act (Act) (735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (West 1992)).

Plaintiffs responded subsequent amendments to the Act removed the statute of repose and should apply retroactively to their claims. Plaintiffs argued that the 1991 Act did not create a vested right in defendants to the expiration of the statute of repose, and, therefore, plaintiffs’ causes of action are not barred. Plaintiffs also responded that if the statute of repose did apply, their complaints are not barred under the doctrine of equitable tolling. In June 2007 the circuit court of Peoria County granted defendants’ motions to dismiss.

The trial court denied plaintiffs’ motions to reconsider in October 2007. This appeal followed.

“We review the trial court's ruling on the section 2-619 [(735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2006))] motion to dismiss based on the statute of repose de novo.” Trogi v. Diabri & Vicari, P.C., 362 Ill. App. 3d 93, 95, 839 N.E. 2d 553, 555 (2005).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs argue that the circuit court of Peoria County erred in finding that defendants possess a vested right to the protection of the statute of repose. Under the version of the Act in effect 12 years after plaintiffs reached majority, the trial court concluded, plaintiffs’ causes of action terminated but none had filed suit. Defendants argued they obtained a vested right to the expiration of plaintiffs’ causes of action. At that time the statute read, in pertinent part as follows:

"(b) [I]n no event may an action for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse be commenced more than 12 years after the date on which the person abused attains the age of 18 years." 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (West 1992). Plaintiffs filed suit in April 2006, more than 12 years after reaching majority, and after reaching age 30.

Before April 2006, the Illinois legislature amended section 13-202.2 of the CASS to remove the statute of repose and to clarify the application of the discovery rule in cases of childhood sexual abuse. Following the first amendment to the Act, the statute read, in pertinent part, as follows:

“(b) An action for damages for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse must be commenced within 2 years of the date the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and that the injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse. * * *

(e) This Section applies to actions pending on the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1990 as well as to actions commenced on or after that date. The changes made by this amendatory Act of 1993 shall apply only to actions commenced on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1993." 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (West 1994) (hereinafter 1993 Act).

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court should have applied the version of the Act in effect when they actually filed their complaints against defendants. Plaintiffs argue this includes proceeding without a period of repose. When plaintiffs filed, the statute read, in pertinent part, as follows:

“(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action for damages for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse must be commenced within 10 years of the date the limitation period begins to run under subsection (d) or within 5 years of the date the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover both

(i) that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and

(ii) that the injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse. The fact that the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred is not, by itself, sufficient to start the discovery period under this subsection (b). Knowledge of the abuse does not constitute discovery of the injury or the causal relationship between any later-discovered injury and the abuse.

* * *

(e) This Section applies to actions pending on the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1990 as well as to actions commenced on or after that date. The changes made by this amendatory Act of 1993 shall apply only to actions commenced on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1993. The changes made by this amendatory Act of the 93rd General Assembly apply to actions pending on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 93rd General Assembly as well as actions commenced on or after that date.” 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b) (West 2006).

Plaintiffs argue that under the current version of the statute the limitations period had not run because none of the plaintiffs had discovered, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, that the acts of childhood sexual abuse occurred or that the abuse caused their injuries. Plaintiffs also argue that the statute of repose does not apply to their causes of action, despite the fact that the statute of repose was in effect twelve years after they reached majority, because the legislature intended the 2003 amendments to the Act to apply retroactively to all claims of childhood sexual abuse.

1. Were Plaintiffs’ Causes of Action Terminated Under the 1991 Statute of Repose following the 1994 Amendment Eliminating the Statute of Repose?

A threshold matter is whether the 2003 amendments to the Act apply retroactively to plaintiffs’ claims. In Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill. 2d 603, 609, 727 N.E.2d 217, 221 (2000), our supreme court explicitly held that, in that case:

"The plaintiff correctly concede[d] that if her action was already barred under the common law discovery rule prior to the enactment of section 13-202.2, then the new statute could not have revived it; under Illinois law, the barring of an action by a statute of limitations creates a vested right in favor of the defendant, and the action cannot later be revived. [Citations.]" Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 609, 727 N.E.2d at 221.

However, Clay is not dispositive of the instant appeal because the court stated explicitly that it had "no occasion here to consider the operation or application of section 13-202.2." Clay, 189 Ill. 2d at 609, 727 N.E.2d at 221. Any reliance defendants place on Clay is misplaced.

Plaintiffs cite the Fifth District’s recent decision in Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d 782, 885N.E.2d 376 (2008), in support of their claim that a cause of action survives where the legislature repeals a statute of repose that would have terminated the cause of action.

Plaintiffs argue the repeal revives the cause of action if the language in the amended statute evinces a legislative intent for retroactive application of the amended statute and if retroactive application of the amended statute is not prohibited by the constitution. Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 789, 885 N.E.2d at 382.

The Dallas court did not directly address the issue of retroactivity as it applies to statutes of repose. The specific question in Dallas was whether, “[i]f the current statute of limitations is retroactive, *** the plaintiff’s lawsuit should *** have been dismissed.” (Emphasis added.) Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 788, 885 N.E.2d at 381.

The Dallas court’s holding is limited to a determination of the “retroactivity of the 2003 limitations amendment.” (Emphasis added.) Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 794, 885 N.E.2d at 386.

Nonetheless, the Dallas court’s opinion is instructive. We find that the same analysis it applied to determine that the change in the statute of limitations applied retroactively applies in this case. Applying that analysis, we find that the legislature intended its repeal of the statute of repose to apply retroactively.

The Dallas court recognized that if either the 1991 limitations period or the 1991 period of repose applied to the plaintiff’s case, then either “could serve to bar the plaintiff’s suit.”

Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 788, 885 N.E.2d at 381. The court rejected the defendants’ argument that “the 2003 amendment to the child sexual abuse statute of limitations cannot serve to revive an expired claim and that the legislature never intended for a retroactive application of the statute for the purpose of reviving an expired claim.” Diocese of Dallas, 379Ill. App. 3d at 788, 885 N.E.2d at 381.

The court ultimately found that the legislature intended the amendment to the statute of limitations to apply retroactively and that “retroactive application does not unreasonably infringe on any due process right.” Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 794, 885 N.E.2d at 385.

The Dallas court recognized that dicta in a “First District decision interpreting similar language relating to the application of the 1990 amendment” repealing the statute of repose and changing the limitations period reached the opposite conclusion. Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App.3d at 791, 885 N.E.2d at 383.

However, the Fifth District found that the defendants’ reliance on the First District’s rationale was unpersuasive, because the First District reached that conclusion “seven years before the supreme court decided Commonwealth Edison Co. [v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 27, 749 N.E.2d 964 (2001)]."

Before Commonwealth Edison Co. courts followed the vested rights approach to retroactivity, under which legislative intent was largely ignored. Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 792, 885 N.E.2d at 384, quoting Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 34, 749N.E.2d at 969.

Despite stating that it recognizes that "the Illinois Supreme Court *** rejected the vested rights approach to retroactivity and adopted the legislative intent approach," the dissent nonetheless finds that the supreme court’s decision in M.E.H. v. L.H., 177 Ill. 2d207, 685 N.E.2d 335 (1997), is controlling. Slip op. at __. In M.E.H., our supreme court found that the defendant in that case had a vested right to invoke the limitations period as a defense and that the defendant’s vested right could not be taken away without offending the due process protections of the state’s constitution. M.E.H. 177 Ill. 2d at 214-15, 685 N.E.2d at 339.

We reject the dissent’s implication that under the supreme court’s decision in M.E.H. "taking away the right to invoke the statute of repose as a defense to a cause of action is" in and of itself, "constitutionally prohibited." Slip op. at ___.

We find that the M.E.H. court reached its conclusion based on the existence of a vested right. The court reached its decision only after first concluding that “once a statute of limitations has expired, the defendant has a vested right to invoke the bar of the limitations period as a defense to a cause of action.

That right cannot be taken away by the legislature without offending the due process protections of our state’s constitution.” M.E.H., 177 Ill. 2d at 214-15,68 N.E.2d at 339-40.

In Commonwealth Edison Co., the supreme court formally adopted “the Landgraf approach” to assess the retroactivity of a legislative amendment. Now, under Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 128 L. Ed.2d 229, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994), courts “first determine if the legislature expressed its intent relative to retroactivity. If the legislature’s intent is clear, we must give effect to that intent unless constitutional principles otherwise prohibit the application.”

Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 789, 885 N.E.2d at 382, citing Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 38, 749 N.E.2d at 971. The M.E.H. court did not find a general constitutional prohibition against the legislature’s judgment to eliminate a statute of repose. The sole basis for the supreme court’s holding in M.E.H. was the existence of what was then a vested right. Our supreme court has flatly rejected the "vested rights" approach and clearly established an alternate mode of inquiry for determining the retroactive impact of a legislative change that this court must employ on a case-by-case basis. Given the supreme court’s rejection of the vested rights approach we must find that M.E.H. no longer controls the instant appeal.

The Commonwealth Edison Co. court further explained the Landgraf approach as follows:

"A court must consider the nature of a *** measure and the circumstances leading to its adoption before the court may determine "that its retroactive application is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation."‘ [Citation].

In determining whether a retroactive *** measure is "‘so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation’" [citation], courts have considered such factors as the legislative purpose in enacting the amendment [citations], the length of the period of retroactivity [citations], whether [an individual] reasonably and detrimentally relied on the prior law [citations], and whether the [individual] had adequate notice of the change in the law [citation].

Parenthetically, we note that the United States Supreme Court has strictly limited the scope of inquiry under the due process clause of the federal constitution, holding that neither lack of notice nor detrimental reliance are ‘dispositive’ factors in determining whether the retroactive application of a[n] *** amendment violates the due process clause of the federal constitution. [Citation]." Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 43, 749 N.E.2d at 974.

The Dallas court found that under the old approach (the vested rights approach), “courts automatically found that retroactive changes to statutes of limitations and repose violated due process without balancing the considerations set forth by the Commonwealth Edison Co. Court.” Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 792, 885 N.E.2d at 382. See also Galloway v. Diocese of Springfield in Illinois, 367 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1002, 857N.E.2d 737, 741-42 (2006) (Chapman, J., dissenting)

(“The balancing required by Landgraf and Commonwealth Edison Co. marks a significant shift from the approach to due process concerns under the vested rights analysis. *** Those courts found that retroactive application would run afoul of due process because defendants have a vested right in the affirmative defense afforded them by statutes of limitations or repose, but they did not perform the careful balancing mandated under Landgraf and Commonwealth Edison Co. in arriving at this result”).

Although the supreme court has never directly held that the Landgraf approach applies to determining whether a repeal of a statute of repose applies retroactively and Commonwealth Edison Co. did not specifically apply the Landgraf analysis to a statute of repose, the Landgraf approach requires courts, faced with any legislative amendment, to “balance the reasons for and against a retroactive application and consider whether it is fair to apply the change retroactively.”

Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 885 N.E.2d at 384, citing Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 44-45, 749 N.E.2d at 975. The Landgraf approach’s guarantee of fairness strongly supports its application to determining the retroactive applicability of a repeal of a statute of repose as well as to determinations of whether changes to statutes of limitations apply retroactively. The same questions inherent in determining whether a statute of limitations may apply retroactively, e.g., whether the legislature evinced a desire to fix problems inherent in a previous version of the statute, apply to determining whether a change in a statute of repose apply retroactively. Under Landgraf, the court asks whether the legislature changed (in this case repealed) the statute of repose “to fix the problems inherent in [the] previous” statute of repose. Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 885 N.E.2d at 385, citing Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 44, 749 N.E.2d at 975 (approving the legislative motive to correct previously existing law). Moreover, the supreme court did not limit the Landgraf approach to the specific legislative amendment before it but stated it as a general rule for determining retroactivity.

Applying the Landgraf approach to the amendments to the Act, the Dallas court noted that “[a]ll three amendments the legislature made to the statute were motivated by an increasing awareness of the fact that the type of abuse alleged by the plaintiff is by its very nature subject to long-repressed memories.” Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 885 N.E.2d at 385.

The court found that “[a]mendments to the statute that make it easier to file a claim even many years after the alleged abuse occurs evince a legislative intent to make the procedural limits on claims of this sort better suit the nature of the claim. That desire to fix the problems inherent in a previous version of a statute weighs in favor of a retroactive application.” Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 885 N.E.2d at 385.

Although a statute of repose differs from a statute of lmitations and creates a substantive right unlike the purely procedural statute of limitations (Freeman v. Williamson, 383 Ill. App. 3d 933, 939, 890 N.E.2d 1127, 1133 (2008)), the legislature has determined that both statutes of limitations and statutes of repose are procedural tools. The supreme court, in adopting the Landgraf approach in Commonwealth Edison Co. has also made clear that the fact that the statute of repose creates a substantive right is no longer determinative.

If the court were to decline to apply a legislative amendment retroactively, it would detrimentally impact the plaintiff's substantive right to a remedy. If the court does determine that retroactive application is appropriate, it may affect the defendant's substantive right to the protections of a repose period.

Under Landgraf, the issue in determining retroactivity is how the substantive rights of the respective parties--either the defendant's right to procedural protections or the plaintiff's right to redress from the alleged wrongs -- will be affected.

Thus, the question is not whether defendants’ substantive right exists or is impacted. The questions is whether the legislature’s act in changing those rights offends due process. The United States Supreme Court has recognized, and our supreme court has agreed, that, “Legislation has come to supply the dominant means of legal ordering, and circumspection has given way to
greater deference to legislative judgments.” Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 37-38, 749 N.E.2d at 971, quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272-73, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 256-57, 114 S. Ct. at 1500-01.

Despite this recognition, even where the legislature has stated its intent that the change in the law apply etroactively, the court is nonetheless bound to determine if there is any constitutional prohibition to following the legislature’s wishes. See Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 38, 749 N.E.2d at 971 (“Under the Landgraf test, if the legislature has clearly indicated what the temporal reach of an amended statute should be, then, absent a constitutional prohibition, that expression of legislative intent must be given effect” (emphasis added)).

Notably, in this case, the legislature chose to take away childhood sexual abuse defendants’ substantive right to the protection of the statute of repose at the same time it provided additional substantive rights for the alleged victims of childhood sexual abuse. In finding that a retroactive application of the change in the statute of limitations did not present a constitutional problem, the Dallas court noted as follows:

“In all litigation, the passage of time carries a potential for evidentiary problems. Memories fade. Records might be lost or destroyed. Witnesses might have moved away or died. While these issues with time affect both plaintiffs and defendants alike, we must determine whether the defense has relied on this limitations defense in some way. While there might be cases in which a defendant truly takes actions in reliance upon a limitations period, in this factual context we are unable to conceive of such reliance. The difficulties inherent in defending an action like the plaintiff's case do not stem from a retroactive application of the statute; rather, the difficulties flow from the legislature's judgment that placing this burden on defendants is an acceptable price to pay for tailoring procedural limitations to reflect the nature of the type of injury alleged.” Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 793-94, 885 N.E.2d at 385.

The same considerations apply to determining whether applying the repeal of the statute of repose retroactively to plaintiffs’ claims presents a constitutional problem. We must consider whether the defense has relied on the period of repose and whether any potential difficulties in defending plaintiffs’ complaints “stem from a retroactive application of the statute” repealing the period of repose. Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 794, 885 N.E.2d at 385.

In making that determination, we are required to assess whether placing the burden on defendants to defend plaintiffs’ causes of action “is an acceptable price to pay for tailoring procedural limitations to reflect the nature of the type of injury alleged.” Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 794, 885 N.E.2d at 385.

As to the impact of retroactive application of the repeal of the statute of repose on the defendants in this case, Goodman claims that “[a] proper reading of the Commonwealth Edison Co. case demonstrates that some asserted rights *** do not constitute vested rights which present a ‘constitutional prohibition’ to the retroactive application of a statute” while in contrast “certain rights, such as the defense resulting from the barring of a claim, operate to preclude the etroactive application of a statute that wold resurrect such claims.” This is a mischaracterization of the basis of the supreme court’s decision in Commonwealth Edison Co. and a misstatement of the law announced in Landgraf.

The Commonwealth Edison Co. court relied heavily on the school district’s settled expectations in distinguishing retroactive application of the amended statute in that case from retroactive application of the amended statute in Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 712 N.E.2d 298 (1998). It did not hold that interference with what the court previously would have found to be a “vested right” is constitutionally prohibited. Our supreme court only held that a defendant’s “settled expectations” should be considered in deciding whether to apply a legislative amendment retroactively. Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 39, 749 N.E.2d at 971-72, quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269-70, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 254-55, 114 S. Ct. at 1499

("A statute does not operate ‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment [citation] or upsets expectations based in prior law.

Rather, the court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. The conclusion that a particular rule operates ‘retroactively’ comes at the end of a process of judgment concerning the nature and extent of the change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event.

*** However, retroactivity is a matter on which judges tend to have ‘sound...instinct[s],' [citation] and familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations offer sound guidance").

The court has made clear that “[i]n assessing the fairness of a retroactive application, relevant considerations include *** the legislature's motive in enacting the statutory change *** and *** whether the parties detrimentally relied on the prior version of the law.” Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 885 N.E.2d at 384-85, citing Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 44-45, 749 N.E.2d at 975.

Applying that analysis in this case, we find that the legislature’s repeal of the statute of repose “weighs in favor of a retroactive application” of the legislature’s repeal of the statute of repose. See Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 885 N.E.2d at 385, citing Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 44, 749 N.E.2d at 975.

As to the legislature’s motive in enacting the statutory change, the court has already held that a problem inherent in the old version of the statute (including the statute of repose) was that it did not suit the nature of claim. In this case the nature of the claim is one which “by its very nature [is] subject to long-repressed memories.” Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 885 N.E.2d at 385, citing Pedigo v. Pedigo, 292 Ill. App. 3d 831, 839, 686 N.E.2d at 1185(1997).

Any statute of repose applicable to incidents of childhood sexual abuse inherently fails to recognize that the nature of the claim is subject to long-expressed memories. Applying the repeal of the statute of repose retroactively to allow plaintiffs to bring suit long after the alleged abuse occurred would correct that problem and bring the current application of the law into line with the nature of the claim.

Turning to whether any of the parties have detrimentally relied on the prior version of the law, none of the defendants have pointed to any detrimental reliance they have placed on the termination of plaintiffs’ causes of action. Even assuming the defendants are relying on the difficulty in defending against plaintiffs’ claims concerning incidents that occurred long ago, that fact is insufficient to tip the scales against retroactive application of the elimination of the repose period.

The Dallas court’s reasoning is instructive. That court wrote as follows: “In all litigation, the passage of time carries a potential for evidentiary problems. Memories fade. Records might be lost or destroyed. Witnesses might have moved away or died. While these issues with time affect both plaintiffs and defendants alike, we must determine whether the defense has relied on this limitations defense in some way. While there might be cases in which a defendant truly takes actions in reliance upon a limitations period, in this factual context we are unable to conceive of such reliance.

The difficulties inherent in defending an action like the plaintiff's case do not stem from a retroactive application of the statute; rather, the difficulties flow from the legislature's judgment that placing this burden on defendants is an acceptable price to pay for tailoring procedural limitations to reflect the nature of the type of injury alleged.” Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d at 793-94, 885 N.E.2d at 385.

Both defendants and plaintiffs face similar evidentiary difficulties in this litigation. Defendants have pointed to no actual actions they took in reliance on the repose period. No records were destroyed. No witnesses died. The legislature has determined that it previously failed to recognize that allegations of this type are subject to repressed memories and may require significant time before a plaintiff brings a cause of action. The legislature determined that placing the burden on defendants to defend old claims of this type is generally an acceptable price to pay to allow victims of sexual abuse to seek redress. Defendants point to no unique facts in this case that would make their burden any higher than the burden the legislature chose to place on defendants in this type of case.

Therefore none of defendants’ difficulties in defending this case, had they actually alleged any, would actually result from retroactive application of the statute of repose. Rather, any such difficulties flow naturally from defending claims of this type.

We hold that retroactive application of the legislature’s repeal of the statute of repose is consistent with the legislature’s motive in enacting the statutory change and that the defendants have not relied on the statute of repose to their detriment. The legislature’s repeal of the statute of repose applies to plaintiffs’ claims. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ complaints are not barred by the statute of repose.

2. Are Plaintiffs’ Causes of Action Barred by the Statute of Limitations.

Plaintiffs argue the applicable statute of limitations is that stated in the 2003 statute. Plaintiffs argue that because, when they filed suit, they had not discovered the “causal relationship between any later-discovered injury and the abuse,” the discovery rule tolled the statute of limitations. Defendants argue that the statute of limitations in the pre-1993 statute is the applicable statute of limitations, that under that version of the Act the statute of limitations expired when plaintiffs reached majority, and, therefore, that plaintiffs failed to timely file their
complaint.

“When a change in law affects only the remedy or the law of procedure, a right of action will be enforced under the new procedure without regard to whether it accrued before or after the change in the law, and without regard to whether or not suit had been instituted.” Becharas v. Cummings, 292 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 1107-1108, 687 N.E.2d 95, 97, citing In re Pronger, 118 Ill. 2d 512, 522, 517 N.E.2d 1076 (1987), citing Ogdon v. Gianakos, 415 Ill. 591, 597, 114 N.E.2d 686 (1953).

We find that the 2003 amendments to the Act apply to plaintiffs’ claims. The legislature evinced an intent that its amendment to the Act apply retroactively. Under Landgraf, the only question remaining for the court is whether retroactive application of the amendment would offend due process. As previously discussed, the retroactive application of the legislature’s repeal of the statute of repose does not offend due process. It would be illogical, therefore, for us to hold that retroactive application of the statute of limitations offends due process.

Finally, retroactive application of the legislature’s amendment to the statute of limitations does not in itself offend due process for the same reasons retroactive application of the repeal of the statute of repose does not offend due process. For all of the foregoing reasons, the statute of limitations in the 2003 Act applies to plaintiffs’ complaints.

The 2003 Act reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

“(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action for damages for personal injury based on childhood sexual abuse must be commenced within 10 years of the date the limitation period begins to run under subsection (d) or within 5 years of the date the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover both (i) that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and (ii) that the injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse.

The fact that the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred is not, by itself, sufficient to start the discovery period under this subsection (b). Knowledge of the abuse does not constitute discovery of the injury or the causal relationship between any later-discovered injury and the abuse. ***

(d) The limitation periods under subsection (b) do not begin to run before the person abused attains the age of 18 years ***.” 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b), (d) (West 2006).

Plaintiffs filed their complaints in April 2006. They argue that their complaints allege sufficient facts to raise material questions of fact as to when they discovered that the acts defendants allegedly committed constituted an “act of childhood sexual abuse” and that their injuries were “caused by the childhood sexual abuse.” 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b) (West 2006).

“Normally, the question of when a party knew or should have known both of an injury and its probable wrongful cause is one of fact, unless the facts are undisputed and only one conclusion may be drawn from them. [Citation.] Thus, the court may make such a determination upon a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment so long as such conclusion is the only one to be drawn from plaintiff's pleading. [Citation.]

Strict scrutiny is applied to determine whether the state of the victim's awareness was such that could reasonably have put him on notice of the nexus between the abuse and the injuries. [Citation.]" Benton v. Vonnahmen, 288 Ill. App. 3d 199, 206, 679 N.E.2d 1270, 1275 (1997).

Defendant Goodman argues that plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to toll the statute of limitations using the discovery rule because (a) plaintiffs failed to allege exactly when they discovered their cause of action under the discovery rule and because (b) the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaints demonstrate that they were aware of the alleged misconduct when it occurred and that the alleged misconduct resulted in harm.

It is insufficient that plaintiffs knew or even suspected that defendants alleged misconduct was wrongful and that defendants’ wrongful conduct harmed them. The legislature has clearly provided:

“The fact that the person abused discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should discover that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred is not, by itself, sufficient to start the discovery period under this subsection (b). Knowledge of the abuse does not constitute discovery of the injury or the causal relationship between any later-discovered injury and the abuse.” 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b) (West 2006).

Goodman’s argument fails to address that plaintiffs alleged that they did not discover the causal relationship between the acts (regardless of whether they were wrongful and who was to blame) and their injuries.

Finally, Goodman cites no authority for his proposition that plaintiffs must allege exactly when they discovered their causes of action. He cites D.P. v. M.J.O., 266 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 1034-35, 640 N.E.2d 1323, 1327 (1994), where the court wrote as follows:

“In the instant case however, the pleadings regarding the plaintiffs' belated discovery of the connection between their abuse and their symptoms is sparse and conclusory. Unlike the pleadings in Franke v. Geyer, the pleadings in this case do not provide any basis upon which to evaluate whether the state of the plaintiffs' awareness was sufficient to have put them on notice of that connection at any earlier time.

"Accordingly, the trial court was premature in dismissing counts I and IV pursuant to defendant's fact motion brought under section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure. No extrinsic facts outside of the pleadings were offered by the movant from which any evaluation could have been made as to whether the state of the plaintiffs' awareness was sufficient to put them on notice of the connection between the abuse and the injury.” D.P., 266 Ill. App. 3d at 1034-35, 640 N.E.2d at 1327.

Goodman argues that plaintiffs’ factual allegations are not sufficient to invoke the discovery rule because they do not allege an exact date plaintiffs discovered their causes of action. Nothing in the D.P. court’s language provides that a plaintiff must allege an exact date of “discovery” to invoke the discovery rule.

Goodman does not attack the quality of plaintiffs’ factual allegations. The D.P. court based its decision on the quality of the plaintiff’s allegations in that case, finding them to be “sparse and conclusory.” D.P., 266 Ill. App. 3d at 1034-35, 640 N.E.2d at 1327.

Goodman only attacks the sufficiency of plaintiffs’ factual allegations. We find that under the plain language of the Act plaintiff’ allegations are sufficient to invoke the discovery rule as defined in the Act.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs’ complaints are not barred by the statute of repose found in the Act when plaintiffs reached majority. Plaintiffs’ causes of action are not barred by the statute of limitations because plaintiffs have pled adequate facts to invoke the discovery rule and filed their complaints within the period of limitations following discovering both “(i) that the act of childhood sexual abuse occurred and (ii) that the injury was caused by the childhood sexual abuse.”

Because plaintiffs’ complaints were timely filed, we need not reach plaintiffs’ arguments that equitable principles also serve to toll the statute of limitations or that plaintiffs’ allegations of repressed memories tolled the statute of limitations.

The circuit court of Peoria County’s order granting summary judgment in defendants’ favor is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

O’BRIEN, P.J., concurs.

CARTER, J., dissenting:

I respectfully dissent because I believe the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the 1991 statute of repose, which barred anyone over the age of 30 from bringing an action for damages based upon childhood sexual abuse. Each of the plaintiffs here reached the age of 30 before the statute of repose was repealed in 1994. While the majority relies upon one Fifth District case, Doe v. Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill. App. 3d 782, 885 N.E.2d 376 (2008), I agree with the analysis set forth in a case decided by another Fifth District panel, Galloway v. Diocese of Springfield in Illinois, 367 Ill. App. 3d 997, 857 N.E.2d 737 (2006). In Galloway, the court recognized that the Illinois Supreme Court in Commonwealth Edison v. Will County Collector, 196 Ill. 2d 21, 749 N.E.2d 964 (2001), rejected the vested rights approach to retroactivity and adopted the legislative intent approach of the United States Supreme Court set forth in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 128 L. E. 2d 229, 114 US. Ct. 1483(1994). Galloway 367 Ill. App. 3d at 999-1000, 857 N.E.2d at 739-40. Under this test, “if the legislature has clearly indicated what the temporal reach of an amended statute should be, then, absent a constitutional prohibition, that expression of legislative intent must be given effect.” Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d at 38, 749 N.E.2d at 971 (2001). The supreme court recognized in Commonwealth Edison, however, that cases decided under the vested rights approach to retroactivity remain relevant insofar as they define interests protected from legislative interference by the due process clause. Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d at 47, 749 N.E.2d at 976. Prior to its decision in Commonwealth Edison, the supreme court decided the question at issue in the instant case, namely, whether the 1991 statute of repose applied to the plaintiffs’ action where the time limit was not in effect when the abuse occurred and was repealed before the action was filed. M.E.H. v. L.H., 177 Ill. 2d 207, 685 N.E.2d 335 (1997). The supreme court found that the defendant in that case had a vested right to invoke the limitations period as a defense, and that this right could not be taken away without offending the due process protections of the state’s constitution. M.E.H., 177 Ill. 2d at 214-15, 685 N.E.2d at 339. I agree with the Galloway court that M.E.H. remains good law. Galloway, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 1000, 857 N.E.2d at 740. While Commonwealth Edison “switches the focus of the first step of the retroactivity analysis from ‘vested rights’ to legislative intent, it did not overrule the ruling in M.E.H. that taking away the right to invoke the statute of repose as a defense to a cause of action is constitutionally prohibited.” Galloway, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 1000, 857 N.E.2d at 739. Thus, I would find that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of repose, and cannot be revived. In addition, I would find that the plaintiffs did not bring suit within a reasonable time period after the period of repose went into effect, and that the statute of repose was not tolled by the plaintiffs’ claims that their memories of abuse were suppressed. M.E.H., 177 Ill. 2d at 217, 685 N.E.2d at 340. Finally, I would find that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the period of repose should be tolled due to fraudulent concealment of the abuse by the defendants. See Clay v. Kuhl, 189 Ill. 2d 603, 613, 727 N.E.2d 217, 223 (2000). Therefore, I would affirm the trial court’s decision granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss, and must dissent.

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IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS THIRD DISTRICT

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit:

Plaintiff-Appellant, Peoria County, Illinois,

v.

Defendants-Appellees: Holy Family Catholic Church formerly known as St. Mary’s Catholic Church, and St. Patrick’s Catholic Church and Daniel R. Jenky, Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Peoria, a Religious Corporation, and the Catholic Diocese of Peoria, a Religious Corporation, Defendants.

The Honorable:

Joe R. Vespa, Kevin R. Galley, Judges Presiding

**************
JUSTICE McDADE delivered the opinion of the court:
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Posted by City of Angels, commentary at City of Angels 5

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Opposition to Fransciscan request to lump Ongoing Public Nuisance case in Santa Barbara with Clergy Cases in LA

***
Posted by City of Angels Network

DAVID L. NYE (Bar #67009)
TIMOTHY C. HALE (Bar #184882)
NYE, PEABODY, STIRLING & HALE, LLP
33 West Mission St., Suite 201
Santa Barbara, California 93101
Telephone: (805) 963-2345
Facsimile: (805) 563-5385

Attorneys for Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
County of Los Angeles

COORDINATION PROCEEDING SPECIAL TITLE (RULE 1550(b))

THE CLERGY CASES I
This s Document Relates to:
MARY JONES, an individual,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Franciscan Friars of California, Inc.; Old Mission Santa Barbara; and Does 5 through 100, Inclusive.
Defendants.
Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 1265207
JUDICIAL COUNCIL COORDINATION PROCEEDING
No. 4286
PLAINTIFF OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ REQUEST TO ADD ON SANTA BARBARA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT CASE NO. 1265207 AND FOR STAY; DECLARATION OF TIMOTHY HALE
California Rule of Court Rule 3.544(b)
Dept.: 308
Coordination Judge: Honorable Emilie H. Elias

Plaintiff Mary Jones submits this Opposition to the Request to Add On Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 1265207 and for Stay filed by Defendant Franciscan Friars of California, Inc. (AFranciscans@) and Defendant Old Mission Santa Barbara (AOld Mission@).

I.
INTRODUCTION
Secrecy is the name of the Franciscans’ deadly game. For decades the Franciscans of the Province of St. Barbara (Province) have concealed and protected Franciscan perpetrators of childhood sexual abuse. Instead of notifying law enforcement and empowering the public to protect their children, the Franciscans’ have sheltered these predators and thereby thrown to the wolves children in the communities throughout the Western United States where the Franciscans conduct their ministry.

Starting at least as early as 1964, and continuing as recently as the abuse committed in Idaho by former Franciscan Louis Ladenburger in 2007, Franciscan corporate practices have created countless victims of childhood sexual abuse, and continue to put an even greater number of today’s children at risk to be sexually assaulted by predators whose identities and propensities are known only to the Franciscans.

No community has suffered greater harm to its children, as a result of Franciscan criminal conduct, than Santa Barbara. Since 1964 the Franciscans have allowed no less than twenty-four (24) Franciscan perpetrators to live in Santa Barbara without any warning to the community. The tragic results have been at least fifty-nine (59) Santa Barbara children sexually assaulted by Franciscans since 1964. These numbers would be outrageous anywhere, but are particularly shocking for a city with a population of approximately 90,000.

*************
The subject lawsuit seeks a court order ending the secrecy. The Franciscans’ corporate practice is a continuing Public Nuisance.
*********************

The subject lawsuit seeks a court order ending the secrecy. The Franciscans’ corporate practice is a continuing Public Nuisance.

It has stifled the ability of law enforcement to protect the public and prosecute these men by concealing their identities until the criminal statutes of limitations have expired. And it has rendered the civil process the last resort for the public to end these practices. Numerous million dollar settlements have not changed the Franciscans’ approach to managing perpetrators and sacrificing children. Equitable, proactive relief is now sought to force the Franciscans to change their ways.

The subject Request to Add On is consistent with the Franciscans’ policy of secrecy. With twenty-four (24) Franciscan perpetrators and fifty-nine (59) victims since 1964, Santa Barbara is the epicenter in the Province of the harm caused by the Franciscans. As they have done so often with their perpetrators, it comes as no surprise that the Franciscans now seek to transfer this case as far away from Santa Barbara as possible, to a comparably disinterested community in Los Angeles where the lawsuit will most likely be ignored. Justice requires this case be heard in Santa Barbara, the community most severely injured by the Franciscans’ conduct.

II.
BACKGROUND

In 1998, plaintiff’s counsel, Nye, Peabody, Stirling & Hale, LLP, began litigating claims involving the criminal conduct of Franciscan perpetrators and hierarchy in Santa Barbara. Since the inception of that litigation the Franciscans’ defense strategy has been consistent and unwavering: preserve the Franciscans’ secrets by narrowing the focus of each lawsuit filed to one victim and one perpetrator. This strategy’s sole purpose is to keep the public ignorant by shifting attention away from the despicable Franciscan corporate practice of concealing the identities, propensities, and current assignments and/or residences of Franciscan perpetrators.

After nearly eleven years of litigation, the Franciscans’ strategy is failing. As a result of discovery and investigation conducted since 1998, plaintiff’s counsel has identified no less than twenty-five (25) Franciscan perpetrators assigned or in residence in Santa Barbara since 1936, and sixty (60) Santa Barbara children who have been sexually assaulted by these men. This tragedy is the result of the Franciscan corporate practice of concealing perpetrators of childhood sexual abuse.

*************
The subject Request for Add On continues the Franciscans’ battle for secrecy.
***********************

The subject Request for Add On continues the Franciscans’ battle for secrecy. Nothing has changed. Once again they are attempting inappropriately to narrow the focus of a lawsuit to one Franciscan perpetrator, one Franciscan victim. A cursory review of the First Amended Complaint makes clear the true focus of the lawsuit: the threat to all children at any location where the Franciscans continue to conduct their business, and the heightened threat to Santa Barbara children where the Franciscans have dumped so many of their perpetrators without any warning to the community. The Franciscans have created a continuing Public Nuisance.

In a preemptive attack on the Public Nuisance cause of action, the Franciscans describe it as Aan attempt to plead around the >Hightower= bar.@ Although a continuing Public Nuisance cause of action is not subject to Hightower, this theory was not incorporated in plaintiff’s complaint in response to that opinion.

Plaintiff’s counsel does not believe this misstatement was an intentional effort by defense counsel to mislead the Court. Rather, this misstatement is the result of defense counsel’s never having represented the Franciscans, to plaintiff’s counsel’s knowledge, prior to this lawsuit. They apparently are unaware that plaintiff’s counsel first began alleging the Franciscans’ conduct constituted a continuing Public Nuisance in 2000, six years before the Hightower opinion was published.

Plaintiff’s counsel first filed a lawsuit against the Franciscans in 1998, Allen v. Van Handel et al., Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 228296. Early in Allen the Franciscan defense strategy of preserving secrecy by narrowing the focus of each lawsuit to one perpetrator, one victim, became clear. As investigation and discovery continued in Allen the Franciscans’ motivation for pressing this strategy became obvious: the Franciscan hierarchy had allowed the adjoining properties of St. Anthony’s Seminary and the Old Mission Santa Barbara to serve for decades as a feeding ground for Franciscan predators.

*****************
"The Franciscan hierarchy had allowed the adjoining properties of St. Anthony’s Seminary and the Old Mission Santa Barbara to serve for decades as a feeding ground for Franciscan predators."
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It quickly became apparent that thanks in large part to a purportedly independent inquiry in 1994 that actually was a Franciscan-controlled whitewash, the public remained unaware of the continuing threat posed to their children by the Franciscans. Consequently, plaintiff’s counsel began to research theories of liability to counter the Franciscans’ defense strategy of narrowing the focus of each lawsuit, and to end the Franciscans’ dangerous culture of secrecy.

After substantial legal research it became clear the Public Nuisance cause of action was the ideal theory to address and terminate the Franciscans’ criminal conduct. Consequently, leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint alleging the Public Nuisance cause of action was sought in Allen in 2000. Since that date, every complaint plaintiff’s counsel has filed against the Franciscans has included the Public Nuisance cause of action. In short, the Franciscans’ contention the Public Nuisance cause of action was "creatively added" to plaintiff’s complaint Ato plead around the >Hightower= bar@ is patently false.

No court has ever issued an order addressing the viability of the Public Nuisance cause of action against the Franciscans. Shortly after the Fourth Amended Complaint was filed in Allen in 2000, the Franciscans settled that lawsuit before the Santa Barbara court could rule on their demurrer to the Public Nuisance cause of action. Since then, the Franciscans have settled fourteen more claims on behalf of plaintiffs represented by plaintiff’s counsel, all resolved before any court addressed the Public Nuisance cause of action.

III.
ARGUMENT

When civil actions share a common question of fact or law with actions coordinated pursuant to section 404 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff or defendant may request an order from the judge assigned to hear the coordinated actions to coordinate the add-on action. Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. ' 404.4.

Cases considered for coordination must share common questions of fact or law. The determination of whether cases share common questions of fact or law is a "threshold" standard, since it must be satisfied at the outset of the coordination procedure. Keenan v. Superior Court, 111 Cal.App.3d 336, 342 (1980).
A. Plaintiff Concedes Her Lawsuit Meets The Threshold Requirement.

Plaintiff does not dispute that her lawsuit shares some common questions of law and fact with the Clergy Cases. Many of the causes of action utilized in the Master Complaint in the coordination are incorporated into plaintiff’s complaint. And as in the Clergy Cases, Plaintiff alleges that, while a minor, she was sexually abused by a member of the clergy acting under the supervision and control of the Roman Catholic Church.

However, unlike the Clergy Cases, the subject complaint alleges the sexual abuse of plaintiff was a symptom of a problem much bigger than the oversimplification continually argued for by the Franciscans, i.e. the criminal acts of a rogue Franciscan against a solitary victim. In fact, it is here the subject complaint drastically departs from the Master Complaint and alleges detailed facts -

the Franciscan corporate practice of concealing the identities of their pedophilic brethren and transferring them into unexpecting communities - and theories

- the continuing Public Nuisance created by this conduct - that set it apart from any prior pleading ever addressed in this coordination or any other court.

Thus, while the complaint may meet the threshold requirement, the balancing test which is the next and final step in the process merits denying the Request for Add On. Justice will be denied, and children will be placed at risk, if the subject lawsuit is transferred from Santa Barbara to Los Angeles.

B. Promoting The Ends Of Justice - The Balancing Test.
Once the threshold requirement is satisfied, the coordination judge must determine whether coordination will serve to "promote the ends of justice." Code of Civ. Proc. ' 404.1 mandates that the coordination judge take into account:

(1) whether the common question of fact or law is predominating and significant to the litigation;

(2) the convenience of the parties, witnesses, and counsel;

(3) the relative development of the actions and the work product of counsel;

(4) the efficient utilization of judicial facilities and manpower;

(5) the calendar of the courts;

(6) the disadvantages of duplicative and inconsistent rulings, orders, or judgments; and

(7) the likelihood of settlement of the action without further litigation should coordination be denied.
Consideration of these factors involves a "weighing and balancing . . . to determine whether coordination . . . best serves the ends of justice in the particular case." Pesses v. Superior Court, 107 Cal.App.3d 117, 126 (1980). Here, denying the request for coordination will best serve the ends of justice.

(1) The Unique Questions Of Fact And Law In Plaintiff's Case Are Predominating And Significant.

Defendants all but concede this point, but attempt to minimize their concession by labeling the Public Nuisance cause of action as a creatively adde "attempt to plead around the >Hightower= bar.

The focus of the First Amended Complaint is the pattern of conduct of the Franciscan hierarchy. The abuse of plaintiff is a symptom of that conduct, and gives her standing as one of the special injuries required for her to prosecute a nuisance claim on behalf of the general public. No court, in the coordination or otherwise, has ever issued an order addressing the viability of the nuisance theory in this context with these facts. These unique questions of fact and law are predominant and significant, and distinguish this lawsuit from any other in the coordination.

Accordingly, this factor weighs against granting the Franciscans’ request.

(2) The Inconvenience To The Parties, Witnesses, And Counsel Merits Denial Of The Petition.

The witnesses, parties, and counsel will be substantially inconvenienced if forced to participate in the coordinated action in Los Angeles.

At the start of this coordinated proceeding in 2003, three of the four law firms representing twenty-five survivors (25) of Franciscan sexual abuse were located in the counties of Los Angeles and Orange. Those three law firms filed lawsuits against the Franciscans in Los Angeles. A number of the twenty-five survivors of Franciscan sexual abuse also lived in the counties of Los Angeles and Orange. And defense counsel for the Franciscans were located in downtown Los Angeles. Thus, prior to the 2006 Franciscan global settlement, there was at least an argument to be made that convenience of the parties, witnesses, and counsel supported coordination of the Franciscan lawsuits.

Now, to plaintiff’s counsel’s knowledge, this is the only currently pending Franciscan lawsuit in California. Plaintiff Mary Jones lives in Northern California in Fairfax. Defendant Old Mission is located in Santa Barbara, with its agent for service of process in Oakland, CA. Defendant Franciscans’ corporate offices are located in Oakland. The Franciscans’ new defense counsel are located in San Francisco. Plaintiff’s counsel are located in Santa Barbara. And most if not all of the key witnesses of which plaintiff’s counsel are aware are located in Santa Barbara or Northern California.

In fact, out of the twenty-eight (28) depositions taken in Franciscan cases litigated in the coordinated proceedings, only four (4) took place in Los Angeles, with the vast majority going forward in and/or far north of Santa Barbara. Accordingly, with the global settlement of the twenty-five Franciscan claims in 2006, the convenience factor now weighs strongly against coordination.

(3) The Status Of Plaintiff’s Lawsuit Case Does Not Support The Franciscans’ Request For Coordination.
Plaintiff’s lawsuit is at a preliminary stage of development. Defendants recently accepted service, and have not yet filed their responsive pleading. Plaintiff was about to serve written discovery when Defendants filed their Request for Add On and Stay. Plaintiff also was about to notice depositions for witnesses whose health and age create the risk their testimony may be lost. In short, the Request for Add
On and Stay has already delayed and slowed the proceedings. Additionally, as the only currently filed Franciscan lawsuit, and the only clergy abuse lawsuit proceeding on a Public Nuisance theory, this lawsuit cannot be consolidated with like cases in a single, efficient forum. To the contrary, there are no like cases to consolidate it with.

(4) Coordination Will Not Foster The Efficient Utilization of Judicial Facilities And Manpower, And Minimize The Burden Upon The Calendar Of The Courts.
Coordination will not result in a more efficient use of judicial resources. This lawsuit shares no common defendants with any other currently filed lawsuits. While there are some common factual allegations with current coordinated lawsuits, none of those coordinated lawsuits are based on allegations and evidence of a continuing Public Nuisance. Accordingly, as there is no risk of multiple courts making disparate rulings related to the continuing Public Nuisance theory, coordination will not result in a more efficient use of judicial resources.

It is also worth noting that courts around the state and outside the coordination continue to rule on the same issues that the Franciscans contend must be decided only by this Court. Five years of coordination have produced a substantial body of caselaw to guide these courts. There will be no duplication of effort if this case proceeds separately. The resolution of this lawsuit can be accomplished just as efficiently by the Santa Barbara trial court.

(5) There Is No Risk Of Duplicative Or Inconsistent Rulings, Orders, And Judgments.

Whereas the remaining coordinated lawsuits have as their foundations childhood sexual abuse by a Roman Catholic Priest or brother, such abuse in Plaintiff’s lawsuit is simply one of the special injuries required for plaintiff to prosecute a Public Nuisance claim on behalf of the general public. The foundation for Plaintiff’s lawsuit is the Franciscan corporate practice of concealing the identities of their pedophilic brethren and transferring them into unsuspecting communities. Plaintiff’s counsel has indisputable evidence of nearly forty-five years of the Franciscans’ corporate practice placing children at risk and creating a continuing Public Nuisance. No other law firm in the history of this coordination has developed such a detailed and continuing history of criminal conduct by a single Roman Catholic entity as a result of ten years investigating and litigating against that entity. As a result, no other firm has filed a lawsuit based on a continuing Public Nuisance. (6) Coordination Will Not Increase The Likelihood Of Settlement Of The Action Without Further Litigation.

Settlement is no more likely in the context of the coordination, and is less likely in Los Angeles than in Santa Barbara.

The parties have already discussed mediation. The Franciscans proposed and plaintiff agreed to mediation dates. Plaintiff even agreed to mediate before, among others, the Honorable Ronald Sabraw, the coordination/trial court judge who presided over Hightower. However, the Franciscans appear to have lost interest in mediation. Adding this case to a coordination proceeding where there are no other Franciscan lawsuits pending will not increase the likelihood of settlement without further litigation. In fact, it likely will decrease the likelihood of settlement.

Numerous communities have seen their children harmed and put at risk by the Franciscan efforts to conceal and cover up their continuing corporate practice of handling their perpetrators. However, with twenty-four Franciscan perpetrators and fifty-nine victims identified since 1964 in a city of approximately 90,000 residents, no city has been harmed more gravely than Santa Barbara. Transferring this case out of Santa Barbara to Los Angeles, a community with a comparably far smaller interest in the Franciscans’ conduct, plays into the Franciscan corporate practice of secrecy by keeping the communities who most need to know in the dark, and will do nothing to enhance the likelihood of settlement. If anything, it will encourage the Franciscans to believe they have once again flown under the radar and will not be held accountable for their conduct in the community where so many of these crimes have been committed. The determination of whether this conduct constitutes a Public Nuisance should be made by a trier of fact from the community in which the conduct occurred.

IV.
DEFENDANTS’ PETITION FOR A STAY OF DISCOVERY SHOULD BE DENIED

Defendants offer no support nor any reason for their request for a discovery stay. While such a stay may have been necessary at one time due to the remarkably high volume of coordinated cases, and the resulting chaos 600+ concurrent discovery disputes could have produced, those high volume days are long since past in Clergy I. Defendants’ sole motivation for requesting the stay is to continue the Franciscans’ ongoing practice of delaying litigation for as long as possible. Obviously, this is not a legitimate basis for requesting a discovery stay.

Additionally, numerous Franciscan witnesses with critical information are aged and infirm, and their testimony is at risk to be lost with each passing day. As a result, Plaintiff will be highly prejudiced by a stay of discovery, particularly where these defendants demand discovery stays while knowing they have and will continue to argue they are incapable of defending themselves due to the loss of key witnesses.

Accordingly, plaintiff requests that Defendants’ request for a discovery stay be denied.

V.
CONCLUSION

Survivors in clergy abuse cases in Northern and Central California are not being deprived of their right to have their lawsuits heard in the communities where the crimes were committed or covered up. Doe v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton et al., Case No. C057895 was filed in Stockton and is currently pending before the Third District Court of Appeal on statute of limitations issues shared by many of the currently coordinated lawsuits. Similarly, Dengler v. Doe 1, Case No. A116907 was filed in Sonoma and was decided last year by the First Appellate District. And Neff v. Doe 1 et al., involving the same plaintiff’s counsel and defense counsel in this lawsuit, is one of a number clergy abuse cases currently pending in Northern California trial courts. All of these matters have been or will be guided by the substantial body of caselaw generated in this coordinated proceeding, with no plaintiff deprived of his or her right to file their lawsuit where most appropriate.

The Santa Barbara Superior Court has presided over Franciscan litigation in the past, and is just as capable as the courts in Northern and Central California of applying the caselaw produced by the coordinated proceeding.

The Archdiocese of Los Angeles is not a defendant in this lawsuit.

The factors that once supported adding prior Franciscan cases to the coordination are no more.



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The Franciscans’ Request for Coordination is an obvious attempt to avoid being held accountable in a court in the community most victimized by the Franciscan conduct set forth in plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.
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The Franciscans’ Request for Coordination is an obvious attempt to avoid being held accountable in a court in the community most victimized by the Franciscan conduct set forth in plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.

Based on the foregoing, plaintiff respectfully requests the Request to Add On Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 1265207 and for Stay be denied.

DATED: September 24, 2008

NYE, PEABODY, STIRLING & HALE LLP


By:

DAVID L. NYE
TIMOTHY C. HALE
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DECLARATION OF TIMOTHY C. HALE

I, Timothy C. Hale, declare as follows:

1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice in all of the courts of the State of California, and am one of the attorneys representing plaintiff Mary Jones in the above action. I am a partner in the law firm of Nye, Peabody, Stirling & Hale, LLP (ANPSH@).

2. I have personal knowledge of the statements set forth in this declaration, except for those stated on information and belief, and if called as a witness in this matter, could and would competently testify thereto.

3. I make this declaration in support of plaintiff’s Opposition to the Request to Add On Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 1265207 and for Stay filed by Defendant Franciscan Friars of California, Inc. (AFranciscans@) and Defendant Old Mission Santa Barbara (AOld Mission@).

4. In 1998 the Santa Barbara law firm of Nye, Peabody, Stirling & Hale, LLP, began litigating claims involving the criminal conduct of Franciscan perpetrators and hierarchy in Santa Barbara. I joined the team of lawyers working on the Franciscan cases in 1999.

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5. Since our first lawsuit against the Franciscans their defense strategy has been consistent and unwavering: preserve the Franciscans’ secrets as much as possible by narrowing the focus of each lawsuit filed to one victim and one perpetrator.
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5. Since our first lawsuit against the Franciscans their defense strategy has been consistent and unwavering: preserve the Franciscans’ secrets as much as possible by narrowing the focus of each lawsuit filed to one victim and one perpetrator.

6. After the scandal first broke in Santa Barbara in 1989, the Franciscans’ retained large defense firms, Sedgwick Detert in particular, who utilized their tremendous resources to implement this strategy quite effectively for nearly ten years, battering smaller plaintiffs’ firms into settling lawsuits for relatively small amounts while limiting the focus of discovery to the perpetrator rather than on the enabling conduct of the Franciscan hierarchy.

7. NPSH first filed a lawsuit against the Franciscans in 1998, Allen v. Van Handel et al., Santa Barbara Superior Court Case No. 228296. Early in Allen the Franciscan defense strategy of preserving secrecy by narrowing the focus of each lawsuit to one perpetrator, one victim, became clear. As investigation and discovery continued in Allen the Franciscans’ motivation for pressing this strategy became obvious: the Franciscan hierarchy had allowed the adjoining properties of St. Anthony’s Seminary and the Old Mission Santa Barbara to serve for decades as a feeding ground for Franciscan predators.

8. It also quickly became apparent during Allen that the public remained unaware of the continuing threat posed to their children by the Franciscans. This was due in large part to the Franciscans’ creation of a purportedly independent inquiry in 1994 that actually was a Franciscan-controlled whitewash. The Franciscans’ AIndependent Board of Inquiry@ was tasked with investigating abuse allegations at St. Anthony’s Seminary, the property adjoining the Old Mission in Santa Barbara. The Board issued its report in 1994, confirming there had been twelve Franciscan perpetrators, but identifying none of them. It also made no reference to numerous instances of notice of abuse received by the Franciscans. These omissions were less than surprising given that one of the Board’s member was a Franciscan from another Province, and, more importantly, given that the Franciscans’ Provincial Minister had to approve the report before it was released to the public.

9. As the Sedgwick firm in Allen continued aggressively to press the Franciscan strategy of narrowing the focus of each lawsuit and the scope of discovery to one perpetrator and one victim, our investigation in Allen was revealing a shocking pattern of conduct by Franciscans with regards to their managing Franciscan perpetrators for whom they had received notice were sexually abusing Santa Barbara children.

As a result of the growing body of evidence of the Franciscans’ deadly approach to managing Franciscan perpetrators, and in response to the Sedgwick firm’s continuing efforts to narrow the scope of discovery, the lead trial attorneys for the plaintiff tasked myself and another associate with researching theories of liability to counter the Franciscans’ defense strategy.

10. After substantial legal research it became clear to us the Public Nuisance cause of action was the ideal theory to respond to the Franciscans’ narrowing strategy. Consequently, we sought leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint alleging the Public Nuisance cause of action in Allen in 2000. Since that date, every complaint we have filed against the Franciscans has included the Public Nuisance cause of action. At the time I drafted the Public Nuisance cause of action, there was no Hightower opinion, nor was there any concern over the statute of limitations for the plaintiff in Allen. The Franciscans’ contention the Public Nuisance cause of action was Acreatively added@ Ato plead around the >Hightower= bar@ is patently false.

However, I do not believe this misstatement was an intentional effort by Tobin & Tobin to mislead the Court. This is not our first case with their firm, and we have always known them to be honest and highly skilled clergy abuse defense attorneys. That said, to my knowledge, they have never represented the Franciscans prior to this lawsuit, and presumably are unaware that NPSH first began alleging the Franciscans’ conduct constituted a continuing Public Nuisance six years before the Hightower opinion was published.

11. To my knowledge, no court has ever issued an order addressing the viability of the Public Nuisance cause of action against the Franciscans. Shortly after the Fourth Amended Complaint was filed in Allen in 2000, the Franciscans settled that lawsuit before the Santa Barbara court could rule on their demurrer to the Public Nuisance cause of action. Since then, the Franciscans have settled fourteen more claims on behalf of plaintiffs represented by NPSH, all resolved before any court addressed the Public Nuisance cause of action.

12. Three lawsuits on behalf of five plaintiffs represented by NPSH were part of the first group of cases released in this coordinated proceeding. Each complaint alleged Public Nuisance. However, all five of those claims settled and were dismissed long before Judge Fromholz ruled on the Omnibus Demurrers. As a result, the court order on the Omnibus Demurrers does not consider or even mention the Public Nuisance cause of action.

13. After nearly eleven years of almost uninterrupted investigation and discovery against the Franciscans we have identified no less than twenty-five (25) Franciscan perpetrators assigned or in residence in Santa Barbara since 1936, and sixty (60) Santa Barbara children who have been sexually assaulted by these men. Twenty-four (24) of those Franciscan perpetrators and fifty-nine (59) of those victims have been in Santa Barbara post -1964.

14. At the start of this coordinated proceeding in 2003, three of the four law firms representing eleven (11) of the twenty-five survivors (25) of Franciscan sexual abuse were located in the counties of Los Angeles and Orange. Those three law firms filed lawsuits against the Franciscans in Los Angeles. A number of the twenty-five survivors of Franciscan sexual abuse also lived in the counties of Los Angeles and Orange. And defense counsel for the Franciscans, Lewis Brisbois, were located in downtown Los Angeles. All of those twenty-five claims were part of the 2006 global settlement involving the Franciscans.

15. To my knowledge this is the only currently pending Franciscan lawsuit in California. Plaintiff Mary Jones lives in Northern California in Fairfax. Defendant Old Mission is located in Santa Barbara, with its agent for service of process in Oakland, CA. Defendant Franciscans’ corporate offices are located in Oakland. Tobin & Tobin are located in San Francisco. NPSH is located in Santa Barbara. And most if not all of the key witnesses of which I am aware are located in Santa Barbara or Northern California. In fact, out of the twenty-eight (28) depositions taken in Franciscan cases in the coordinated proceedings, only four (4) took place in Los Angeles, with the vast majority going forward in and/or far north of Santa Barbara.

16. Settlement is much less likely to occur if this case is litigated in Los Angeles rather than in Santa Barbara. The parties have already discussed mediation. The Franciscans proposed and plaintiff agreed to mediation dates. Plaintiff even agreed to mediate before, among others, the Honorable Ronald Sabraw, the coordination/trial court judge who presided over Hightower. However, the Franciscans appear to have lost interest in mediation. Adding this case to a coordination proceeding where there are no other Franciscan lawsuits pending will not increase the likelihood of settlement without further litigation.

In fact, it likely will decrease the likelihood of settlement. Transferring this case out of Santa Barbara to Los Angeles, a community with a comparably far smaller interest in the Franciscans’ conduct, plays into the Franciscan corporate practice of secrecy by keeping the communities who most need to know in the dark, and will do nothing to enhance the likelihood of settlement. If anything, it will encourage the Franciscans to believe they have once again flown under the radar and will not be held accountable for their conduct in the community where so many of these crimes have been committed. The determination of whether this conduct constitutes a Public Nuisance should be made by a trier of fact from the community in which the conduct occurred.

17. Survivors in clergy abuse cases in Northern and Central California are not being deprived of their right to have their lawsuits heard in the communities where the crimes were committed or covered up. Doe v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton et al., Case No. C057895 was filed in Stockton and is currently pending before the Third District Court of Appeal on statute of limitations issues shared by many of the currently coordinated lawsuits. Similarly, Dengler v. Doe 1, Case No. A116907 was filed in Sonoma and was decided last year by the First Appellate District. And Neff v. Doe 1 et al., involving NPSH and Tobin & Tobin, is one of a number clergy abuse cases of which I am aware that currently are pending in Northern and Central California trial courts.

18. The Santa Barbara Superior Court has presided over Franciscan litigation, such as Allen, in the past, and is just as capable as the courts in Northern and Central California of applying the caselaw produced by the coordinated proceeding.

19. As a result of discovery conducted to date, I am aware of numerous Franciscan witnesses with critical information who are aged and infirm, and whose testimony is at risk to be lost with each passing day. For instance, Br. Sam Cabot, the likely perpetrator in this case, has had open-heart surgery in recent years and is known to be in poor health. The Provincial Ministers who are responsible for this pattern of conduct are all, with one possible exception, in their late 60s, 70s, and in some cases, 80s. As a result, plaintiff will be highly prejudiced by a stay of discovery.

I declare under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct, and that this declaration was executed on this 19th day of September 2008, at Santa Barbara, California.

TIMOTHY C. HALE